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 Work requirements implemented through welfare reform have led to a focus on 
moving mothers into employment. As a consequence, the labor force participation rates 
of single mothers have increased dramatically in the last decade, increasing the 
importance of child care policies.   
 Although numerous studies have examined the impact of child care subsidies in 
assisting parents to obtain employment, very few have examined the impact of subsidies 
on maintaining employment.  This study sought to determine whether families with a 
child care subsidy differed from families without a subsidy on three child care-specific 
variables assumed to affect a mother’s ability to maintain employment: child care 
problems, child care-related work disruptions, and a desire to switch care arrangements.  
The mediating roles of child care costs and type of care on the relationships between 
child care subsidies and these variables were also examined. 
 Data for this study come from two samples of low-income single mothers. The 
first was a study of 40 mothers in a mid-Atlantic county interviewed before and after 
receiving a child care subsidy.  The second was a subsample of 658 mothers from the 
  
Fragile Families and Child Well-Being study.  Data were analyzed via multivariate 
techniques and path models on both static and dynamic models, including comparing 
changes by the same parents over time. 
 Receipt of a child care subsidy was found to be a significant predictor of 
experiencing fewer child care problems and child care-related work disruptions across 
datasets and using multiple methods.  Parents were also less likely to report desiring to 
switch their care arrangement when they had a child care subsidy compared to when they 
did not have a subsidy. Finally, the use of formal child care was found to mediate the 
relationship between child care subsidy status and child care-related work disruptions for 
parents in one of the samples.  Policy and program recommendations for assisting low-
income families balance work and family by minimizing experiences with child care-
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Increasing labor force participation rates among mothers in the U.S. highlight the 
growing need of families to balance work and family.  For women with children under 
six, the labor participation rate has been rising steadily since the 1970s (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2006).  In the mid-1990s the demography of mothers in the labor force changed.  
Until this point, compared to single mothers, a greater percentage of married mothers 
were in the labor force.  Around 1995, single mothers surpassed married mothers in labor 
force participation (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006).  This shift was especially pronounced 
among mothers of children under the age of six.  As of 2004, among mothers with 
children under six, 68% of single mothers were in the labor force compared to 59% of 
married mothers (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006).   
 The trends noted above can be credited to a number of changes in America’s 
economy, philosophy, policy, and household structure.  First, America’s economy has 
affected women’s labor force participation rate.  This is due in large part to the 
globalization of traditionally male dominated manufacturing jobs and the consequent 
shift in American jobs from the manufacturing to service industry (Gornick & Meyers, 
2003).  Second, American philosophy regarding women in the workplace has changed 
dramatically.  World War II brought with it the first invitation to the workforce for most 
women.  Since the Second World War, women became more accepted into the labor 
force, increased their education, and consequently found more opportunities for 
employment (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). Third, with the passage of the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which changed welfare from a 
system of entitlement to employment-based assistance, American policy has limited 
impoverished and low-income mothers’ choices about employment during their 
1 
children’s formative years.  This policy shift is temporally associated with large increases 
in labor force participation among single mothers.   
Balancing Work and Family 
 All families with an employed member must to some degree balance work and 
family responsibilities.  This struggle to manage home and work is most salient for 
families with children (Glass & Estes, 1997; Wohl, 1997).  Families with children are 
faced with negotiating work demands, responding to children’s needs, keeping up with 
household work, and, for some, caring for elderly/aging parents.  Attempts at balancing 
these demands can lead to costly consequences for parents, including: stress and mental 
health symptoms, decreased productivity, absenteeism/ tardiness at work, limited career 
advancement/wages, and job terminations (Dodson & Bravo, 2005; Dwyer, 2004; 
Galinsky & Stein, 2003; Glass & Estes, 1997; Golden & Wiens-Tuers, 2006; Hart & 
Kelley, 2006; Lechner & Creedon, 1994; Parasuraman & Greenhaus, 1997; Press, Fagan, 
& Bernd, 2006; Saltzstein, Ting & Saltzstein, 2001)  
Role of Child Care in Work/Family Balance 
 Non-parental child care plays a major role in the work-family balance of dual-
earner and single parent households. According to the National Survey of American 
Families data, 75% of children under five with employed mothers were in non-parental 
child care in 2002 (Cappizzano & Adams, 2000).  The number of hours a child spends in 
care varies with a significant proportion of children under five being in care full time.  
For example, in 2002, among children under five with working mothers, 41% were in 
care 35 or more hours per week (52% when examining only children whose mothers 
worked full time) (Cappizzano & Adams, 2000).   
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Work Family Balance and Economic Self-Sufficiency among Low-Income Single Parent 
Families 
 Successfully balancing work and family demands is difficult for low-income 
single parents.  An inability to balance work and family demands has been associated 
with poor work and family outcomes such as decreased productivity, tardiness or missed 
days at work, entrapment in low-paying jobs, job probation/termination, debt, unstable 
child care arrangements, and, in extreme cases, welfare dependence, bankruptcy, and 
child endangerment (Dodson & Bravo, 2005; Dwyer, 2004; Galinsky & Stein, 2003; 
Glass & Estes, 1997; Lechner & Creedon, 1994; Parasuraman & Greenhaus, 1997; Press, 
2003; Saltzstein et al., 2001). 
Influences of Work/Family Balance on Low-Income Families 
 Several factors affect low-income1 single parents’ ability to balance work and 
family.  First, fiscal constraints restrict families’ ability to access services that facilitate 
the work/family balance.  Second, low-income single parents are restricted in the type of 
work they do and the number of hours they work.  These restrictions stem from parents’ 
lack of education or job skills, economic necessity, and work-based assistance programs, 
such as welfare reform and child care subsidies that require parents work at least a 
prescribed number of hours in order to receive assistance.  Third, low-income single 
parents, especially those with few skills or little education, are less likely to be offered 
the flexibility and family-friendly work policies offered to individuals in management 
and professional positions (Glass & Estes, 1997; Heymann, 2005; Hofferth, 2000; 
Saltzstein et al., 2001).   
                                                 
1 Low-income families are generally defined as those under 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL), 
though the study analyses will include families up to 311% of the FPL. 
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 Low-income single parent families are unique in that they are more likely than 
higher-income families to face multiple hardships that interfere with meeting work and 
family demands (Boushey, Brocht, Gundersen, & Bernstein, 2001).  Using national 
datasets, Boushey et al. found 74% of low-income families experienced at least one 
serious hardship (i.e. being unable to make housing or utility payments, lacking health 
insurance, or having inadequate child care) in the last year.  Additionally, Boushey et al. 
found 87% of all families who could not afford necessities for meeting work/family 
demands were under 200% of the federal poverty level.   
 Families who are unable to afford necessities for family living are likely to face 
difficult choices.  First, parents may be forced to prioritize and choose among competing 
family and employment needs.  For example, a single mother may choose to pay for high 
quality child care and sacrifice having a car.  Although this choice may improve the 
mother’s peace of mind regarding her child, it could limit her employment options and, 
depending on the availability of jobs, her earnings potential.  Second, parents may choose 
to lower their standards regarding services or products.  For example, a parent might 
choose to purchase less nutritious foods, less safe housing, or a lower quality child care 
arrangement than would be chosen if cost were not an issue.  Third, parents with limited 
assets may choose to go into debt using credit cards, borrowing money, or failing to pay 
bills.   
Child Care and Economic Self-Sufficiency 
 Among employed single parents, child care is essential for managing work/family 
issues.  Unfortunately, for low-income single parent families without child care subsidies, 
child care can absorb a high proportion of the family budget (Anderson & Levine, 1999; 
4 
Brayfield & Hofferth, 1995; Hofferth, 1999; U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services [USDHHS], 1999).  Although the absolute cost of child care tends to be higher 
among middle- and upper-income families, the relative cost of child care, measured as a 
percentage of family income, is higher among impoverished and low-income families 
(Anderson & Levine, 1999; Brayfield & Hofferth, 1995; Hofferth, 1999; USDHHS, 
1999).  In 1999, employed mothers who paid for child care and were under the federal 
poverty threshold with children under five spent 34% of their monthly income on child 
care compared to 7% paid by higher income families (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005).  
Impact of Unreliable/Low-Quality/Unstable Care on Employment 
 Low-income working parents struggling to achieve/maintain economic self-
sufficiency often choose less expensive child care options that are low-quality, unreliable, 
or unstable (Knox, London, Scott, & Blank, 2003).  Ironically, these choices can result in 
child care-related work problems that negatively impact parents’ ability to maintain 
employment.  Press (2003) found that two-thirds of her low-income sample of 
Philadelphia mothers had child care-related work problems including absenteeism, 
tardiness, an inability to be productive, and an inability to take a job/participate in school 
in the last year.  These child care-related work problems were associated with lost wages, 
lost jobs, and limited career opportunities (Press, 2003).   
 Absenteeism is one consequence of child care problems.2  In Schumacher and 
Greenberg’s (1999) analysis of welfare leaver data, 22% of study participants in Florida 
reported missing work in the last month because of a child care problem.  Additionally, 
                                                 
2 Child care problems refer to episodes in which providers are unable to provide care without notice and 
other child care specific situations that arise, negatively affecting a parents’ ability to work. 
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Press (2003) found that 47% of the mothers in her sample reported being absent from 
work with some regularity in the last year because of child care problems. 
 Tardiness and being unproductive at work have also been tied to child care 
problems.  Interviews with low-income working parents and employers revealed that both 
agree that parents too often have to leave work early because of child care problems 
(Dodson & Bravo, 2005).  Likewise, parents report arriving to work late because of child 
care problems.  In one study, one-third of a sample of low-income mothers reported being 
late to work because of child care and one-fifth reported being late at least once a month 
(Press, 2003).  Parents also reported problems with child care lead to depression, anxiety, 
conflicts at work, personal calls during work hours, an inability to be productive, and 
consequent work sanctions (Dodson & Bravo, 2005; Fernandez, 1986; Press, 2003; Press, 
Fagan, & Laughlin, 2006).  Managers recognize the impact of child care problems on 
work performance.  One study of management and crafts workers at five manufacturing 
plants revealed 67% of managers viewed child care problems as leading to distraction 
and unproductive usage of employee time (Fernandez, 1986).  Each of the consequences 
of child care problems described above may not, in and of itself, lead to job termination.  
However, strong relationships between absenteeism/tardiness/ unproductivity and job 
termination have been established in the literature (Dodson, 2006; Holzer, 1999; Holzer, 
Stoll, & Wissoker, 2001). 
Government Programs and the Work/Family Balance 
To assist low-income families in their quest for economic self-sufficiency, a 
number of government programs have been developed3. A requirement for obtaining 
                                                 
3 Though a plethora of programs/policies designed to support families in achieving economic self-
sufficiency by facilitating work-family balance, supporting the health and development of children, and 
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services for many programs is that parents maintain employment or engage in 
employment-related activities.  Thus, these programs mandate that parents meet both 
family and employment demands in order to be eligible for support services.  Replacing 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996 created Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families (TANF) to temporarily support impoverished parents in finding and maintaining 
employment through services such as cash assistance, job training, job placement, and 
child care.  The TANF program requires that single parents maintain employment or 
involvement in work-related activities thirty hours per week and subsidizes the cost of 
child care.  The Child Care Development Fund (CCDF), developed in 1996 by combining 
the Child Care Development Block Grant, At-Risk Child Care program, and Transitional 
Child Care program (Cohen, 1996), offers low-income parents child care subsidies in the 
form of vouchers or direct payment to providers with the goals of making the financial 
burden of child care manageable and minimizing the role of child care as a barrier to 
work as families transition off TANF.  In order to be eligible for CCDF subsidies, single 
parents must be employed or in school, though the minimum number of hours per week 
varies by state. Tax programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the 
Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) have been developed to lessen employed 
low-income parents’ tax burdens and in some cases provide a tax refund.  Both the EITC 
and the CDCTC are designed to assist only individuals/couples who are employed. 
 It is worthy to mention that despite the availability of these programs to many 
needy families only two programs listed above offer a useful benefit that is universally 
                                                                                                                                                 
providing families with financial support, job training/placement, and other services are available, only a 
select few are mentioned here. 
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available to eligible low-income families without time restrictions.  These programs are 
the EITC and CCDF subsidies at the federal and state level.   TANF, the current welfare 
program, has a five year lifetime time limit on cash assistance and services and the 
CDCTC, although universally available, does not provide effective assistance to families 
with little or no tax liability because it is not refundable (Forry & Anderson, 2006).   
Examination of Child Care Subsidies 
 Numerous studies have explored the impact of child care subsidies on parents’ 
propensity to work (Averett, Peters & Waldman, 1997; Bainbridge, Meyers & Waldfogel, 
2003; Berger & Black, 1992; Blau & Tekin, 2003; Henry, Werschkul & Rao, 2003; Lee 
et al, 2004; Lemke, Witte, Quaralt & Witt, 2000; Meyers, Heintze & Wolf, 2002; Tekin, 
2004; U.S. General Accounting Office [USGAO], 1994).  These researchers have studied 
the association between child care subsidies and employment with various samples of 
low-income mothers and found employment to be more probable among mothers 
receiving a child care subsidy than mothers not receiving a subsidy (Anderson & Levine, 
1999; Bainbridge et al., 2003; Berger & Black, 1992; Blau & Tekin, 2003; Brooks, 
Reisler, Hamilton & Nackerud, 2002; Michalopoulos & Robins, 2002; Tekin, 2004, 
2005; USDHHS, 1999; USGAO, 1994).  
 Few studies, however, have focused on the impact of child care subsidies on 
parents’ ability to maintain employment.  As low-income mothers have little choice 
regarding whether they will work, research on the impact of child care subsidies on 
facilitating behaviors that maximize a parents’ ability to maintain employment (i.e. 
arriving to work on time, avoiding absenteeism, and working productively) is warranted.  
Based on the literature and theoretical underpinnings of rational choice, it is logical to 
8 
assume that child care subsidies may impact low-income parents’ ability to maintain 
work.  Research supporting a relationship between child care subsidies and employment 
has suggested that parents who are not able to afford child care may be limited in their 
employment opportunities (Averett et al., 1997; Bainbridge et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2004; 
Lemke et al., 2000; Meyers et al., 2002).  Child care subsidies may facilitate not only an 
ability to afford child care, but an ability to afford reliable, satisfactory child care, both of 
which are associated with parents’ ability to avoid absenteeism and work productively 
and ultimately parents’ ability to maintain their jobs (Chaudry, 2004; Dodson, 2006; 
Fernandez, 1996;  Henly & Lyons, 2000; Hofferth, 1996; Holzer, 1999; Holzer et al., 
2001; Kisker & Silverberg, 1991; Press, 2003; Press, Fagan, & Laughlin, 2006). 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, with increasing numbers of low-income single mothers joining the 
labor force, the work/family balance is becoming more precarious.  This struggle is 
especially difficult for low-income families who lack fiscal resources.  Research on the 
effect of child care subsidies on parents’ ability to maintain employment could further the 
field of family studies by providing insight into parents’ preferences for child care, 
barriers to selecting preferred care, and how policies/programs can facilitate economic 
self-sufficiency by improving parents’ ability to work reliably and efficiently.  Such 
information could be helpful both for understanding families and for improving upon and 
developing new policies and programs for low-income families. 
Introduction to Study 
 This study explored the impact of child care subsidies on parents’ experiences of 
child care problems and child care-related work disruptions, as well as their desire to 
9 
switch child care arrangements (a proxy for parents’ dissatisfaction with care).  Each of 
these dependent variables were chosen because of their potential influence on parents’ 
abilities to be consistent and productive employees and ultimately to maintain steady 
employment.  Specifically, this study examined whether child care subsidies reduced 
parents’ experiences of child care problems and child care-related work disruptions, as 
well as their desire to switch child care arrangements.  This study also examined whether 
the relationships between child care subsidy status and child care problems, child care 
related work disruptions, and desire to switch care were mediated by the financial burden 
of child care (per child)4, perceived affordability of formal care, and type of care chosen 
(formal v. informal) (See Figure 1 for Conceptual Model).   
                                                 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
Introduction of Variables 
 In this section, each of the variables in the conceptual model (see Figure 1) of this 
study are defined.  Child care subsidy, the independent variable for this study, refers to 
monetary subsidies provided through the government or a county-funded program either 
directly to a low-income family or to the family’s child care provider.  These subsidies 
cover a portion of one/more child(ren)’s child care expenses, leaving the family with a 
co-pay.   
 There are three main dependent variables in this study: child care problems, child 
care-related work disruptions and desire to switch child care arrangements.  Child care 
problems are defined as events in which the child care provider is unexpectedly 
unavailable to care for a child, thus forcing the parent to find alternative child care 
arrangements.  Child care-related work disruptions refer to events in which the 
unreliability of a child care provider results in the parent having to miss a day at work, be 
late for work or leave work early, change work hours, take their child to work with them, 
leave their child with an alternative child care arrangement, or leave their child home 
alone.  Desire to switch child care arrangements refers to parents’ hypothetical choice to 
switch child care arrangements assuming no financial constraints. 
 Three variables, financial burden of child care (per child), perceived affordability 
of formal care, and type of care, are hypothesized to mediate the relationships between 
child care subsidy status and the dependent variables5.  Financial burden of child care per 
                                                 
5 A fourth proposed mediator, perceived availability of formal care (i.e. was formal care able to be found, 
accessed, and of adequate quality to use), was included in the proposal of this study.  This variable was 
found to have limited variance (almost all parents perceived formal care to be available) and it had a 
12 
child refers to the ratio of families’ out-of-pocket child care expenses per child to the 
household income.  Perceived affordability of formal care refers to a parent’s perception 
that formal6 child care providers are an economically feasible choice.  Finally, type of 
care refers to the type of provider (formal/informal) that a parent is using. 
   This study includes eleven control variables7.  These variables are defined as 
follows.  The age of the focal child is defined differently in analyses with Wait List 
versus Fragile Families data.  In the Wait List study, child’s age is defined as age in 
years.  In the Fragile Families study, the focal child age variable indicates which wave 
the data on this child was collected (wave one follow-up, children were approximately 
one year old, wave three follow-up, children were approximately three years old).  
Number of children aged 13 or under in care refers to the number of children related to 
the participant who were living in the household, aged 13 years or younger, and in non-
parental/sibling/self child care.  Number of adults in the household refers to the number 
of persons over the age of 18 on the household roster in addition to the study participant.  
Household income refers to the gross income from all members of the household.  
Maternal race refers to the mother’s self-identified race and is broken into three 
categories: Hispanic, Black, and Non-Black, Non-Hispanic.  Maternal education refers to 
the highest degree of education achieved by the mother at the time of data collection.  It 
                                                                                                                                                 
multicollinear relationship with other variables in the conceptual model.  For these reasons, this variable 
was omitted from multivariate analyses. 
 
6 Formal child care arrangements include: child care centers, family day care providers, pre-kindergarten 
programs, before and after school programs.  Informal care includes care provided by friends or family 
members of the child’s parent/caregiver. 
 
7 Type of child care subsidy was included in the proposal for this study and was subsequently omitted when 
analyses revealed no significant difference between child care subsidy programs on the dependent 
variables.  Likewise, some controls were omitted from the Wait List study analyses due to lack of 
significant effects and the sample size. 
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is also broken into three categories: less than high school, high school degree/GED/ 
vocational degree, and associates/bachelors degree.  Maternal work hours is a continuous 
measure of work hours per week.  It serves as an exogenous proxy for hours in child care.  
Mother in school is a dummy variable indicating whether the mother was in school or 
not.  Work during non-traditional hours indicates whether the mother worked during 
evenings/nights (6 p.m. to 7 a.m.) or weekends.  Maternal depressive symptoms is a 
dichotomous variable that indicates the mother either met the criteria for a Major 
Depressive Episode8 in the year prior to data collection or was currently taking 
medication to treat depression. Use of multiple child care arrangements is an indicator as 
to whether more than one child care arrangement was used for the focal child.  Finally, 
help paying for care from sources other than the governmental child care subsidy is a 
binary variable that signifies whether the mother received help from any of the following 
sources in paying for child care: non-residential father, relative, employer/foundation, 
child care provider, Head Start, community organization, or other source. 
Theoretical Framework 
 The economically-based rational choice theory provides the theoretical foundation 
for this study.  According to rational choice theory, individuals make decisions based on 
a rational evaluation of how they may maximize their satisfaction or utility and minimize 
their costs (White & Klein, 2002). Important concepts from rational choice theory 
include: constraints, utility maximization, costs, and rational choice.   
 Constraints refer to contextual factors that limit an individual’s choices (White & 
Klein, 2002).  Two frequently cited constraints are time and money.  Constraints are 
                                                 
8 Survey questions and coding instructions for this variable comes from the Composite International 
Diagnostic Interview (CIDI). 
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especially pertinent in this study because of the limited incomes of the study population.  
For example, one assumption of the proposed study is that low-income parents are 
frequently limited in their child care choices because of an inability to afford certain 
types of care.  Additionally, characteristics of children (i.e. behavior problems, 
disabilities, or health issues) can constrain parents’ child care choices.9 
 The second important concept from rational choice theory is utility maximization.  
Utility refers to benefits individuals receive from a choice or action (White & Klein, 
2002).  In the economic literature, utility primarily refers to financial gain. However, the 
experience of positive emotions, or any other obtained good or resource that is in line 
with one’s values, may also be considered sources of utility.  In the case of the current 
study, utility might refer to the income received from working or the peace of mind 
parents experience when using a trustworthy child care provider.   
 Costs are the opposite of utility.  Costs refer to what one must sacrifice in order to 
gain some utility (White & Klein, 2002).  Costs may take the form of money, time, or 
emotional/physical energy expenditures.  Examples of costs relevant to the current study 
are the financial sacrifice of paying for child care and the emotional turmoil a parent 
might experience when using a child care arrangement with which he/she does not feel 
comfortable.   
 The final concept of rational choice theory important to this study is the act of 
choice.  The act of choice refers to the idea that humans choose actions based on a 
rational evaluation of the involved costs, benefits, and constraints.  This rational 
evaluation may be based on logical thought or emotion-based values and preferences. For 
example, a parent may choose a provider based on the provider’s distance from the 
                                                 
9 Characteristics of children are not controlled for in this study due to data and sample size limitations. 
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parent’s home (logical) or her feelings that the provider will love and care for her 
children (emotional). 
 Two limitations of rational choice theory in explaining parents’ choices involve a 
lack of information.  First, information necessary for predicting whether one will obtain 
the utility they are seeking may not be available (Kahneman & Thaler, 2006).  For 
example, the parent may not know if a provider is reliable until she experiences a child 
care problem.  Second, information on alternative choices and how they impact one’s 
choices is often not available (Kahneman & Thaler, 2006).  For example, what other 
child care providers the parent perceives as available will likely affect the parent’s choice 
of a provider.   
Theoretical Basis for Path Model 
 In this section, the paths of the conceptual model (see Figure 1) are theoretically 
justified. The first path in the model is a direct relationship between child care subsidy 
status and each of the dependent variables: child care problems, child care-related work 
disruptions and desire to switch child care arrangements.  Theoretically, receiving a child 
care subsidy is assumed to be a utility-enhancing resource that decreases the cost of child 
care.  Parents with this resource were hypothesized to experience fewer child care 
problems/child care-related work disruptions and be less likely to desire switching their 
child care (a proxy for child care dissatisfaction)10 compared to parents without a child 
care subsidy.  This hypothesis is theoretically justified because the fiscal utility of a child 
                                                 
10 As is discussed further in the literature review, desire to switch care is a proxy for child care 
dissatisfaction due to findings that dissatisfaction with child care is not a reliable measure (Hofferth, 
Brayfield, Diech, & Holcomb, 1991). 
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care subsidy is assumed to decrease the financial constraint of care, thereby allowing 
parents to choose more reliable and desirable child care.11 
 The second path in the model is between child care subsidies and financial 
burden/perceived affordability of formal care.  It makes intuitive sense that the receipt of 
a government child care subsidy, a voucher or direct payment provided to a parent or 
child care provider in order to lessen the out-of-pocket cost of child care for a family, 
would have an impact on both the families’ financial burden related to child care and 
their perception of the affordability of formal child care arrangements.  This path in the 
model is based on the assumption that many low-income parents without child care 
subsidies are constrained in their child care choices by their limited financial resources 
and that child care subsidies help alleviate this constraint.  Because child care subsidies 
lessen parents’ out-of-pocket payments for child care, it was hypothesized that the receipt 
of a child care subsidy would be associated with a decrease in the financial burden of 
child care (out-of-pocket cost of care: income ratio) and an increase in the likelihood of 
perceiving formal child care arrangements as affordable.  In theoretical terms, it was 
assumed that the receipt of a subsidy would result in an increase of fiscal utility for 
families. 
 Financial burden/perceived affordability of formal care is also linked directly to 
the dependent variables of child care problems, child care-related work disruptions, and 
desire to switch child care arrangements.  These links were included based on the 
                                                 
11 An assumption is made in this paragraph that formal care, which is often more expensive than informal 
care, is more reliable/desirable than informal care.  This assumption is based on literature (Henly & Lyons, 
2000; Hofferth, 1996; Hofferth & Wissoker, 1991; Kisker & Silverberg, 1991; Knox et al., 2003; Wolfe & 
Scrinver, 2004), but may not hold for all parents, especially parents of young infants/young toddlers who 
are more likely to prefer informal care (Burchinal & Nelson, 2000; Hofferth & Wissoker, 1991; Huston, 
Chang, & Gennetian, 2002; Mulligan, Brimall, West, & Chapman., 2005; Uttal, 2002).   
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concepts of constraints and utility from rational choice theory.  It is assumed that a parent 
with minimal fiscal constraints, in this case one who did not spend a high proportion of 
her income on child care or who perceived she could afford formal child care providers, 
would choose a provider with whom she was satisfied and who would minimize her 
experiences of child care problems and child care-related work disruptions.12  This 
assumption is justified theoretically because using a reliable child care provider and/or 
one who is perceived as satisfactory maximizes utility for a parent by minimizing her 
need to take time off work to deal with child care problems/child care-related work 
disruptions (which could ultimately affect her productivity, wages, and career 
advancement opportunities) and maximizing her peace of mind regarding child care. The 
link described in this paragraph also allowed for an examination of the relationships 
between child care subsidies and child care problems, child care-related work disruptions, 
and desire to switch care as mediated by financial burden/perceived affordability of 
formal care. 
 The next path in the model is between the financial burden of care/perceived 
affordability of formal care and the type of child care (formal or informal)13 chosen.  
When considering financial burden, the assumption in this path is that parents spending a 
higher proportion of their income on child care are more likely using formal care than 
informal care compared to parents spending a lower proportion of their income on child 
care.  This is assumed because formal care tends to be more expensive than informal care 
(Mulligan et al., 2005).  Constraint may play a role in this relationship as parents who do 
                                                 
12 This assumption does not consider parent’s other preferences for child care. 
13 Formal arrangements include: child care centers, family day care providers, pre-kindergarten programs, 
before and after school programs.  Informal care includes care provided by friends or family members of 
the child’s parent/caregiver. 
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not have access to lower cost informal care have no choice but to pay a relatively high 
proportion of their income on formal care.  Likewise, it is assumed that parents who 
perceive formal care to be affordable are more likely to use formal care than parents who 
perceive formal care to be unaffordable.  This path highlights the role of fiscal constraints 
on child care choice.  The paths between financial burden of care/perceived affordability 
of formal care and type of care also allowed for examination of the relationship between 
child care subsidy status and type of care (as mediated by financial burden/perceived 
affordability of formal care).   
 In addition to the indirect relationship by which subsidy predicts what type of 
child care parents will use (formal vs. informal) through financial burden/perceived 
affordability of formal care, it was hypothesized that receiving a child care subsidy would 
also have a direct influence on parents’ use of formal care.  This path was hypothesized 
due to presence of constraints on parental child care choices from regulations in the 
subsidy program that prohibit most informal providers from receiving child care 
subsidies.  Thus, since parents who receive a child care subsidy may not be able to pay 
informal providers with their subsidy, it was hypothesized that they would instead choose 
formal providers who can accept the subsidy. This path also allowed for examination of 
the relationship between child care subsidies and the dependent variables as mediated by 
type of care. 
 The paths between type of care (formal/informal) and child care problems, child 
care-related work disruptions, and desire to switch care are next in the model.  These 
paths were included based on the literature and the potential contribution of findings 
regarding these relationships for program and policy implications.  The concept of utility 
19 
from rational choice theory can be applied to this path as formal child care providers 
might be more invested in (and gain more utlity from) their business than informal 
providers, who are often paid little and provide care to help out a friend/family member 
or to fill a gap in employment.  Assuming this investment hypothesis is true, as events 
occur in the life of a provider (for example, illness or job opportunities), informal 
providers (as compared to formal providers) may experience greater utility from 
prioritizing things other than providing child care and their choice to discontinue or 
temporarily be unavailable to provide child care may more adversely affect parents since 
the provider may be the only person “on staff”.  The path between type of care and child 
care problems, child care-related work disruptions, and desire to switch care also allowed 
for examination of the relationship between child care subsidies and the dependent 
variables as mediated by type of care. 
 The final relationship explored in the model is between child care problems and 
child care-related work disruptions.  Intuitively, one would assume a high correlation 
between child care problems and child care-related work disturbances.  However, the 
prevalence of child care-related work disruptions may differ from the prevalence of child 
care problems experienced based on the characteristics and resources available to 
families.  For example, some parents may have resources (sources of utility) that allow 
them to find alternative arrangements when child care problems occur.  Others may face 
constraints (i.e. not having access to a phone), which could limit their ability to avoid 
child care-related work disturbances when child care problems arise.  Thus, this path 
sheds light on the impact of resources/family characteristics on parents’ ability to cope 
with child care problems. 
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 Other variables thought to affect the relationships in this conceptual model  
include number of adults in the household, number of children aged thirteen or under in 
care, age of the focal child, household income, maternal race, education and work hours, 
whether the mother was in school, worked non-traditional hours, or had depressive 
symptoms, whether multiple child care arrangements were used, and whether help in 
paying for child care was received from sources other than the government child care 
subsidy.  Three of these variables, mother’s race, mother’s education, and child’s age are 
assumed to affect parents’ preferences regarding child care providers.  Three variables, 
household income, number of children aged thirteen or under in care and whether the 
mother works non-traditional hours, are assumed to constrain parents’ choices regarding 
child care providers.  And two variables, number of adults in the household and whether 
help in paying for child care was received from sources other than the governmental child 
care subsidy are assumed to be potential sources of utility for parents.  The other control 
variables are included due to their potential associations with the dependent variables. 
Current State of Knowledge  
 Next, a review of empirical findings regarding each of the variables in this study 
is presented.  In this section, empirical evidence of the relationship between the 
dependent variables (child care problems, child care-related work disruptions, and 
parents’ desire to switch care) and parents’ ability to maintain employment is reviewed.  
Next, literature on the effects of child care subsidies on child care problems, child care-
related work disruptions, and parents’ desire to switch care is presented.  Finally, a 
review of literature on each of the relationships among intermediary and control variables 
in the conceptual model (see Figure 1) is provided.   
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Connecting Child Care Problems, Child Care-Related Work Disruptions, and Parents’ 
Desire to Switch Child Care Arrangements to Parents’ Ability to Maintain Work 
 The literature connecting the dependent variables in this study (child care 
problems, child care-related work disruptions, and parents’ desire to switch care) with 
parents’ ability to maintain work is based mainly on studies of welfare recipients 
transitioning to work and low-income families who are at risk for returning to welfare.  
Chaudry (2004) and Dodson (2006) both interviewed low-income women about their 
ability to balance work and family.  Chaudry followed the same women longitudinally 
and tracked their child care and employment choices.  He found that mothers consistently 
prioritized their children over their work and that many of them left jobs voluntarily or 
were dismissed due to choices they made to ensure their children were safe and happy.  
These choices included leaving jobs when child care arrangements fell through or parents 
deeming the provider inadequate until another suitable provider could be found, making 
calls to check on children during work hours against employers’ policies, and arriving to 
work late/leaving work early to drop-off/pick-up children.   
Dodson’s qualitative analysis of over 300 low-wage women from three studies 
conducted between 1998 and 2003 revealed similar findings. Dodson highlighted parents’ 
perception of having to choose between their children and their work.  She found that 
parents were willingly dismissed from jobs or left jobs themselves if they perceived a 
conflict between the needs of work and family.  She also found many parents in her study 
were sanctioned/dismissed from jobs due to absenteeism and tardiness related to child 
care issues stemming from dissatisfaction with providers and provider unreliability.  
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 Holzer (1999) conducted a survey of 900 employers in Michigan during 1997.  In 
asking employers whether or not they would be willing to hire welfare recipients, Holzer 
found employers to be more concerned with “soft” skills, such as work attitude and 
absenteeism, than basic/skill-based job skills.  Using a sample of 750 employers from 
four metropolitan areas in Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, and California who had hired 
former welfare recipients in the last two years, Holzer et al. (2001) evaluated the job 
performance and retention of the former welfare recipients.  They found that over the 
course of two years, employees without absenteeism due to child care were more than 
two times more likely to have retained their job than employees with absenteeism due to 
child care.  Interestingly, among those employees with child care-related absenteeism 
who had not retained their job, an equal percentage quit and was involuntarily dismissed. 
Finally, Holzer et al. obtained performance ratings on the former welfare recipients, 
ratings that influenced dismissal decisions and served as an indicator of productivity on 
the job.  They found those with child care-related absenteeism were almost five times as 
likely to have had a worse performance rating relative to the other employees at that 
company.  Holzer et al. concluded that absenteeism due to child care significantly 
affected both productivity and job retention. 
 Each of the studies described above has limitations.  Notably, each used urban 
samples that were not nationally representative.  Despite these limitations, the 
consistency of findings from the studies supports the argument that child care problems, 
child care-related work disruptions, and parents’ desire to switch child care arrangements 
all affect parents’ ability to maintain steady employment.  This relationship results from 
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both employers’ choices to dismiss parents who are frequently absent/unproductive and 
parents’ choices to voluntarily leave jobs in order to meet their children’s needs.  
Impact of Child Care Subsidies on Child Care Problems and Child Care-Related Work 
Disruptions 
 Child care problems refer to episodes in which a child care provider is unreliable 
and thus fails to provide child care as expected.  Child care problems affect the stability 
of child care arrangements as well as parents’ ability to be a reliable and productive 
worker (Chaudry, 2004; Dodson & Bravo, 2005; Fernandez, 1986).  Child care-related 
work disruptions refer to disruptions in one’s ability to arrive at work on time, work the 
hours one is scheduled, and be productive while at work.  Research has revealed some 
predictors of child care problems and child care-related work disruptions.  These 
predictors include having limited social capital or income, having no family nearby, using 
informal care, and lacking alternatives to one’s normal child care arrangement (Hofferth, 
1996; Knox et al., 2003; Press, 2003). 
 The relationship between child care subsidies and child care problems/child care-
related work disruptions has been empirically evaluated by a limited number of 
researchers.  Two research teams, Danziger, Ananet, and Browning (2004) and Huston et 
al. (2002), did not find child care subsidies to have an effect on child care-related work 
disruptions.  Using a random sample of women who received welfare in an urban area of 
Michigan, and including families who were and were not receiving a child care subsidy, 
Danziger et al. found that work disruptions did not differ between subsidy and non-
subsidy users, with about half of the sample in each group reporting at least one child 
care-related work disruption in the last year.  Using data from three random assignment 
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demonstration studies in three states, Huston et al. evaluated demonstration projects 
designed to raise the employment rate of low-income parents. In order to establish 
causality, the researchers conducted two interviews 18 months apart and found that 1) 
compared to those who did not report child care-related barriers to employment at 
baseline, those who did report such barriers had more child care problems that interfered 
with work after receiving a subsidy and 2) subsidy use was not a significant predictor of 
child care problems.  These findings are contrary to the hypotheses of this study and may 
be specific to the urban samples or other factors such as the parents’ choices of type of 
child care.  
 Two research teams found that parents who received a child care subsidy were 
less likely to experience child care problems that interfered with work than parents who 
did not receive a subsidy.  Press et al. (2006) conducted interviews with low-income 
mothers residing in Philadelphia who received/applied/were signed up for a child care 
subsidy by their local welfare office in the last month.  Forty-six percent of these mothers 
were receiving a child care subsidy at the time of the study. Using multivariate logistic 
regression models applied to a quasi-experimental design comparing women who were 
eligible and applied for a subsidy to those currently receiving a subsidy, Press et al. found 
that those who received child care subsidies were 21% less likely to experience at least 
one work-hour problem.14 Weinraub, Shlay, Harmon, & Tran (2005) interviewed African 
American low-income parents in Philadelphia and using basic descriptive and 
comparative statistics found those who were receiving a child care subsidy were absent 
from work because of child care problems significantly less often than those who were 
                                                 
14 A work-hour problem refers to a parent changing a work shift/schedule, working fewer hours per week 
than desired, or being unable to work overtime because of child care in the last year. 
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not receiving a child care subsidy.   Both of these studies may have limited 
generalizability, since they were both conducted in one mid-Atlantic city.  Additionally, 
the use of a cross-sectional research design by both studies precludes either from 
concluding a causal relationship between child care subsidies and child care-related work 
problems exists. 
 In conclusion, data on the impact of child care subsidies on child care problems 
and child care-related work disturbances are inconsistent.  One factor that may have 
affected the results of the reviewed studies is the type of care used by parents. Danziger 
et al. (2004) mention that child care subsidies in their study state of Michigan were 
mostly used by parents to pay for in-home care provided by relatives.  This may explain 
why no difference was found between parents who did and did not receive a child care 
subsidy (the type of care purchased was the same for both groups).  Huston et al. (2002) 
lend support to this theory15.  They found that parents from one of their samples reported 
formal care to be associated with fewer child care problems.  Perhaps the most judicious 
conclusion regarding these studies is that more research needs to be conducted on this 
topic, especially research examining the role of child care type as a mediator between 
child care subsidy and child care problems/child care-related work disturbances.   
Impact of Child Care Subsidies on Desire to Switch Care 
 Studies examining parents’ satisfaction with child care are challenged by 
methodological issues.  Studies that have measured satisfaction with child care by asking 
parents to rate their satisfaction on a continuum from very satisfied to very dissatisfied 
have revealed little variation in response with a high percentage of families being 
                                                 
15 No significant differences in type of care were found in the Press et al. (2006) study of families receiving 
and not receiving a subsidy. Thus, this theory is likely not the only explanation for the diverse research 
findings in this section. 
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somewhat or very satisfied (e.g. Hofferth et al., 1991).  In order to obtain a more valid 
response, some studies have asked whether parents desired to switch their child care 
arrangement as a proxy for dissatisfaction with care (Hofferth et al., 1991; Hofferth, 
1995; Kisker & Silverberg, 1991).  Such studies reveal a high proportion of single 
mothers and low income parents to be dissatisfied with their care and a high proportion of 
families using center-based care to be satisfied (Fernandez, 1986; Hofferth, 1995; Kisker 
& Silverberg, 1991; Wolfe & Scrivner, 2004). 
 Similar to the literature on child care subsidies and child care problems/child care-
related work disruptions, findings from studies on the impact of child care subsidies on 
satisfaction with care and parents’ desire to switch child care arrangements are mixed. 
Two research teams found that families who had child care subsidies were no more likely 
to be satisfied with their child care than families who did not have subsidies.  Weinraub 
et al. (2005), who studied low-income African American parents, found no difference 
between parents who were or were not receiving a child care subsidy on parents’ 
dissatisfaction with child care. A power analysis of the Weinraub et al. study revealed an 
inability to detect small effect sizes, thus small differences in dissatisfaction with care 
may have remained undetected in the study.  Contrary to their hypothesis, the Press et al. 
(2006) study of  low-income mothers who were eligible or receiving a child care subsidy 
also revealed no significant difference between families receiving and those not receiving 
subsidies when asked if they would prefer a different child care arrangement.  This 
finding may result from differences among parents who endured the procedures to 
actually receive a child care subsidy versus those who applied and then dropped off the 
administrative roster without receiving a subsidy. In other words, parents who are 
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dissatisfied with their child care may seek out subsidies more persistently in order to gain 
access to more expensive providers than parents who are satisfied with their care.  Thus, 
statistics may fail to detect a difference in satisfaction between parents receiving and not 
receiving subsidies. 
 Three research teams, Berger and Black (1992), Wolfe and Scrivner (2004), and 
Brooks et al. (2002) found child care subsidies to be associated with greater satisfaction 
with child care.  Berger and Black, who conducted phone interviews with unmarried 
women either receiving or on the wait list for a child care subsidy, found that parents 
receiving a subsidy had a significantly higher level of satisfaction with their child care 
arrangements than parents on the wait list for a subsidy. Wolfe and Scrivner conducted a 
two-wave study of parents engaged in the Wisconsin Welfare Evaluation Study.  Using a 
multivariate probit model, they concluded that receiving a child care subsidy for part of 
the year was significantly associated with a desire to change child care arrangements in 
the first wave.  Receiving a child care subsidy for the whole year was not associated with 
a desire to change child care arrangements in either wave. Additional analyses of the 
types of care families used led these authors to conclude that the receipt of a child care 
subsidy (especially for a whole year) lessened the financial constraint of child care for 
low-income families, thus allowing them to choose center-based care, a type of care 
negatively correlated with a desire to switch child care arrangements.  Finally, Brooks et 
al. conducted simple statistical comparisons on data from demographically matched 
working poor parents in Georgia who were either receiving a child care subsidy or on the 
wait list for a subsidy.  They found that those receiving a subsidy were significantly less 
likely to report wanting to change their child care arrangement than those who were not 
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receiving a subsidy.  Both Berger and Black and Brooks et al. analyzed cross-sectional 
data, which precludes one from drawing a causal inference about child care subsidies and 
satisfaction with care.  Wolfe and Scrivner, though analyzing two waves of data, may not 
be generalizable past the study state of Wisconsin. 
 Though results from the studies described above are inconsistent, it is likely that 
child care subsidies are associated with satisfaction with care.  This conclusion is made 
based on the consistency of findings by Berger and Black (1992), Wolfe and Scrivner 
(2004), and Brooks et al. (2002) and on the limitations and availability of alternative 
explanations for the Weinraub et al. (2005) and Press et al. (2006) studies.  There is a 
need for researchers to continue investigating the relationship between child care 
subsidies and satisfaction with care, including type of care as a mediator to further clarify 
the relationship. 
Review of Literature on Intermediary and Control Variables in the Conceptual Model 
 The conceptual model presented in Figure 1 displays a number of variables 
hypothesized to affect the impact of child care subsidies on child care problems, child 
care-related work disruptions and parents’ desire to switch child care arrangements.  In 
this section, literature on the relationships among these variables is reviewed.   
 Subsidy and perceived affordability of formal care/financial burden.  Concern is 
often expressed over the ability of low-income families to access high quality child care 
due to financial constraints and the high cost of the service (Brandon, 1999; Brayfield & 
Hofferth, 1995; Burchinal & Nelson, 2000; Chin & Phillips, 2004).  The last available 
data from the U.S. Census Bureau (2005) reveals families with children under five paid 
on average $94 per week for child care in 1999.  This cost has likely increased in the last 
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eight years and does not accurately reflect the higher cost of care for infants or families 
living in urban areas.  In addition to the high absolute cost of child care, the relative cost 
of care is particularly high for low-income families.  Among such families, a high 
percentage of family income (up to 33.95% according to a recent Census Bureau 
publication) is spent on child care (Anderson & Levine, 1999; Brayfield & Hofferth, 
1995; Hofferth, 1999; U.S. Census Bureau, 2005; USDHHS, 1999).   
 For families using a formal child care provider, receiving a child care subsidy 
decreases both the absolute cost and the relative financial burden of child care (Danziger 
et al., 2004; Weinraub et al., 2005).16  Weinraub et al. (2005) studied African American 
employed parents living in an urban area with children under five, 52% of whom were 
receiving a child care subsidy, and found the absolute cost of child care to be reduced by 
half for parents with a child care subsidy.  In a random sample panel study of women 
who received welfare in an urban Michigan county, Danziger et al. (2004) found that 
child care subsidies reduced the percentage of family income devoted to child care by 
about eight percentage points.  Each of these studies should be generalized with caution 
due to their small sample sizes relative to most nationally representative data and the 
limited geographic representation of the samples.  Additionally, caution should be taken 
in interpreting Weinraub et al.’s study as causality can not be assumed with a cross-
sectional design. 
 Subsidies may also affect the perceived affordability of formal care.  It is well 
established in the literature that child care subsidies are associated with the use of formal 
care providers (Huston et al., 2002; Lowe & Weisner, 2004; Tekin, 2005; Weinraub et 
al., 2005; Wolfe & Scrivner, 2004).  Some researchers have concluded that this 
                                                 
16 This statement assumes the formal child care provider accepts child care subsidies. 
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relationship is due to a selection effect with those families who prefer to use a formal 
provider applying for subsidies and those who prefer informal providers choosing not to 
apply (Lowe & Weisner, 2004).  In her analysis of descriptive statistics from the 
nationally representative National Child Care Survey of 1990, Hofferth (1995) found 
child care subsidies to be associated with center-based care.  Based on this finding, 
Hofferth concluded that high- and low-income families have similar preferences for child 
care, but low-income families without child care subsidies are constrained by the cost of 
care from utilizing formal providers.  Berger and Black (1992) conducted a phone survey 
of mothers in Louisville, Kentucky who were on the waitlist or receiving child care 
subsidies and found that the majority of families who received a child care subsidy and 
subsequently changed their child care arrangements rated their new child care 
arrangement more positively than their pre-subsidy arrangement.  This finding lends 
further support to the theory that child care subsidies enhance the affordability of 
preferred child care arrangements for many families.  Despite the timing of the data 
collection pre-welfare and CCDF reform for both Hofferth’s and Berger and Black’s 
studies, their findings reveal a micro level theory of behavior that is likely applicable in 
the current policy context. 
 Perceived affordability of formal care/financial burden and child care 
problems/child care-related work disruptions.  As mentioned, cost is a constraining 
factor on the child care choices of parents.  One might guess that parents who are limited 
in their child care choices due to cost constraints are more likely to have problems with 
their child care than parents who are able to afford any provider.  Surprisingly, few 
researchers have examined this relationship.  Participants in Kisker and Silverberg’s 
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(1991) study of teenage parents participating in a parenting demonstration program 
reported that cost, availability, and quality of care were all associated with child care-
related work problems.  The main limitation of this study is its limited generalizability 
due to the urban only sample taken from three cities in two states in the late 1980s.  
 More work has been done on the impact of fiscal resources on the stability of 
care.  Brooks et al. (2002) ran a cross-sectional study comparing families receiving a 
child care subsidy and families on a wait list for a child care subsidy and concluded that 
mothers who received a child care subsidy had more stable child care arrangements than 
mothers without a subsidy.  Henly and Lyons (2000) also examined the relationship 
between finances and child care stability in their study of low-income mothers, some of 
whom had welfare experience.  The mothers in Henly and Lyons’ study reported their 
financial instability to affect the stability of their child care arrangements.  Though both 
Brooks et al. and Henly and Lyons provide useful information, both use a cross-sectional 
design.  Thus a causal relationship between child care subsidies/financial stability and 
stability of child care can not be assumed.  
 In conclusion, more research is needed on the relationship between the financial 
burden/perceived affordability of formal care and child care problems/child care-related 
work disruptions.  The research available to date does suggest that the financial burden of 
child care affects parents’ ability to afford stable care.  However, these studies are silent 
on issues of reliability and they rely heavily on cross-sectional research designs. 
 Perceived affordability of formal care/financial burden and desire to switch care. 
The relationship between perceived affordability of formal care/financial burden of care 
and desire to switch care is another relationship that makes intuitive sense, but has not 
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been well documented.  Fernandez (1986) found, on average, lower income 
manufacturing employees were less satisfied with their child care arrangements than  
higher income managers.  This finding suggests a relationship between family income 
and child care satisfaction exists.  However, such a conclusion should be made with 
caution due to the plethora of other influences that could moderate this relationship (i.e. 
values, parental education level, work hours, etc.). Brooks et al. (2002) and Berger and 
Black (1992) both conducted cross-sectional analyses comparing families who received a 
child care subsidy with families who were on the wait list for subsidies.  Both research 
teams found families who received a child care subsidy, a resource that would arguably 
increase the perceived affordability of formal care and decrease the family’s financial 
burden from child care, were more satisfied with their child care than families who were 
on the wait list for a child care subsidy.   
Each of the studies above has limitations.  Fernandez’s (1986) study, despite 
providing information otherwise absent in the literature, was conducted over twenty years 
ago and was limited to employees from one manufacturing company.  For these reasons, 
this study should be generalized to present day low-income workers, most of whom work 
in the service industry, with caution. Brooks et al. (2002) also used a sample with 
potentially limited generalizability.  This sample was taken from one southeastern state.  
Finally, both Berger and Black (1992) and Brooks et al. used cross-sectional research 
designs, thus precluding one from drawing causal inferences from their studies.  Despite 
these limitations, it is likely that the findings on financial burden/perceived affordability 
of formal care and satisfaction with care described in this section are valid due to the 
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absence of studies providing findings to the contrary.  Further research on this 
relationship using different samples and a panel study design is warranted. 
 Impact of child care subsidies on parents’ child care choices. It is well 
established in the literature that receipt of a child care subsidy is predictive of using 
center-based care, even with young children (aged 0-5) (Huston et al., 2002; Lowe & 
Weisner, 2004; Tekin, 2005; Weinraub et al., 2005; Wolfe & Scrivner, 2004).  Some 
researchers have concluded this strong association exists because of a selection effect, 
with those families who prefer to use a formal provider applying for subsidies and those 
who prefer informal providers choosing not to apply (Lowe & Weisner, 2004).  This 
selection effect may occur for two reasons. First, informal care tends to be less expensive 
than formal care, so a child care subsidy might only be sought after by families who want 
to use formal care (Mulligan et al., 2005).  Second, many informal providers are not 
eligible to receive a child care subsidy due to regulations of the subsidy program, so 
families who do obtain a child care subsidy may have little choice but to use a formal 
provider. 
 An alternative hypothesis put forth by Hofferth (1995) is that high- and low-
income families have similar preferences for child care, but low-income families without 
child care subsidies are constrained by the cost of care from utilizing formal providers.  
Hofferth’s conclusions were based on her analysis of descriptive statistics on children 
aged 0-12 from the nationally representative National Child Care Survey of 1990.  Both 
Huston et al. (2002), whose sample included randomly assigned parents of children aged 
0-10, and Tekin (2005), whose sample included children aged six and under, lent support 
to Hofferth’s conclusion by conducting regressions on data containing low-income 
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families and finding subsidies to significantly increase the probability of such families 
using center-based care.  Tekin’s results were especially strong.  He found a 33% 
increase in the probability of using center care and working when a subsidy was received.  
Additionally, in comparing families with and without child care subsidies, both Weinraub 
et al. (2005) and Wolfe and Scrivner (2004) found families with children aged 0-5 who 
received subsidies were more likely to use center-based care than families with children 
aged 0-5 without child care subsidies.   
The studies above each have strengths and limitations.  Hofferth (1995), Tekin 
(2005), and Weinraub et al. (2005) rely on cross-sectional data with Hofferth and Tekin 
using nationally representative data.  Thus, though the results of each of these studies are 
generalizable and valid, they can not establish a causal relationship between child care 
subsidy receipt and type of care chosen.  The remaining studies in this section, though 
offering data from multiple time periods, used samples limited in geographic region and 
in the case of Lowe and Weisner (2004) from a small number (<40) of participants.  
Despite these limitations, it is clear that a relationship exists between child care subsidies 
and type of care chosen, with subsidy recipients being more likely than non-recipients to 
choose center-based formal care providers, even for their young children. 
 The relationship between child care subsidies and type of care chosen is 
noteworthy for this study because of the relationship between type of care and the 
dependent variables of interest.  Studies have documented formal care to be a more 
reliable type of child care (Knox et al., 2003; Hofferth et al., 1991) as well as a more 
desirable type of care for many parents (Kisker & Silverberg, 1991; Wolfe & Scrivner, 
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2004).17  Thus, the relationship between child care subsidies and type of care is key to 
understanding the mechanisms by which the independent variable in this study (child care 
subsidies) affects the dependent variables (child care problems, child care-related work 
disruptions, and desire to switch care). 
 Perceived affordability of formal care/financial burden and type of care.  It is 
well established in the literature that the type of care a family chooses, formal or 
informal, is closely associated with family income with lower income families being 
more likely to choose informal care (Fuller, Kagan, Caspary, & Gauthier, 2002; 
Hirshberg, Huang, & Fuller, 2002; Mulligan et al., 2005).  Fuller et al. (2002), who 
analyzed data from a longitudinal study of single mothers with preschoolers and a 
welfare history, found as the former welfare recipients earned more money, they were 
more likely to use formal child care providers.  This change likely occurred because 
formal providers are more expensive than informal providers and thus can only be 
afforded when adequate financial resources are available (Johnansen, Leibowitz, & 
Waite, 1996).  
 Some researchers have further investigated the relationship between income and 
type of care chosen and found the cost of care to be one central factor in parents’ choices 
among child care providers. Hofferth and Wissoker (1991) analyzed 1985 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth data and found strong labor markets, child care vouchers 
and tax credits to increase low-income parents’ use of formal providers.  Hofferth and 
Wissoker also found price to be an important predictor of a parent’s choice among child 
care providers.  Based on these findings, the researchers concluded that low-income 
                                                 
17 It deserves mention that depending on who provides the informal care and other contextual factors, 
informal care in some cases may be more reliable than formal care.  Additionally, some parents, for 
example parents of infants/young toddlers, are more likely to desire informal care (Uttal, 2002). 
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parents may prefer formal care but choose informal providers due to cost constraints.  
Chin and Phillips’ (2004) study of families with fourth graders from an urban and 
socioeconomically diverse community support Hofferth and Wissoker’s findings.  Chin 
and Phillips found that parents reported cost to be the primary influence on choice of 
children’s summer activities.  Fuller et al. (2002) also highlighted the constraining effect 
of cost on child care arrangements by asking single mothers of preschoolers with a 
welfare history, approximately 50% of whom were using informal care, what type of 
child care they would use if all care were within close proximity and affordable.  Sixty 
percent of the mothers in Fuller et al.’s study responded that they would choose formal, 
center-based care. Finally, Henly and Lyons (2000), in their research among low-income 
mothers in entry level jobs, found that providers’ flexible payment plans and acceptance 
of non-cash payments were cited by parents as important factors in selecting care.  This 
observation demonstrates parents need to minimize the financial costs of child care and 
build coping strategies around child care options with a high financial burden.   
 As can be seen, multiple researchers have found evidence to support the role of 
affordability/financial burden on type of care used.  Each of these studies has limitations.  
Three of the summarized studies, Chin and Phillips (2004), Henly and Lyons (2000), and 
Fuller et al. (2002) used samples that were not nationally representative.  Hofferth and 
Wissoker’s (1991) study did use nationally representative data, but the date of data 
collection was pre-welfare and CCDF reform thus making it impossible to see the impact 
of the current policy environment.  Despite these limitations, the evidence provided by 
these studies and the lack of studies that dispute this evidence allows for the conclusion 
that perceived affordability of formal care/the financial burden of child care does 
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influence the type of care chosen.  Additional research on this topic using a nationally 
representative sample collected post-welfare and CCDF reform is warranted. 
 Type of care and child care problems/child care-related work disruptions. Center-
based care is generally accepted as producing the fewest incidences of child care 
problems/child care-related work disruptions.  In their ethnographic study of low-income 
families, Knox et al. (2003) found low-income parents were most often inconvenienced 
by child care problems experienced with informal providers.  Using a nationally 
representative sample of families with children under thirteen, Hofferth et al. (1991) also 
found the highest proportion of unscheduled unavailability among child care providers to 
be among relatives and providers of in-home care.   
Based on their ethnography of welfare recipients, Scott, London, and Hurst (2005) 
put forth one theory as to why informal providers are more unreliable than formal 
providers.  This theory is that the instability of informal care, especially unpaid informal 
care, is likely a function of the situation that leads to the availability of such a provider: 
their own unemployment, illness or temporary disability (Scott et al., 2005).  These 
conditions may cause or be correlated with causes of unreliability as a child care 
provider.   
The Hofferth et al. (1991) study used a nationally representative dataset of 
families with children under thirteen years of age to provide reliable evidence of the 
relationship between center-based care and child care problems/child care-related work 
disruptions.  Though the Knox et al. (2003) and Scott et al. (2005) studies are based on 
smaller samples (116 and 38 participants, respectively) of low-income mothers in urban 
areas, their use of ethnography allows for theoretical explanations of this relationship. 
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 Type of care and desire to switch child care arrangements. While parents’ 
satisfaction with child care depends on a myriad of factors, researchers have found most 
dissatisfied parents to prefer center-based care  (Hofferth et al., 1991; Kisker & 
Silverberg, 1991; Wolfe & Scrivner, 2004).  Hofferth et al.’s (1991) descriptive analysis 
of 1990 National Child Care Survey data revealed 26% of parents as desiring to switch 
child care arrangements.  Preference to switch care providers was pronounced among 
employed mothers who were using in-home, sibling, or self-care, with parents’ primary 
reason for wanting to switch child care arrangements being a desire to enhance the 
quality of care.  Kisker and Silverberg (1991), who interviewed teen parents in a 
demonstration program, had similar results.  Kisker and Silverberg reported that the 
majority of parents who were dissatisfied with their child care preferred their child be in 
center-based care.  Reasons parents provided for desiring to switch their child care 
arrangements centered around desires for their child to experience more social 
interaction, more educational opportunities, and better care (Kisker & Silverberg, 1991).  
Finally, Wolfe and Scrivner’s (2004) two-wave evaluation of welfare recipients in 
Wisconsin revealed parents to be more satisfied with center-based care than with other 
types of care.  Wolfe and Scrivner also found parents who used center-based care less 
likely to want to change their child care arrangement.  Though the findings reviewed 
above might be influenced by the age of the children in the studies and maturation 
effects, the consistency in findings despite varied research designs and ages of the data 
suggests that a relationship exists between type of child care and parents’ satisfaction 
with/desire to switch care.  
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 Control variables.  A number of variables were selected for inclusion in this study 
based on their relationships with the independent, intervening, and dependent variables.  
Each of these variables and why they were selected in accordance with the literature is 
described below. 
 The first set of control variables to be discussed: household income, receipt of 
assistance in paying for child care from a source other than the governmental child care 
subsidy, parental work hours, age of the focal child, whether the mother work non-
traditional hours, and number of children aged thirteen or under in care are all associated 
with the type of care chosen.  In all cases, these associations are mediated at least in part 
to the financial burden/perceived affordability of formal care.   
 Multiple researchers have found income to be associated with type of care.  
Families who have a higher income are generally more likely to use formal care than 
families with a lower income (Burchinal & Nelson, 2000; Hofferth, 1995).  Hirshberg et 
al. (2002) also found receiving help in paying for child care and working long hours to 
increase the likelihood of a parent choosing formal care.   
 Child’s age also affects parents’ child care choices.  As children age, parents tend 
to desire formal providers that can offer a more educational experience (Sonenstein, 
Gates, Schmidt & Bolshun, 2002). However, parents of infants and young toddlers are 
more likely to choose informal care (Brayfield, Deich & Hofferth, 1993; Burchinal & 
Nelson, 2000; Fuller, Holloway & Liang, 1996; Hirshberg & Huang, 2000; Hofferth, 
1996; Hofferth & Wissoker, 1991; Hunts & Avery, 1998; Huston et al., 2002; Mulligan et 
al., 2005; National Research Council & Institute of Medicine [NRC/IOM], 2003; 
Sonenstein et al., 2002; Uttal, 2002).  This choice appears to be mostly based on parental 
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preference in line with the child’s developmental abilities (many parents do not want to 
send their children to a formal provider when the children are too young to communicate 
verbally), though cost of care may be an issue as infant care is significantly more 
expensive than formal care for older children (Brayfield et al., 1993; Burchinal & Nelson, 
2000; Fuller et al., 1996; Hofferth, 1996; Hofferth & Wissoker, 1991; Hunts & Avery, 
1998; Huston et al., 2002; Mulligan et al., 2005; NRC/IOM, 2003;  Sonenstein et al., 
2002; Uttal, 2002).   
 Most parents work mainly traditional hours, between 8:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. 
Monday through Friday (Presser & Cox, 1997).  Work schedules in which at least half of 
the hours worked fall outside this time frame (i.e. evenings, nights, and weekends) are 
considered non-traditional (Presser, 2000).  Parents who work non-traditional hours, an 
employment trend that disproportionately affects low-wage workers (Hofferth, 1996), are 
less likely to use formal child care (Henly & Lyons, 2000; Hirshberg et al., 2002; 
Hofferth, 1996; Hunts & Avery, 1998; NRC/IOM, 2003; Riley & Glass, 2002).  This 
usage pattern is likely due at least in part to parents’ inability to find formal providers 
open during these hours.18  Similar to infant care, due to a lack of supply, formal care 
during non-traditional hours is significantly more expensive then care during standard 
hours. 
 Finally, the number of children in the household has been found to affect the type 
of care parents choose, with families having more children being less likely to use formal 
care (Huston et al., 2002).  This relationship likely results from the increased financial 
                                                 
18 In Hofferth’s (1996) review of the literature, it was reported that only 10% of centers and 6% of family 
day care providers offered weekend care.  Additionally, only 3% of centers and 13-20% of family day care 
providers offered evening/night hours (Hofferth, 1996).  Among formal providers, family day care 
providers offer more flexible hours than child care centers (Scott et al., 2005). 
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burden of having multiple children in care and the convenience that an informal provider 
(including an older child within the family) can offer in taking children of diverse ages 
(Hofferth and Wissoker,1991; Huston et al., 2002; Johnasen et al., 1996). 
  A variable that is associated with type of care chosen, but may not be mediated 
by financial burden/perceived affordability of formal care is maternal education.  It has 
been well established in the literature among various samples that maternal education is 
linked to child care choice with more education being associated with a greater likelihood 
of using center-based care (Brayfield et al., 1993; Fuller et al, 1996; Fuller et al., 2002; 
Hirshberg et al., 2002; Huston et al., 2002; Leibowitz, Klerman & Waite, 1992; Mulligan 
et al., 2005; NRC/IOM, 2003; Wolfe & Scrivner, 2004).   
 A few variables were selected as controls in this study due to their potential 
association with the dependent variables.  These variables include maternal depressive 
symptoms, use of multiple child care arrangements, and the number of adults in the 
household.  Huston et al. (2002) found parents who experienced symptoms of depression 
to be more likely to experience child care problems than parents without depressive 
symptoms.  Likewise, Scott et al. (2005) found when parents used multiple providers, 
they were more likely to experience both child care problems and child care-related work 
disruptions.  Finally, Ciabattari (2007) found the presence of other adults (except 
grandparents) in the household to be associated with a small decrease in perception of 
work-family conflict among low-income, primarily single mothers.  This decrease is 
likely due in part to other adults’ availability to serve as back-up child care providers 
should child care problems occur. 
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 The final two control variables, maternal race and whether the mother is in school 
were selected for methodological reasons.  Maternal race was included in the study as a 
proxy for a weighting variable.   Whether the mother was in school served as a dummy 
variable to control for hours spent in school since actual hours in school was not available 
in the Fragile Families data. 
Conclusions and Gaps in Research 
 Inconsistency in the results of studies in the above literature review and an over 
reliance on cross-sectional data among the studies reviewed highlight the need for 
additional research on the relationships between child care subsidies and child care 
problems/child care-related work disruptions as well as child care subsidies and parents’ 
desire to switch care.  The current study adds to this literature in important ways.  First, 
including financial burden, perceived affordability of formal care and type of care as 
mediators further clarifies the relationships between these concepts.  Second, using a 
national sample contributes to the reliability of understanding these concepts, which to 
date have primarily been studied through pilot program evaluations and geographically 
limited studies.  Third, though some of the studies reviewed rely on panel data, none 
follow the same parents specifically before and after receiving a child care subsidy.  As a 
pre-/post-design allows for causal inferences, using this research design offers 
researchers, policymakers and program administrators a better understanding of the 
impact of subsidies.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 The following research questions are examined in this study:  1) Are families who 
are currently receiving a child care subsidy less likely to experience child care problems, 
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child care-related work disruptions, and a desire to switch child care arrangements than 
families who are not currently receiving a subsidy?  Additionally, are the relationships 
between child care subsidies and child care problems, child care-related work disruptions, 
and a desire to switch care mediated by parents’ perceived affordability of formal care, 
the financial burden of care, the type of care used, or a combination of these variables? 2) 
Does a change from not receiving a child care subsidy to receiving a child care subsidy 
for the same family over time lessen the number of child care problems and child care-
related work disruptions a parent experiences and reduce that parent’s desire to switch 
child care arrangements?  Additionally, are these relationships between change in child 
care subsidy status and changes in child care problems, child care-related work 
disruptions, and desire to switch care mediated by changes in parents’ perceived 
affordability of formal care, financial burden of care, type of care used, or a combination 
of these variables? In order to answer these questions, the conceptual model presented in 
Figure 1 was tested as both a static model, allowing for a comparison of families who 
were and were not receiving a child care subsidy at one point in time, and as a change 
model, allowing for an analysis of the same families over time.  Hypotheses for the static 
and change models are detailed in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Hypotheses 
 Child Care Problems/Child Care-
Related Work Disruptions 
Desire to Switch Care 
Static 
Model 
1a: Parents with a child care subsidy 
will be less likely to report child care 
problems and child care-related work 
disruptions than parents who do not 
have a subsidy. 
1b: The relationships between child 
care subsidy receipt and child care 
problems/child care-related work 
disruptions are mediated by at least 
one of the following variables: 
financial burden of care, perceived 
affordability of formal care, or type 
of care.   
1c: The relationships between child 
care subsidy receipt and child care 
problems/child care-related work 
disruptions are mediated by the 
combined effects of financial 
burden/perceived affordability of 
formal care and type of care. 
1a:  Parents who are receiving a child 
care subsidy will be less likely to 
report a desire to switch child care 
arrangements than parents who are not 
receiving a child care subsidy.  
1b: The relationship between child 
care subsidy receipt and desire to 
switch child care arrangements is 
mediated by at least one of the 
following variables: financial burden 
of care, perceived affordability of 
formal care, or type of care.   
1c:  The relationship between child 
care subsidy receipt and desire to 
switch child care arrangements is 
mediated by the combined effects of 
financial burden/perceived 




2a:  Parents who were not receiving a 
child care subsidy at Time 1 and 
were receiving a child care subsidy at 
Time 2 will report a decrease in child 
care problems/child care-related 
work disruptions from Time 1 to 
Time 2. 
2b:  The relationships between 
2a:  Parents who were not receiving a 
child care subsidy at Time 1 and were 
receiving a child care subsidy at Time 
2 will report a decrease in desire to 
switch child care arrangements from 
Time 1 to Time 2. 
2b:  The relationship between changes 
in child care subsidy receipt and 
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changes in child care subsidy receipt 
and changes in child care 
problems/child care-related work 
disruptions are mediated by at least 
one of the following variables: 
change in financial burden of care, 
change in perceived affordability of 
formal care, or change in type of care 
between time periods.    
2c:  The relationships between 
changes in child care subsidy receipt 
and changes in child care 
problems/child care-related work 
disruptions are mediated by the 
combined effects of change in type of 
care and the change in financial 
burden/perceived affordability of 
formal care between time periods. 
change in desire to switch child care 
arrangements is mediated by at least 
one of the following variables: change 
in financial burden of care, change in 
perceived affordability of formal care, 
or change in type of care between time 
periods.    
2c:  The relationship between changes 
in child care subsidy receipt and 
change in desire to switch child care 
arrangements is mediated by the 
combined effects of change in type of 
care and the change in financial 
burden/perceived affordability of 
formal care between time periods. 
Note. The financial burden and perceived affordability of formal care were both included 
in these hypotheses so that the absolute fiscal impact of subsidies could be tested in 
addition to the impact of subsidies on parents’ subjective perception of child care 
affordability.  Financial burden of child care per child was used to test the conceptual 
model shown in Figure 1 with both the Fragile Families and Wait List data.  Perceived 
affordability of formal care was used to test the conceptual model for the Wait List data 
only.  Additionally, due to data limitations, research question two (hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 
2c) was only tested using Wait List data. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
Data 
 Two sources of data were used for this study.  The first, herein referred to as the 
Wait List data came from a sample of 40 low-income employed mothers from a mid-
Atlantic county, which was collected by the investigator in 2005 and 2006.  Participants 
in this sample were interviewed twice, once while on the wait list for a child care subsidy 
and again approximately eight months later.  The majority of participants received a child 
care subsidy in the period between interviews, thereby allowing for a pre-/post-research 
design.  This dataset was included in this study because it allows the same family’s 
choices to be compared before and after receiving a child care subsidy.  Few research 
studies on child care subsidies have employed this approach. The Wait List dataset also 
includes administrative data regarding subsidy receipt, thereby allowing for accurate 
reporting of the type and amount of child care subsidy families were receiving.  The 
second dataset was from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing (Fragile Families) 
study, a longitudinal study following a 1998-2001 cohort of children born to a nationally 
representative sample of predominately low-income single parents.  Mother interview 
data from follow-up waves one and two of the Fragile Families Study were examined in 
this research.  The Fragile Families dataset was included in the study in order to replicate 
the study model, to the degree possible, with a national sample of unmarried women who 
were demographically similar to participants in the Wait List dataset.  
Wait List Study Data 
 The Wait List Study panel data were collected in two waves, the first of which 
occurred in the summer of 2005 and the second in the spring of 2006.  The interviews for 
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this study included open- and closed-ended questions in order to allow for an in-depth 
analysis of information from parents.  The county in which this study was conducted has 
two child care subsidy programs.  The first program is funded and governed by the rules 
of the Child Care Development Fund (CCDF).  The second program is county-run and 
designed to support low-income families (~ 300% FPL and below) who exceed the 
income cut-off for CCDF subsidies in the study state, which, at the time of data 
collection, was equivalent to $29,990 for a family of three.  The county child care subsidy 
program also differs from CCDF in that it prioritizes children in a family, providing the 
majority of the subsidy to the oldest child in the family, and it prohibits parents from 
using the subsidy to pay informal care providers. 
 Shortly before data collection began for this study, a funding allocation allowed 
the state in which data were collected to open its wait lists for CCDF and county-
provided child care subsidies.  This funding allocation provided an opportunity to 
interview parents who had been on the wait list for a child care subsidy before and after 
they received the subsidy19, thus providing for a natural quasi-experiment via a pre-/post-
test design. 
 Sampling procedures. Through a partnership with the county Commission on 
Child Care and the county child care office of the Department of Health and Human 
Services, contact information for parents on the wait list that had consented to being 
contacted for research studies was obtained.   The investigator then contacted all parents 
from this list to educate them about the study and asked if they would be interested in 
participating.  Among parents contacted, the only eligibility criterion was that parents 
                                                 
19 Some parents in this study were awarded a subsidy before the initial interview took place.  For these 
parents, retrospective data were collected. 
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spoke and understood English. There was a 65% response rate among parents called with 
non-response resulting from language barriers (6%), refusal to participate (47%), and 
inability to be reached (47%).  Parents who were interested in participating were provided 
an informed consent form to sign and the first interview was scheduled.  Parents were 
given the choice of being interviewed by phone or in-person in order to maximize their 
comfort with the research project and minimize the burden of participation in the study.20 
 Before commencing the first interview, parents who preferred to be interviewed 
via phone were mailed a consent form with the investigator’s phone number, should they 
have any questions.  The parents were then read the consent form prior to the first 
interview, given an opportunity to ask questions about the study, and asked to provide 
oral consent.  Once each of these steps was completed, the investigator conducted the 
first interview.  Parents then mailed the signed consent to the investigator in a pre-paid 
stamped envelope.   For parents who preferred to be interviewed in-person, a consent 
form was provided to the parents before the first interview.  Parents were read the consent 
form and provided an opportunity to ask questions about the study during the first 
scheduled meeting.  If applicable, questions were answered.  Parents then signed the 
consent form and were interviewed.   
 The consent form (see Appendix A) explained the purposes of the research, 
research procedures, costs and benefits of the study, rights of a research participant, and 
grievance procedures.  The consent form also offered a place for study participants to 
give permission for the researcher to obtain access to their records at the county child 
care office and provided a space for the interviewee to give contact information for three 
                                                 
20 Including both waves of data collection, thirty in-person and thirty-eight phone interviews were 
conducted. 
49 
emergency contacts should the interviewee be unreachable for the second round of 
interviews.  Parents were provided a $10.00 incentive each time they were interviewed 
for the study. 
 Thirty percent of the 2005 interviews took place before school recessed for the 
summer.  Although summer is not ideal for interviewing parents about their child care 
choices (many parents’ child care needs change from part-time to full-time care when 
school recesses), the first interview was conducted at this time in order to maximize the 
number of parents interviewed while still on the child care wait list.  The second set of 
interviews occurred in winter 2006 with the average duration between interviews being 
7.5 months.     
 In the winter of 2006, parents were called to schedule participation in the second 
round of interviews.  The response rate for this round of interviews was 70% with non-
response resulting from active refusal to participate (8%), passive refusal to participate 
(17%), and an inability on the part of the researcher to reach the interviewee (75%). For 
parents who were interested in participating in the second round of interviews, a second 
interview via phone or in-person depending on the parent’s preference, was scheduled 
and conducted. 
 Demographics. The participants of this study were primarily young (mean 
age=30) unmarried females. The sample was racially diverse with African Americans 
comprising the largest proportion.21  All participants had a high school degree/GED and 
the majority (56%) had at least some college.  Most of the participants (95%) were 
                                                 
21 The racial breakdown of this sample is: African American (50%), Caucasian (18%), Hispanic (8%), 
Asian (8%), not reported (16%). 
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employed at the time of the first interview.  Parents worked an average of 36 hours per 
week and had an average annual income of $27,839. 
 Advantages/disadvantages of data.  There are both advantages and disadvantages 
of using the Wait List data for this study.  The advantages are threefold.  First, because of 
the timing of the data collection around a CCDF funding allocation, the Wait List data 
allows for a unique opportunity to examine the same families’ child care choices, child 
care problems, child care-related work disruptions, and desire to switch child care 
arrangements both before and after receiving a child care subsidy.  Unlike most studies of 
governmental child care subsidies, which have employed a cross-sectional approach to 
examine such issues, having information on the same families allows for a comparison of 
the same families over time, avoiding a comparison between unlike families.  Such an 
analysis allows the investigator to make inferences about causality, which have 
previously been impossible in studies of CCDF subsidies.  Second, the use of 
administrative data allow for accurate information regarding the type and amount of child 
care subsidy each family received. Third, because the survey was designed by the student 
investigator, with input from faculty in the Department of Family Studies and the county 
child care commission, questions not included in the Fragile Families study were able to 
be incorporated.  Inclusion of such questions was particularly useful because it allowed 
the student investigator to test the conceptual model for this study in different ways and 
with more depth than would be permitted by using the Fragile Families dataset alone.   
 There are a few disadvantages to the Wait List Study data.  First, the sample size 
of this study is small.  Complete data are available for forty families from the first wave 
and twenty-eight families from the second. The small sample size is attributable to the 
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limited number of families who consented with the study county to be contacted for 
research studies and the investigator’s inability to reach all families who did consent to be 
contacted.  To compensate for the small sample size in the static research model, data 
across waves was pooled and a clustering variable was included to eliminate the effect of 
pooling on bias in the standard errors.  Additionally, in the change model, the inclusion of 
retrospective questions asked of some participants at each wave allowed for multiple 
comparisons between waves of data collection for the same family.22  Again, a clustering 
variable was included to adjust standard errors. Despite these efforts, as a result of the 
small sample size, the number of control variables included in the Wait List analysis was 
limited.  Second, participants were from one mid-Atlantic county and are thus not 
nationally representative.  To compensate for this limitation, the proposed study model 
was replicated, to the degree possible, using a larger national sample of low-income, 
primarily single, urban parents from the Fragile Families dataset.  Third, sampling bias 
may have been introduced through the voluntary nature of the study.  To address this 
concern, an attrition analysis was run using administrative data for all participants and 
characteristics among the Wait List and Fragile Families samples were compared.   
Fragile Families 
 Fragile Families is a longitudinal dataset. The baseline surveys were conducted 
between 1998 and 2001 and the first two waves of follow-up interviews occurred twelve 
and thirty-six months after the baseline (Reichman, Teitler, Garfinkel, & McLanahan, 
2001).  Data collected from unmarried low-income mothers in the first and second 
follow-up interviews of the Fragile Families study are used for this analysis.  Mothers 
were selected for the study sample if, at the time of the interview, they were employed/in 
                                                 
22Details on the construction of the Wait List static and change datasets are provided in the results sections. 
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school, living at or below 300% of the federal poverty level (FPL) with no more than one 
child in the household, age 18 or older, using non-parent/sibling/self-care for their child’s 
primary child care arrangement, and had non-missing responses on the child care subsidy 
status variable. This subsample was selected to make the Fragile Families sample as 
comparable as possible in terms of range of mother’s and children’s ages, marital status, 
and income to the Wait List sample.   The choice to include only families with one child 
in the household was out of necessity because some of the variables of interest in the 
Fragile Families survey refer to the focal child while others refer to all children in the 
household.  The choice to include only mothers who were employed/in school was 
necessary due to skip patterns involving work/school status and the dependent variables.  
Finally, the choice to include mothers who did not use parent/sibling/self-care was made 
due to child care subsidy policies that prohibit subsidies from paying for this type of care 
(except in the case of sibling care when the sibling is 16-21 years or older23). 
 Sampling procedures. The Fragile Families study is a collaborative multi-site 
study designed to obtain information on (a) non-marital childbearing, (b) welfare reform, 
and (c) the role of fathers (Reichman et al., 2001).   Fragile Families used a three-stage 
sampling process. Through this sampling process, a national sample of urban dwelling, 
primarily single and low-income parents included 4,700 parents (3,600 unmarried and 
1,100 married) at baseline survey from seventy-five hospitals in twenty cities in the U.S.  
Cities were chosen for the Fragile Families study according to the following criteria: (a) 
population of 200,000 or more, (b) diverse policy environments on the dimensions of 
welfare generosity and child support enforcement, and (c) diverse labor market strengths 
                                                 
23 Allowable age of informal providers is state-dependent (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
[US DHHS], 2007). 
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(as indicated by unemployment rates, job growth rates and population growth) (Reichman 
et al., 2001).  The Fragile Families sample consisted of parents from the following cities: 
Austin, TX; Baltimore, MD; Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Corpus Cristi, TX; Detroit, MI; 
Indianapolis, IN; Jacksonville, FL; Nashville, TN; Newark, NJ; New York NY; Norfolk, 
VA; Oakland, CA; Philadelphia, PA; Pittsburg, PA; Richmond, VA; San Antonio, TX; 
San Jose, CA; and Toledo, OH (Reichman et al., 2001). In cities with five or fewer 
birthing hospitals, interviews were conducted in all hospitals located within city limits.  
For cities with more than five birthing hospitals, hospitals were selected randomly from a 
list of hospitals that allowed the researchers to interview parents while in-patient 
(Reichman et al., 2001).24   
 The Fragile Families study collected data from both mothers and fathers. Parents 
were included in the study through random selection until certain sampling quotas were 
met (Reichman et al., 2001).  Parents were excluded from the study if they met any of the 
following criteria: (a) the parents planned to put the child up for adoption, (b) the father 
of the baby was deceased, (c) neither parent spoke English/Spanish well enough to 
complete the interview, (d) either the mother or infant was too ill for the mother to 
complete the interview, or (e) the infant died before the baseline interview (Reichman et 
al., 2001).   
 Demographics.  Participants of the study sample from the Fragile Families data 
were primarily young (mean age=24) unmarried females. The sample was primarily 
                                                 
24 The Fragile Families dataset is a nationally representative sample of predominately low-income, single 
mothers living in urban areas.  Because the Wave 3 weights had not yet been released at the time of this 
study’s analysis, the Fragile Families sample in this analysis is not nationally representative. 
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Black and Hispanic.25  Participants varied in education, with 33% not having a high 
school degree/GED, 41% having obtained a high school degree/GED/vocational degree, 
and 26% having an associates/bachelors degree. All members of the sample were 
employed or in school.  Parents worked an average of 36 hours per week and had an 
average annual household income of $20,68526.   
 Advantages/disadvantages of data. As with the Wait List Study data, the Fragile 
Families data have both advantages and disadvantages for use with the current study.  
The first advantage of the Fragile Families data is that it is a national sample of mostly 
unmarried low-income parents living in urban areas.  As such, it is similar to the sample 
of participants in the Wait List Study, thus making it appropriate to use for replicating the 
proposed conceptual model.  The second advantage of the Fragile Families data is that 
the sample size is large.  Having a large sample size allows for more power in statistical 
procedures and increases the likelihood that the results of this study will be generalizable 
to the population being studied.   
The main disadvantage of using the Fragile Families data is that the range and 
average age of children in the datasets differ significantly.  A second disadvantage is that 
some variables of interest for the current study (i.e. perceived affordability of formal care 
and parental desire to switch care) were not included.  Additionally, some variables of 
interest that were included in the survey (i.e. child care problems/child care-related work 
disruptions) differed in time frame from the Wait List variables and, in the case of child 
care-related work disruptions, were less comprehensive in scope compared to the Wait 
                                                 
25 The racial breakdown of this sample is: Hispanic (42%), African American (41%), non-Black, non-
Hispanic (14%). 
 
26 This income has been inflated to 2005 dollars.  The income variable for the Fragile Families study 
includes income from social service programs. 
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List study.  Despite these limitations, the Fragile Families dataset is appropriate for this 
study because it allows for the study’s conceptual model to be tested on a national sample 
that is comparable in most characteristics to the Wait List sample.  
Measures 
 This section defines the variables in this study and their operationalization 
through the survey questions.  Sources for the survey questions are provided, where 
applicable, along with a brief description of these sources use with samples comparable 
to the current study sample. Finally, psychometric properties of index variables are also 
provided when appropriate.  
Variables and Survey Questions 
 As can been seen in Table 2, each of the variables in this study has been measured 
with question(s) that reflect the variable’s conceptual definition.   










voucher or cash 
payment to a 
parent/child care 
provider in order to 
help parents pay for 
child care. 
The type of government 
child care subsidy 
received (CCDF or 
county-run subsidy 
program) and the amount 
of subsidy per child were 
obtained from the county 
child care office’s 
administrative records.   
Does any person 
or any agency 
give you money, 
a voucher, or a 
scholarship to 
help pay for child 
care? Who gives 




agency is one 
response option) 
How much 
money does the 
government 
agency give you? 





  Wait List Study Fragile Families 
period? 
Financial 
Burden of Care 
Ratio of out-of-
pocket child care 
expenses per child 
to household 
income. 
How much do you (and 
your partner) currently 
pay out-of-pocket for 
child care per week for 
all of your children? 
Which of your children 
did this payment cover? 
The interviewer then 
probed to obtain the 
breakdown of cost per 
child for child care.  The 
household income was 
obtained from 
administrative records at 
the county child care 
office. 
How much do 
you pay out-of-
pocket for all the 
child care you 
currently use? Is 
this amount for 
(focal child)’s 
care only, or does 







included in this 
amount? 
What was your 
total household 
income before 
taxes last year, 




(Wait List only) 
For each type of 
formal care, is this 
type of care 
considered 
affordable by the 
parent for the child. 
Which of the following 
types of care could you 
afford before/after 
getting your child care 
subsidy? (Question asked 
for each child.) 
 
Type of Care Whether the type of 
arrangements 
currently used for 
child care were 
formal or informal. 
Formal options:  
a child care center 
(includes churches, 
community centers, 
Head Start, pre-K, 
Before/After school 
Program, and child 
care centers run at 
place of 
Please tell me all child 
care arrangements you 
use for each child on a 
regular basis, that is, at 
least once a week for the 
last two weeks.  Starting 
with your youngest child, 
what child care 
arrangements have you 
used in the last two 
weeks? (Options 
incorporate all types of 
care listed in conceptual 
definition provided. 
What type(s) of 
arrangement(s) 
are you using 
now? If more 
than one 
arrangement, 
what is your 
primary 
arrangement? By 
primary, I mean 
the arrangement 
where (child) 






  Wait List Study Fragile Families 
employment), a 
family day care 
provider, 
extracurricular 
activities (i.e. sports 
teams, after school 
clubs/lessons), 
babysitters (non-





custodial parent in 
your/their home, 




care, maternal care. 
Parents were able to 




(Wait List only) 
Whether or not a 
parent would 
switch child care 
arrangements if no 
constraints were 
imposed on her. 
Assuming you could 
have any type or 
combination of care 
arrangements you wanted 
for your children, would 
you prefer some other 
type or combination of 
care instead of what you 
have now? Why would 
you like to change 
(child)’s care? 
What changes would you 
make to your child’s 




The presence of 
events in which the 
provider got ill, had 
personal problems 
or closed early and 
consequently the 
parent had to find 
alternative child 
care arrangements. 
How often have you 
experienced a situation 
like your provider getting 
ill or having personal 
problems, or the child 
care facility being closed 
in which you needed to 
find an alternative to 
your regular child care 
Approximately 
how many times 
in the past month 




















The presence of 
events in which the 
unreliability of the 
child care provider 
resulted in the 
parent having to 
change work hours, 
take their child to 
work with them, 
leave child with an 
alternative child 
care arrangement, 
leave child home 
alone, miss a day at 
work, be late for 
work or leave work 
early. 
Parents sometimes 
experience times when 
they have to find 
different child care 
arrangements from the 
ones they usually use.  In 
the last three months did 
you experience situations 
such as your provider 
getting ill or having 
personal problems, or the 
child care facility being 
closed that made you: a) 
change your work hours? 
b) take your child to 
work with you? c) leave 
child with a friend/ 
relative? d) leave child at 
home alone?  
In the last three months, 
as a result of a problem 
with your child care 
arrangement (for 
example the problems we 
were just discussing), a) 
Were you late to work? 
b) Did you leave work 
early? c) Did you miss a 
day of work? d) Was 
your spouse/ partner late 
to work? e) Did your 
spouse/partner leave 
work early?   
f) Did your 
spouse/partner miss a day 
of work? 






many times in the 
last month did 
you miss work or 
school because 































Whether or not the 
parent worked 
evenings/nights 
(after 6 p.m.) or 
weekends. 
Are your work hours 
usually standard (8 a.m. 





evenings (6 p.m. 
to 11 p.m.), nights 
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(nights/weekends), or do 
they change?  If work 









Starting with the 
youngest, how old is 
each person in the 
household?  











What is your highest 













race was obtained from 
the county child care 
office’s administrative 
records. 






13 or Under in 
Care 
(Wait List only) 
Number of children 
living in the 
household and 
related to the 
mother by birth, 
adoption, or 
marriage who are 
thirteen years old or 
younger and are not 
in 
parent/self/sibling 
care as their 
primary care 
arrangement. 








Income from all 
members of the 
household. 
Administrative data 
received from county 
(gross income from all 
household members). 
Now, please think 
of your household 
income from all 
sources. Include 
not just your own 
income, but the 
income of 
everyone living 
with you.  What 
was your total 
household income 
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Number of 




Number of persons 
over the age of 18 
in the household. 
For each person in 
household, what is their 
relationship to you? 
What is their age? 
For each person 
in household, 
what is their 
relationship to 







Mother meets the 
criteria for having 
experienced a 
major depressive 
episode in the last 
twelve months, or 
is currently being 
medicated for 
depression. 
 Mental Health 
Scale for 
Depression: 15 
item scale based 





from the Fragile 






More than one child 
care arrangement is 
used to care for 
focal child. 
Please tell me all the 
child care arrangements 
you use for each child on 
a regular basis, that is, at 
least once a week for the 
last two weeks. 
If more than one 
child care 
arrangement, 
which is your 
primary? By 
primary, I mean 
the arrangement 
where the child 






Number of hours 
mother usually 
works per week. 
How many hours a week 
do you work? 
How many hours 
do you usually 






Mother is currently 
enrolled in school. 
Are you currently going 
to school? 







classes?  Please 
include regular 
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trade school, Job 
Corps, college or 
other types of 
school as well as 
training programs 
to learn job skills. 





Mother is currently 
receiving help for 
paying for child 
care from a source 
other than the 
governmental child 
care subsidy.  
 Does any person 
or any agency 
give you money, 
a voucher, or a 
scholarship to 
help pay for child 
care? Who gives 




agency is one 
response option) 
Note. a The conceptual definition is not precisely reflected in these questions because of limitations in the 
availability of variables in the Fragile Families study.  A number of control variables were excluded from 
the Wait List multivariate analyses, including maternal education and marital status, due to the small 
sample size of this dataset. 
 
Sources of Survey Questions and Application to Comparable Populations 
 As can be seen in Table 3, a number of the questions used in the Wait List study27 
were taken from other well-known surveys used with comparable populations.  A review 
of these surveys and their samples follows. 
                                                 




Table 3. Source of Survey Questions for Wait List Study 
Variable Source of Survey Question 
Out-of-Pocket Cost of Child Care National Child Care Survey of 1990 
Child’s Age National Child Care Survey of 1990 
Mother’s Education Philadelphia Survey of Child Care and Work 
Type of Care National Child Care Survey of 1990 
Desire to Change Child Care 
Arrangements 
National Child Care Survey of 1990 
Philadelphia Survey of Child Care and Work 
Child Care-Related Work 
Disturbances 
Index created using survey questions from: 
National Child Care Survey of 1990 
Philadelphia Survey of Child Care and Work 
Women’s Employment Study 
 
 The surveys in Table 3: National Child Care Survey (NCCS) of 1990, 
Philadelphia Survey of Child Care and Work, and Women’s Employment Study (WES) 
were all conducted on samples similar in demographics to the sample in the current 
study.  The NCCS was conducted on a nationally representative sample of U.S. families 
with children under thirteen.  An analysis of low-income families in this study through 
the Low-Income Sub-Study of the NCCS was conducted.  The parents in this sub-study 
had a similar income to the majority of families in the Fragile Families sample and were 
primarily single mothers (Brayfield et al., 1993).  The parents in the low-income sub-
study differed from those in the current study in that a higher proportion of African 
American parents are in the current study (Brayfield et al., 1993).  The Philadelphia 
Survey of Child Care and Work was administered to parents living in low, medium, and 
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high poverty neighborhoods of Philadelphia.  The parents in this study were similar to the 
current study sample in terms of income, education, racial diversity, maternal age, and 
labor force participation rate (Press, 2003).  Finally, the WES was administered to current 
and former welfare recipients living in an urban county of Michigan.  The respondents of 
this survey were similar in demographics to the current study sample in terms of age and 
race.  Additionally, the subset of the WES sample that was wage-reliant was similar in 
income and labor force participation rates to the sample in the current study (Michigan 
Program on Poverty and Social Welfare Policy, 2004).   
Psychometric Properties 
 No psychometric properties are available for most of the variables in this study 
because the straightforward nature of the concepts (i.e. maternal education, child’s age, 
type of care) allowed for measurement through single questions rather than indexes or 
scales.  An index was used to measure child care-related work disturbances in the Wait 
List study.  This index had an acceptable measure of reliability (alpha=.778) (Nunnally, 
1978).  
Analysis 
 This section presents the analysis plan for this study, including the basic 
analytical models tested, how data were coded for analysis, and what analyses were 
conducted.  Strengths and limitations of the analysis plan are also presented. 
Static Model 
 Descriptive and bivariate statistics including means and t-values comparing 
participants with and without a child care subsidy are presented for each sample.  The 
primary analyses in this study were conducted using multivariate analyses and path 
64 
analysis.  Descriptive statistics and the static path model shown in Figure 2 were used on 
each sample and in a comparison28 of the Wait List and Fragile Families samples.  Due to 
the availability of the perceived affordability of formal care and parents’ desire to switch 
care variables in the Wait List study only, the path model in Figure 3 was tested in the 
Wait List sample only.  The path models in Figures 2 and 3 include direct effects between 
child care subsidy status and the dependent variables (child care problems, child care-
related work disruptions, and desire to switch care), indirect effects between the child 
care subsidy status variable and the dependent variables through financial 
burden/perceived affordability of formal care and type of care, a direct effect between 
financial burden/perceived affordability of formal care and type of care, and a correlation 
between child care problems and child care-related work disruptions.    
                                                 
28 In the comparison path model, control variables were limited to number of children aged thirteen or 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Additions to Path Models (Wait List data only) 
 
         Note.  a Controls were included in all paths. bThese controls were used in analyses with the Wait List study data.  
         c These controls were used in analyses with the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being study data.  
Subsidy
Financial Burden of Care
Type of Care 
(Formal vs. Informal)
Child Care Problems (yes/no)
Child Care-Related Work 
Disruptions (yes/no)





Type of Care 
(Formal vs. Informal)
Child Care Problems (yes/no)
Child Care-Related Work 
Disruptions (yes/no)
Desire to Switch Child Care 
Arrangements (yes/no)
Controlsa:
Focal Child's Agebc,  Number of Children Aged 13 or Under in Careb, Number of Adults in the 
Householdc, Household Incomec, Maternal Racec, Maternal Educationc, Maternal Work Hoursc, Mother 
in Schoolc, Mother Works Non-Traditional Hoursc, Maternal Depressive Symptomsc, Multiple Child 




 Due to sample size issues in the Fragile Families data, the change model was only 
analyzed with the Wait List data.   Descriptive and bivariate statistics including means 
and t-values comparing the same participants across time points are presented for this 
sample.  Additionally, multivariate analyses in which a) change scores on the dependent 
variables are regressed on the change in child care subsidy, and b) a series of tests for 
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mediation among change variables are reported.29  It is worthy of mention that the design 
of the Wait List change dataset allows for analyses over varying intervals ranging from 
one month to three months.  No adjustments were made to compensate for this difference 
in interval.  
Variables 
 The variables for both the static and change analyses are coded as delineated in 
Table 4 unless otherwise specified. 
Table 4. Variable Coding    
Variable Static Model   Change Model 
(Change from Time 1 to 
Time 2) 
Child Care Subsidy 
 
0= Not Currently Receiving 
Subsidy 
1= Currently Receiving 
Subsidy 
0=No Change in Child Care 
Subsidy Status from No 
Subsidy at Time 1 to Subsidy 
at Time 2 (Omitted) 
1= Change in Child Care 
Subsidy Status from No 
Subsidy at Time 1 to Subsidy 
at Time 2 
Financial Burden Out-of-Pocket Child Care 
Costs Per Child/ Household 
Income 
Difference between Out-of-
Pocket Child Care Per Child/ 
Household Income (T2 – T1) 
Perceived Affordability 
of Formal Care 
(Wait List only) 
0= Parent Perceives Formal 
Care as Unaffordable 
1= Parent Perceives Formal 
Care as Affordable 
0=No Change from 
Perceiving Formal Care as 
Unaffordable at Time 1 to 
Perceiving Formal Care as 
Affordable at Time 2 
(Omitted) 
1= Change from Perceiving 
Formal Care as Unaffordable 
at Time 1 to Perceiving 
Formal care as Affordable at 
Time 2 (Omitted) 
Type of Care a 
(Primary Arrangement) 
0= Informal Care 
1= Formal Care 
0=No Change from Using 
Informal Care at Time 1 to 
Using Formal Care at Time 2 
                                                 
29 Due to the small sample size and conservative nature of the change analyses, no path model was 
conducted on the change data.  An attrition analysis was conducted.  The methodology and results from this 
analysis are reported in Chapter 6. 
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(Omitted) 
1= Change from Using 
Informal Care at Time 1 to 
Using Formal Care at Time 2 
(Omitted) 
Desire to Switch Child 
Care Arrangements b 
(Wait List only) 
0= Parent Does Not Desire to 
Switch Child Care 
Arrangements 
1= Parent Desires to Switch 
Child Care Arrangements  
0=No Change from Desiring 
to Switch Child Care 
Arrangements at Time 1 to 
Not Desiring to Switch Child 
Care Arrangements at Time 
2 (Omitted) 
1= Change from Desiring to 
Switch Child Care 
Arrangements at Time 1 to 
Not Desiring to Switch Child 
Care Arrangements at Time 
2 
Child Care Problems b 0= No Child Care Problems 
Reported 
1= At Least One Child Care 
Problem Reported 
 
Continuous Variable (Fragile 
Families only)=Number of 
Child Care Problems 
Experienced in the Last 
Month 
0=No Change from 
Experiencing Child Care 
Problems at Time 1 to Not 
Experiencing Child Care 
Problems at Time 2 
(Omitted) 
1= Change from 
Experiencing Child Care 
Problems at Time 1 to Not 
Experiencing Child Care 
Problems at Time 2  
 
Continuous Variable (Wait 
List only)=Difference 
Between Number of Child 
Care Problems (T2-T1) 
Child Care-Related 
Work Disruptions bc 
0= No Child Care-Related 
Work Disruption Reported 
1= At Least One Child Care-
Related Work Disruption 
Reported 
 
Continuous Variable (Fragile 
Families only)=Number of 
Child Care-Related Work 
Disruption Experienced in 
the Last Month 
0=No Change from 
Experiencing Child Care-
Related Work Disruptions at 
Time 1 to Not Experiencing 
Child Care-Related Work 
Disruptions at Time 2 
(Omitted) 
1= Change from 
Experiencing Child Care-
Related Work Disruptions at 
Time 1 to Not Experiencing 
Child Care-Related Work 
Disruptions at Time 2  
69 
 
Continuous Variable (Wait 
List only)=Difference 




Maternal Work During 
Non-Traditional Hours 
(Fragile Families only) 
0= No Work 6 p.m. to 7 a.m. 
Weekdays or Any Hours on 
Weekends 
1= At Least Some Work 
During Evenings/Nights (6 
p.m. to 7 a.m.)/Weekends 
 
Child’s Age Wait List: Continous (in 
Years) 
Fragile Families:  
0=About 1 Year Old 
1=About 3 Years Old 
 
Maternal Education 
(Fragile Families only) 
Dummy Variables: 






(Fragile Families only) 
 
Dummy Variables: (non-
Hispanic, non-Black as 
Omitted), African American, 
Hispanic 
 
Number of Children 
Aged 13 or Under in 
Care 
(Wait List only) 
Continuous  
Household Income 
(Fragile Families only) 
Continuous Measure of 
Income Per Month (Logged) 
 
Number of Adults in the 
Household 




(Fragile Families only) 
0= Did Not Meet Criteria for 
Major Depressive Episode 
and Is Not Currently on 
Medication for Depression 
1= Did Meet Criteria for 
Major Depressive Episode or 
Is Currently on Medication 
for Depression 
 
Multiple Child Care 
Arrangements 
0= No Multiple Child Care 
Arrangements Used for 
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(Fragile Families only) Child 
1= Multiple Child Care 
Arrangements Used for 
Child 
Maternal Work Hours 
(Fragile Families only) 
Continuous Hours Per Week  
Mother in School 
(Fragile Families only) 
0= Not Currently in School 
1= Currently in School 
 
Other Help in Paying for 
Child Care 
(Fragile Families only) 
0= Not Receiving Other Help 
in Paying for Child Care 
1= Receiving Other Help in 
Paying for Child Care 
 
a  Formal arrangements included: child care centers, family day care providers, pre-kindergarten programs, 
Head Start, before and after school programs.  Informal care included care provided by friends or family 
members.  
b Each of these variables were coded “2” for the attrition analysis if the parent attrited over the course of the 
study.  c The only child care-related work disturbance examined in analyses for the Fragile Families sample 
is absenteeism from work. 
 
Tests of Research Questions 
 Research question 1: Are families who are currently receiving a child care 
subsidy less likely to experience child care problems, child care-related work disruptions 
and a desire to switch child care arrangements compared to families who are not 
currently receiving a subsidy?  Additionally, are the relationships between child care 
subsidies and child care problems, child care-related work disruptions, and a desire to 
switch care mediated by parents’ perceived affordability of formal care, the financial 
burden of care, the type of care used, or a combination of these variables? 
 
 The first hypothesis of this research question (hypothesis 1a) states that parents 
with a child care subsidy will be less likely to report child care problems, child care-
related work disruptions, and a desire to switch child care arrangements than parents who 
do not have a subsidy.  Before engaging in comparative statistics and running regression 
models, a correlation matrix was reviewed (see Appendices B and C). This hypothesis 
was then tested with bivariate statistics, comparing families receiving and not receiving 
child care subsidies on measures of child care problems, child care-related work 
disruptions, and parents’ desire to switch child care arrangements.  Next, ordinary least 
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squares, ordinal logit, and logistic regressions30 in which each of the dependent variables 
was regressed on child care subsidy status and the control variables were used.   
 The second and third hypotheses (hypothesis 1b/c), which state the relationships 
between child care subsidy receipt and child care problems/child care-related work 
disruptions/parents’ desire to switch care arrangements are mediated by the financial 
burden/perceived affordability of formal care/type of care used and the combined effects 
of the financial burden/perceived affordability of formal care and type of care used were 
tested using bivariate comparisons and multivariate analyses.   T-tests were conducted in 
which each of the proposed mediating variables (financial burden/perceived affordability 
of formal care and type of care) was separated into two groups (based on median scores 
and dummy variable categories) and used as independent variables to test differences in 
child care problems, child care-related work disruptions, and parents’ desire to switch 
care arrangements.  Ordinary least square, ordinal logit, and logistic regressions31 of the 
dependent variables on each/all of the mediating variables were then run.  Next, 
hierarchical models were analyzed in the following stages: 1) dependent variables 
regressed on child care subsidy status and control variables and 2) dependent variables 
regressed on proposed mediating variables (one at a time, then together), child care 
subsidy status, and control variables.  The hierarchial models were conducted to examine 
                                                 
30 In the statistical analysis of Wait List data, ordinary least squares regressions were used for all 
multivariate analyses, even with dichotomous dependent variables.  This action was taken because, due to 
the small sample size for this study, some of the coefficients using logistic regression were unstable.  The 
choice to use ordinary least squares regressions is acceptable due to the distribution of the dependent 
variables (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  Fragile Families data was analyzed using ordinal logit 
regression (due to the non-normal distribution of data) logistic regressions.  See Appendix E for Wait List 
results using logistic regressions. 
 
31 With the Fragile Families data, ordinal logit regressions and logistic regressions were used, with the Wait 
List data, ordinary least squares regressions were used (see previous note). 
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whether a decline in the effect of child care subsidy on the dependent variables occurred 
when the proposed mediator was added as a predictor.   
 Finally, path models (See Figures 2 and 3), including control variables determined 
to have an effect on each path, were analyzed to test direct effects between child care 
subsidy status and the dependent variables and indirect effects between child care subsidy 
status and the dependent variables through the proposed mediators.  In this path model, 
the dependent variables (child care problems, child care-related work disruptions, and 
desire to switch care arrangements) were regressed on child care subsidy status and, 
separately, on the proposed mediators (financial burden, perceived affordability of formal 
care, and type of care); the proposed mediators (financial burden, perceived affordability 
of formal care, and type of care) were regressed on child care subsidy status; type of care 
was regressed on financial burden/perceived affordability of formal care; and child care 
problems was correlated with child care-related work disruptions.  In each regression 
listed above, variables hypothesized to affect the path were controlled. 
 Research Question 2:  Does a change from not receiving a child care subsidy to 
receiving a child care subsidy for the same family over time lessen the number of child 
care problems and child care-related work disruptions a parent experiences and reduce 
that parent’s desire to switch child care arrangements? Additionally, are these 
relationships between change in child care subsidy status and changes in child care 
problems, child care-related work disruptions, and desire to switch care mediated by 
changes in parents’ perceived affordability of formal care, financial burden of care, type 
of care used, or a combination of these variables?32   
 
 The first hypothesis of this research question (hypothesis 2a) states that parents 
who were not receiving a child care subsidy at Time 1 and who were receiving a child 
                                                 
32 The second research question was tested solely using the Wait List data.  Due to sample selection criteria 
necessary for use with the Fragile Families sample, the sample size for change analyses using this sample 
would have been 118, with 24 parents changing subsidy status and 94 parents not making this change.  Due 
to the small sample size, the Fragile Families sample was dropped from analyses of this research question. 
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care subsidy at Time 2 will report a decrease in child care problems, child care-related 
work disruptions, and a desire to switch care from Time 1 to Time 2.  Before testing this 
hypothesis a correlation matrix with change scores (i.e. categorical variables signifying 
the presence of a change between time points and continuous values reflecting the 
difference in scores between time points) was reviewed (see Appendix D).  Bivariate 
analyses using dependent t-tests and chi-square statistics comparing parents at each time 
point on the variables of child care problems, child care-related work disruptions, and 
desire to switch child care arrangements were then analyzed.  Finally, multivariate 
analyses using logistic and ordinal logit regressions were analyzed using change in child 
care subsidy status as the predictor and categorical change/difference scores for each of 
the dependent variables (for variable coding, see Table 4).   
 The second and third hypotheses (hypotheses 2b/c) state the relationship between 
a change in child care subsidy status and the decline of child care problems, child care-
related work disruptions, and desire to switch child care arrangements between time 
points is mediated by a change in financial burden/perceived affordability of formal 
care/type of care and the combined effects of a change in financial burden/perceived 
affordability of formal care and type of care between time points.  These hypotheses were 
tested through multivariate analyses.  Ordinal logits and logistic regressions were used to 
regress the change scores (see Table 4) of each of the dependent variables on the change 
scores of proposed mediating variables.  Following this analysis, hierarchical regression 
models using variables’ difference and categorical change scores between two time 
points were run as: 1) change in dependent variables regressed on the change in child 
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care subsidy status variable and 2) change in dependent variables regressed on change in 
proposed mediating variables and the change in child care subsidy status variable.   
Unit of Analysis 
 The unit of analysis for this study was the family.  For the Wait List study, though 
the family was the unit of analysis, separate analyses were run using 1) the youngest child 
in the family as the focal child and 2) the oldest child eligible to receive a child care 
subsidy (up to age 13) as the focal child.  These separate analyses allowed for 
examination of how the relationships between variables differ when children of various 
ages are considered.  In the Fragile Families study, the family was the unit of analysis 
with the sole child in the household serving as the focal child.  
Variations from the Base Model with Wait List Data Only 
 Compared to the Fragile Families data, the Wait List data offer more variables of 
interest.  For this reason, variations on the basic path model using only the Wait List data 
were analyzed.  These variations included substituting perceived affordability of formal 
care for the financial burden of care variable and adding the dependent variable of 
parents’ desire to switch care arrangements.  
 First, the basic path model was tested substituting perceived affordability of 
formal care for the financial burden of care.  In this analysis, the perceived affordability 
of formal care variable was coded as a binary variable in the static and change models 
(See Table 4 for coding).  Second, the dependent variable of desire to switch care 
arrangements was included as a dependent variable (See Figure 1 for path depiction).  
The desire to switch care arrangements variable was coded as a binary variable for both 
the static and change models (See Table 4 for coding).   
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Strengths and Limitations of Analyses  
 The study’s analysis plan has a number of unique strengths and limitations.  The 
first strength of the analysis plan results from using two demographically similar 
samples.  Having similar samples allows for a reliable replication of the research models, 
greater power in analyses (because of the larger sample size of the Fragile Families data), 
and more generalizable results.  The second strength of the analysis plan results from the 
use of a pre-/post-research design.  Because of the Wait List study’s collection of data 
both before and after families received a child care subsidy, the temporal condition 
necessary for establishing causality was met.  As was previously mentioned, this research 
design is unprecedented in research studies on the impact of CCDF child care subsidies 
on parents’ ability to maintain employment.  The third strength of the analysis plan is the 
accuracy of subsidy information in the Wait List study, which was gathered through 
administrative data. 
 The limitations of the analysis plan result from a few restrictions in the data.  
First, both datasets in the current study have short time periods for the survey questions 
addressing child care problems and child care-related work disturbances.  Second, the 
time frames for these survey questions differ.  The Fragile Families study asks about the 
prevalence of child care problems and child care-related work disturbances for the 
previous month and the Wait List study asks for the last three months.  Though providing 
parents a short and recent time period may maximize the reliability of information, it is 
likely that parents will not have experienced as many problems/disturbances as they 
would have if the time period were longer.  Additionally, ideal comparison of each 
dataset would use the same time frame in measuring the dependent variable.  Third, a 
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limited supply of questions in the Fragile Families survey constrains the researchers’ 
ability to conduct ideal analyses.  For example, the question on child care-related work 
disturbances in the Fragile Families data does not reflect the full scope of the variable 
from the Wait List data.  Additionally, because the out-of-pocket cost and child care 
subsidy questions in the Fragile Families study were worded to include all children in the 
family and the type of care and use of multiple arrangements questions asked about one 
focal child only, analyses including families with more than one child in the household 
were not possible.  Finally, neither dataset offers indicators of child care quality or job 
tenure.  Child care quality would have been helpful because it is a key variable that 
affects parental choice of child care providers.  Additionally, job tenure would have 
allowed for an analysis of the effect of child care problems, child care-related work 
disruptions, and parents’ desire to switch child care arrangements on a relevant 
employment outcome. 
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Chapter 4: Results of Wait List Study Cross-Sectional Analyses 
Demographic Characteristics 
Family Characteristics  
 The majority of study participants in the Wait List sample were single (90%).  
Their mean annual household income was $27,853 for the non-subsidy group and 
$27,822 for the subsidy group.  These incomes translated into an average percent poverty 
of 167% FPL and 174% FPL, respectively.  No families were above 311% of the poverty 
threshold.  Families in each group had an average of about two children aged thirteen or 
younger in the household.  These children ranged in age from five months to thirteen 
years.  Few participants lived with other adults, with the number of other adults in the 
household ranging from 0 to 2 (M=.44). 
Multivariate analyses of the Wait List data were broken into two groups, one 
using the youngest child in the family as the focal child and the other using the oldest 
child eligible to receive a subsidy (i.e. 13 years of age or younger) as the focal child.  The 
choice to disaggregate in this way is justified by an interest of the researcher to a) 
compare the results from the Wait List data to results involving young children (aged 
approximately 1 and 3 years) in the Fragile Families data, and b) disaggregate the 
findings by age to the degree possible using data from multiple children in the family.  
Differences in results between the youngest and oldest focal children and explanations for 
those differences are provided in the discussion chapter (Chapter 8).  The average age of 
the youngest and oldest focal children in both the subsidy and non-subsidy groups for this 
study were four and six, respectively.   
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Creation of the Data File 
 For the static model of the Wait List study, a pooled analysis sample was created 
from four subgroups.  In the first wave of data, all families (N=40) were asked about their 
current experiences, either on the wait list or while receiving a subsidy. Retrospective 
data were also collected from those families in the first wave who were currently 
receiving a subsidy (N=22) to explore their experiences immediately before receiving a 
subsidy (i.e. while on the wait list for a subsidy). In the second wave, all interviewed 
families (N=28) were asked about their current experiences. Additionally, families (N=8) 
who reported having a subsidy and losing it in the time between the first and second 
round of interviews were asked to provide data on the time in which they were receiving 
a subsidy.  The subsamples described above were combined into one data file yielding 98 
observations. In this pooled dataset, families may have between one and four 
observations depending upon whether they participated in both waves and whether they 
provided retrospective data.  Among the 98 observations, 54 were about a time in which 
the participant did not have a child care subsidy and 44 were about a time in which the 
participant did have a child care subsidy. For ease of interpretation, observations are 
referred to as parents/families from this point onward33. 
Characteristics of the Sample 
 Table 5 provides means and results of t-tests comparing the subsidy and no 
subsidy groups of this pooled sample on a number of characteristics including: marital 
status, living arrangements, maternal education, maternal work and school participation, 
children in the household, and assistance with child care.  The subsidy and no subsidy 
                                                 
33 All multivariate analyses were run with a clustering variable to account for the fact that some had 
multiple observations. 
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groups were similar. Household composition, maternal schooling, employment, and child 
care assistance were the only areas in which significant differences between these groups 
were found.  Parents not receiving a child care subsidy had more adults living in the 
household than parents receiving a child care subsidy.  Parents receiving a subsidy were 
more likely to be in school and to be going to school part-time compared to parents not 
receiving a subsidy.  Additionally, there was a trend (p < .10) in which parents receiving 
a subsidy were more likely to have more than one job than parents not receiving a 
subsidy.  Finally, parents not receiving a subsidy were more likely to be receiving help 
from sources not listed in this study compared to parents receiving a subsidy.  Among 
parents who received a child care subsidy, the average amount of subsidy was $466 per 








Household Income 27853 27822 0.01
Percent Poverty 166.54 173.83 -0.55
Single 0.889 0.955 -1.23
Number of Other Adults in the Household 0.353 0.127 1.980 *
Living Arrangements
   Rents 0.796 0.886 -1.2
   Owns 0.074 0.068 0.11
   Lives with friends/family 0.111 0.046 1.23
   Temporary Housing 0.019 0.000 1
Length of Time in Residence 2.580 2.240 0.63
Race
   Hispanic 0.130 0.136 -0.100
   Black 0.519 0.500 0.180
   Non-Hispanic, Non-Black 0.278 0.273 0.060
Mother's Education
   H.S./GED 0.370 0.318 0.54
   Some college/vocational 0.500 0.568 -0.67
   Bachelors degree/more 0.130 0.114 0.24
Employment/Student Status
Mother in School 0.111 0.364 -2.97 ***
Mother's School Schedule
   Part-time 0.056 0.250 -2.66 **
   Full-time 0.056 0.114 -1.01
Degree Studying For
   GED 0.000 0.000 NA
   Associates/Vocational Training 0.204 0.318 -1.29
   Bachelors 0.093 0.046 0.9
Mother's Employment Status 0.944 0.955 -0.22
Length of Time in Current Job (in months) 2.635 4.845 -1.16
Non-Traditional Work Hours 0.426 0.409 0.17
Number of Jobs
   No jobs 0.074 0.068 0.11
   One job 0.870 0.750 1.53
   More than one job 0.056 0.182 -1.89 †
Work Hours 35.972 35.125 0.34
Work and School Hoursb 37.639 39.898 -0.87
Children
Number of Children 2.093 2.068 0.1
Number of Children under 13 1.963 1.886 0.38
Number of Children in Care aged 13/Under 1.500 1.705 -1.17
Youngest Child's Age 3.664 3.924 -0.72
Oldesta Child's Age 6.645 6.849 -0.31
Child Care
Has Help Paying for Child Care 0.648 1.000 -5.36 ***
Sources of Help
   Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit 0.444 0.605 -1.57
   Child care provider 0.222 0.186 0.43
   Foundation 0.019 0.047 -0.75
   Relative 0.130 0.070 0.96
   Non-custodial parentc 0.019 0.000 1
   Other help 0.056 0.000 1.77 †
Table 5. Wait List Group Differences on Demographics and Other Characteristics
Note. As this sample was pooled over time points, the same parents may be counted more 
than once.  a Oldest child eligible for a subsidy (13 or under). b 10 hours were added for part-
time school enrollment, 20 hours for full-time school enrollment. c Non-custodial parent 
assistance does not include child support. 
† p  ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01,  *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed t-tests  
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Table 6 provides means and t-test results comparing parents receiving and not 
receiving a child care subsidy on the dependent variables.  Areas of interest in this table 
include child care choices, perceptions of availability and affordability of care, out-of-
pocket costs of care, parents’ desire to change care, and the use of unreliable or low 
quality care. A number of significant differences among the groups were found through 
these comparisons.   
 First, with regard to type of care, families without a subsidy reported using more 
relative care and less formal care for their youngest children than those with a subsidy.  
Perceptions of availability and affordability among families with and without subsidies 
were the same in comparisons of the youngest and oldest focal children.34  In both 
comparisons, families receiving a subsidy were more likely to perceive formal care as 
available (able to be found and accessed) and affordable than families not receiving a 
subsidy.  Unsurprisingly, parents not receiving a subsidy had higher out-of-pocket costs 
of care and a higher financial burden of child care (both per child and for all children in 
the family) compared to parents who had a subsidy. 
                                                 
34 Seventy-six percent of family day care providers and 81% of child care centers accepted child care 
subsidies in the state in which the Wait List data were collected (Maryland Child Care Resource Network, 
2007).  No rates for the county in which the study was conducted were available. 
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       Child Care Youngest Child
Type of Care
   Center 0.444 0.568 -1.22
   FDCP 0.315 0.341 -0.27
   Relative 0.111 0.023 1.7 *
   Parent/sibling/selfa 0.130 0.068 1.02
   Formal care 0.759 0.909 -2.04 *
Multiple Arrangements 0.222 0.318 -1.07
Perceived Availability
   Formal care 0.889 0.977 -1.81 *
   Informal care 0.352 0.250 1.08
Perceived Affordability
   Formal care 0.685 0.955 -3.78 ***
   Informal care 0.482 0.568 -0.85
       Child Care Oldestb Child
Type of Care
   Center 0.463 0.614 -1.49
   FDCP 0.278 0.250 0.31
   Relative 0.111 0.046 1.18
   Parent/sibling/selfa 0.148 0.091 0.85
   Formal care 0.741 0.864 -1.500
Multiple Arrangements 0.222 0.318 -1.07
Perceived Availability
   Formal care 0.889 1.000 -2.57 **
   Informal care 0.333 0.227 1.15
Perceived Affordability
   Formal care 0.667 0.955 -3.99 ***
   Informal care 0.482 0.568 -0.85
       Child Care All Children
Out of Pocket Cost 535.43 379.72 1.91 *
Out of Pocket Cost/Child (Average) 351.14 253.14 1.87 *
Financial Burden of Child Care For All Childrenc 0.257 0.162 2.6 **
Financial Burden of Care Per Childc 0.184 0.114 2.38 *
At Least One Child in Arrangement Didn't Like 0.167 0.146 0.27
At Least One Child in Unreliable Care Arrangement 0.111 0.073 0.62
At Least One Child in Low-Quality Arrangement 0.185 0.098 1.19
Note. As this sample was pooled over time points, the same parents may be counted more than once. a 
Because child care subsidy status was a family-level variable, it is possible for a focal child in the 
subsidy group to use parent/sibling/self-care.  This focal child was not the child whose care was paid 
for by the subsidy.  b Oldest child eligible for a subsidy (13 or under).     
c Financial Burden of Child Care=Monthly Out of Pocket Cost/Monthly Household Income 




 Two control variables were selected for inclusion in multivariate analyses of the 
Wait List cross-sectional data.  These variables are the focal child’s age and the number 
children aged thirteen or under living in the household and in child care (non-
parent/sibling/self-care).  The focal child’s age was selected because of its potential 
impact on the type of child care chosen.  It is established in the literature that parents tend 
to use informal care for infants and toddlers and formal care for older children (Huston et 
al., 2002; Mulligan et al., 2005; Sonenstein et al., 2002).  Number of children aged 
thirteen or under in care was selected as a control because of its potential effect on 
parents’ experiences of child care problems and child care-related work disruptions 
(having more children in care increases the parents’ risk of exposure to these outcomes), 
and the amount of resources available to the family (more children in care can cause 
more financial drain), which can in turn affect type of care chosen. These two control 
variables were significantly correlated with the proposed mediators and at least one 
dependent variable (see Appendix B).  Due to the small sample size in this study, other 
controls were tested in regression models and omitted because they had no significant 
association with the dependent variables.  These control variables included: maternal 
education, household income, whether mothers worked during non-traditional hours, and 
type of child care subsidy (CCDF/county administered). 
Hypothesis 1a: Impact of Child Care Subsidies 
Bivariate Results 
 Hypothesis 1a of this study examines whether families receiving a child care 
subsidy are less likely to experience child care problems, child-care related work 
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disruptions, and a desire to switch care compared to families without a child care subsidy.  
The first test of this hypothesis uses t-tests to compare parents receiving and not receiving 
a child care subsidy on each of the dependent variables.  As shown in Table 7, parents not 
receiving a subsidy had a greater probability of experiencing at least one child care 
problem and child care-related work disruption over the last three months compared to 
parents receiving a subsidy.  Additionally, there was a tendency (p < .10) for parents not 
receiving a subsidy to report a greater number of child care problems than parents 
receiving a subsidy.  Finally, with regards to the type of child care-related work 
disruptions experienced, parents not receiving a subsidy were significantly more likely 
than those with a subsidy to report leaving work early, changing their work hours, leaving 
their child with friends or family, or leaving their child home alone. 
 There was no difference among parents receiving or not receiving a subsidy in 
desire to switch child care arrangements for their youngest child.  However, among those 
parents who did desire to change their child care arrangements for their youngest child, a 
difference in reason for wanting to switch care by subsidy status was found. Specifically, 
parents receiving a subsidy wanted more convenience compared to those not receiving a 
subsidy.  No difference was found among parents receiving or not receiving a subsidy in 
desire to switch child care arrangements for their oldest child.  However, reasons for 
wanting to switch care for oldest focal children varied by subsidy status.  Parents who 
were receiving a subsidy wanted more convenience and parents who were not receiving a 









Proportion that Experienced Child Care Problems 0.296 0.114 2.31 **
Number of Child Care Problems 0.519 0.227 1.47 †
Proportion that Experienced Child Care-Related 
Employment Disruptions 0.407 0.182 2.46 **
Type of Child Care-Related Work Disruptions
   Arrived at work late 0.148 0.068 1.29
   Left work early 0.130 0.023 2.08 *
   Missed work 0.074 0.046 0.58
   Changed work hours 0.185 0.046 2.25 *
   Took child with work 0.056 0.046 0.22
   Had to leave child with friends/family 0.148 0.023 2.33 *
   Had to leave child home alone 0.037 0.000 1.43 †
Youngest Child
Desire to Change Care 0.500 0.463 0.35
Reason for Desiring Change
   Safety 0.000 0.000 NA
   Preference 0.056 0.023 0.85
   Quality 0.037 0.023 0.41
   Convenience 0.074 0.205 -1.83 *
   Culture 0.000 0.000 NA
   Learning opportunities 0.167 0.091 1.1
   Dissatisfied but unable to afford other care 0.019 0.023 -0.15
   Provider too expensive 0.167 0.091 1.1
Oldesta Child
Desire to Change Care 0.463 0.366 0.94
Reason for Desiring Change
   Safety 0.000 0.000 NA
   Preference 0.056 0.023 0.85
   Quality 0.037 0.023 0.41
   Convenience 0.056 0.159 -1.62 †
   Culture 0.000 0.000 NA
   Learning opportunities 0.148 0.068 1.29 †
   Dissatisfied but unable to afford other care 0.000 0.000 NA
   Provider too expensive 0.148 0.068 1.29 †
Table 7. Wait List Group Differences on Measures of Child Care Problems, Child Care-Related Work 
Disruptions, and Desire to Switch Care
Note.  As this sample was pooled over time points, the same parents may be counted more than once. 
Time frame for child care problems and child care-related work disruptions is three months.  a Oldest 
child eligible for a subsidy (13 or under).






Multivariate Results- Regressing Dependent Variables on Child Care Subsidy 
 The next test of this hypothesis takes control variables into account through the 
use of linear regression models.35  Each regression model was executed two ways: 1) 
with subsidy as the predictor and the youngest focal child’s age as well as the number of 
children aged thirteen or under in care as controls (i.e. youngest child as focal child), and 
2) with subsidy as the predictor and the oldest focal child’s age as well as the number of 
children aged thirteen or under in care as controls (i.e. oldest child as focal child).   
 Child care problems and child care-related work disruptions.  The first regression 
models (see Table 8) were fit to dichotomous measures of child care problems and child 
care-related work disruptions (whether or not one experienced a child care problem/child 
care-related work disruption over the last three months).36  The receipt of a subsidy was 
found to be predictive of whether one experienced a child care problem or child care-
related work disruption.  Families who received a subsidy were 19-20% less likely to 
experience a child care problem compared to families without a subsidy depending upon 
which focal child was analyzed.  With regards to child care-related work disruptions, 
parents receiving a subsidy were 24% less likely to experience a child care-related work 
disruption regardless of which focal child was analyzed.   
                                                 
35 Though most of the dependent variables in regression analyses within this chapter were measured 
dichotomously, results from ordinary least squares regressions were reported here. This is because, due to 
the small sample size, logistic regressions sometimes resulted in unstable coefficients. Logistic regressions 
provided similar results for most of the regressions in this chapter and the distribution of all dependent 
variables in this chapter are sufficient for use with ordinary least squares regression (see Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001).  See Appendix E for results from logistic regressions. 
 
36 Due to the small sample size and non-normal distribution of the continuous measures of child care 
problems and child care-related work disruptions, only dichotomous measures of these variables are 
included in multivariate analyses within this chapter. 
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B sig. B sig. B sig. B sig.
Subsidy -0.191 ** -0.195 ** -0.236 ** -0.236 **
(0.074) (0.074) (0.086) (0.084)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.007 0.004
(0.029) (0.028)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.011 -0.003
(0.017) (0.016)
Children Aged 13 or 
Under In Care 0.049 0.069 0.048 0.053
(0.044) (0.056) (0.049) (0.059)
Constant 0.25 0.263 * 0.322 * 0.347 **
(0.176) (0.134) (0.160) (0.116)
R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
N 98 98 98 9
Table 8. Wait List Regressions of Child Care Problems and Child Care-Related Work Disruptions 
on Child Care Subsidy 
Child Care Problems (Yes/No)
Youngest ChildYoungest Child Oldest Childa
Note.  Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-tailed.  a Oldest child eligible to 
receive a subsidy (up to age 13). 






 To get an idea of the type of child care-related work disruptions parents 
experienced, a model in which missing a full or part day of work was predicted as 
compared to parents’ use of alternative child care arrangements (see Table 9). Only 
parents who reported experiencing child care-related work disruptions were included in 
this analysis so the sample size was very small (N=30). According to these regression 
models, receiving a child care subsidy was not a significant predictor of whether one 
missed a part/full day of work as compared to making alternative child care 
arrangements. Due to the small sample size and lack of statistically significant 
relationships between type of child care-related work disruptions and either the child care 
subsidy variable or the proposed mediating variables (See Appendix B for correlation 
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matrix), additional analyses on type of child care-related work disruptions are not 
reported. 
B sig. B sig
Subsidy -0.052 -0.031
(0.198) (0.228)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.101 **
(0.038)*
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.033
(0.036)
Children Aged 13 or 
Under In Care -0.128 -0.111
(0.108) (0.124)





Table 9. Wait List Regression of Type of Child Care-Related 
Work Disruption on Child Care Subsidy
Oldest Childa
Missed Part/Full Day Modeled, Alternative Arrangements as 
Omitted
Note.  Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-
tailed.  a Oldest child eligible to receive a subsidy (up to age 
13).






 Desire to switch care.  The final set of regression models for this hypothesis (see 
Table 10) tested the effect of having a child care subsidy on parents’ desire to switch their 
child care arrangements. Receiving a subsidy was not found to be a significant predictor 
of parents’ desire to switch care according to these models for either the youngest or 
oldest focal child.   
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B sig. B sig
Subsidy -0.053 -0.121
(0.127) (0.132)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.047
(0.037)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.018
(0.020)
Children Aged 13 or 
Under In Care 0.126 ** 0.108 *
(0.049) (0.064)





Table 10. Wait List Regression of Desire to Switch Care on 
Child Care Subsidy 
Note.  Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-
tailed.  a Oldest child eligible to receive a subsidy (up to age 
13).
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
Oldest Childa





Hypothesis 1b/c: Role of Perceived Affordability of Formal Care, Financial Burden37 and 
Type of Care as Mediators 
Bivariate Results 
 Hypotheses 1b/c of this study examines whether parents’ perceived affordability 
of formal care, the financial burden of care (out-of-pocket cost of care per 
child/household income), and type of care used (formal vs. informal) mediate the 
relationship between having a child care subsidy and parents’ experience of child care 
problems, child-care related work disruptions, and a desire to switch care.  Before using 
multivariate methods to test this hypothesis, families were split into two levels for each of 
the proposed mediating variables and compared on the dependent variables of child care 
                                                 
37 Financial burden refers to the financial burden per child in all analyses of hypotheses 1b/c. 
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problems, child care-related work disruptions, and a desire to switch care through t-tests.  
These t-tests results were consistent with the multivariate analyses of hypothesis 1b/c, 
which are reported next.  
Multivariate Results- Regressing Proposed Mediators on Child Care Subsidy 
To further explore the relationships between the proposed mediators (perceived 
affordability of formal care, financial burden, and type of care), the independent variable 
(child care subsidy status), and the dependent variables (child care problems, child care-
related work disruptions, and desire to switch care), a series of multivariate analyses were 
run in accordance with criteria for mediation set forth by Baron and Kenny (1986).  
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), in order for mediation to occur, four conditions 
must be true.  First, the independent variable must be a significant predictor of the 
dependent variable.  Second, the independent variable must be a significant predictor of 
the proposed mediator. Third, the proposed mediator must be a significant predictor of 
the dependent variable.  Fourth, in a regression of the dependent variable on the 
independent variable, when the proposed mediator is added as a predictor the regression 
coefficient of the independent variable must decrease in magnitude.   
 As child care subsidy status was shown to be a significant predictor of child care 
problems and child care-related work disruptions in the last section, the next test of 
mediation was to regress each of the proposed mediators on the child care subsidy 
variable.  Receiving a child care subsidy was found to be a significant predictor of all 
three proposed mediators (financial burden, perceived affordability of formal care, and 
type of care) (see Table 11).  Using either child as the focal child, parents without a 
subsidy were predicted to have a financial burden 7% higher than that of parents with a 
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child care subsidy. Receiving a subsidy was also a strong predictor of perceived 
affordability of formal care.  Depending upon which focal child was used, parents with a 
subsidy were 26-28% more likely to perceive formal care as affordable compared to 
parents without a subsidy.  Finally, receiving a subsidy was a significant predictor of 
using formal care for the youngest focal child only.  Parents who were receiving a 
subsidy were 14% more likely to use formal care for their youngest child compared to 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Multivariate Results- Regressing Dependent Variables on Proposed Mediators 
The next set of tests for mediation regressed each of the dependent variables on 
each of the proposed mediators and then on two combinations of the proposed mediators.   
 Financial burden. Using the youngest focal child, financial burden was a 
significant predictor of desire to switch care (see Table 12).  Regressions predicted if a 
family had gone from paying none of their income on child care to paying 100% of their 
income on child care, they would have been 44% less likely to desire to switch their child 
care arrangement for their youngest child once their financial burden was increased.  
Financial burden was not a significant predictor of any of the other dependent variables in 
analyses of the youngest focal child.  Additionally, in analyses of the oldest focal child 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Perceived affordability of formal care.  In analyses with both focal children, perceived 
affordability of formal care was a significant predictor of parents’ desire to switch care (see 
Table 13).  Depending upon which focal child was analyzed, parents who perceived formal care 
as affordable were 32-34% less likely to want to switch care arrangements for that child 
compared to parents who did not perceive formal care as affordable.  Perceived affordability of 
formal care was not a significant predictor of any other dependent variables for either focal child.  
B sig. B sig. B sig. B sig. B sig. B si
Perceived Affordability 
Formal Care 0.001 0.006 0.047 0.062 -0.337 ** -0.322 **
(0.116) (0.113) (0.110) (0.105) (0.136) (0.137)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.011 -0.003 -0.039
(0.029) (0.029) (0.035)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.01 -0.001 -0.018
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
Children Aged 13 or Under 
In Care 0.035 0.053 0.028 0.03 0.144 ** 0.122 *
(0.046) (0.056) (0.052) (0.060) (0.050) (0.060)
Constant 0.201 0.189 0.234 0.219 * 0.669 *** 0.601 ***
(0.200) (0.159) (0.170) (0.128) (0.166) (0.162)
R2 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.15 0.09
N 98 98 98 98 98 98
Table 13. Wait List Regressions of Child Care Problems, Child Care-Related Work Disruptions, and Desire to Switch Care on 
Perceived Affordability of Formal Care
Child Care-Related 
Work Disruptions (Yes/No)Child Care Problems (Yes/No)
Note.  Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-tailed.  a Oldest child eligible to receive a subsidy (up to age 13).  
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001  
Oldest Childa
Desire to Switch Care (Yes/No)
Youngest ChildOldest ChildaYoungest ChildYoungest Child Oldest Childa
g.
 
 Type of care (formal vs. informal).   Parents’ use of formal care was a significant 
predictor of both child care problems and child care-related work disruptions (see Table 14).  
The effect between type of care and child care problems was detected in analyses of the oldest 
focal children only.  Parents who used formal care for their oldest child (up to age 13) were 29% 
less likely to experience a child care problem than parents who used informal care for their oldest 
child (up to age 13).  Whether parents used formal care was a significant predictor of child care-
related work disruptions regardless of which focal child was used.  Depending on which focal 
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child was used, parents who used formal care were 21-26% less likely to experience a child care-
related work disruption compared to parents using informal care.   
 13).
B sig. B sig. B sig. B sig. B sig. B sig.
Formal Care -0.093 -0.29 * -0.207 * -0.263 * -0.218 -0.184
(0.135) (0.147) (0.120) (0.134) (0.139) (0.160)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.008 0.007 -0.041
(0.028) (0.028) (0.039)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.031 -0.021 -0.03
(0.019) (0.018) (0.027)
Children Aged 13 or Under 
In Care 0.037 0.101 * 0.035 0.077 0.124 * 0.125 *
(0.042) (0.053) (0.050) (0.060) (0.056) (0.070)
Constant 0.262 0.495 ** 0.397 ** 0.536 ** 0.621 *** 0.572 **
(0.208) (0.214) (0.170) (0.188) (0.178) (0.246)
R2 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.04
N 98 98 98 98 95
Table 14. Wait List Regressions of Child Care Problems, Child Care-Related Work Disruptions, and Desire to Switch Care on 
Type of Care
Note. Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-tailed.  a Oldest child eligible to receive a subsidy (up to age 
 * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001  
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
Desire to Switch Care 
(Yes/No)Child Care Problems (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa





 Combinations of proposed mediators.  A final set of regression models was run in which 
the dependent variables were regressed on two combinations of the proposed mediators. In order 
to split the effects of financial burden of care and perceived affordability of formal care, which 
are in separate path models, financial burden and type of care were analyzed together and 
perceived affordability of formal care and type of care were analyzed together (See Table 15).  
With type of care controlled, financial burden was not a significant predictor of any of the 
dependent variables and perceived affordability was a significant predictor of parents’ desire to 
switch care only.  The effect of perceived affordability of formal care on parents’ desire to 
switch care was slightly weaker with type of care controlled compared to without this control.  
97 
With type of care controlled, parents who perceived formal care to be affordable were 30-32%38 
less likely (depending upon which focal child was analyzed) to desire to switch care than parents 
who perceived formal care to be unaffordable.  Type of care was a significant predictor of child 
care-related work disruptions for both focal children when either financial burden or perceived 
affordability of formal care was controlled.  Additionally, type of care was a significant predictor 
of child care problems for the oldest focal children when financial burden/perceived affordability 
of formal care was controlled. The coefficients for the type of care variable were stronger with 
financial burden/perceived affordability of formal care controlled compared to when they were 
not controlled. 
  
                                                 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Multivariate Results- Regressing Dependent Variables on Child Care Subsidy and 
Proposed Mediators  
 A third set of regressions testing for mediation effects among the financial 
burden, perceived affordability of formal care, and type of care variables were run in 
steps.  In the first step, the dependent variable was regressed on child care subsidy.   In 
the second step, the proposed mediator was added to the model as a predictor so that 
changes in the child care subsidy coefficient with the additional predictor could be 
examined.    
 The first three conditions of mediation require a) the independent variable to 
significantly predict the dependent variable, b) the proposed mediator to significantly 
predict the dependent variable, and c) the proposed mediator be predicted to a statistically 
significant level by the independent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  Since these 
conditions were only met in the relationships among child care subsidy status, type of 
care, and child care-related work disruptions in analyses of the youngest focal children, 
mediation effects through type of care and combinations of proposed mediators including 
type of care among youngest focal children are the only proposed mediation effects 
evaluated in this section.   
 A table of regressions testing type of care as a mediator and two models including 
combinations of proposed mediators39 are reported below. In these regressions, the 
presence of mediation is evaluated by reviewing whether the child care subsidy 
coefficient decreases with the addition of the proposed mediator(s).  Standardized beta 
coefficients, in addition to unstandardized coefficients are reported in the tables of 
combined mediation effects. 
                                                 
39 1) financial burden with type of care and 2) perceived affordability of formal care with type of care 
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 Type of care.  As shown in Table 16, the magnitude of the child care subsidy 
coefficient decreased in each model in which type of care was introduced as a predictor 
(i.e. each model 2).  This suggests type of care had some mediation effects (accounted for 
some of the predictive effect of child care subsidy status) on each of the dependent 
variables. As the first, second, and third criteria of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) tests for 
mediation were only satisfied in the relationships between child care subsidy status and 
child care-related work disruptions through type of care among the youngest focal child, 
the model including these variables is the only model in which significant mediation 
occurs40.  Among youngest focal children, the amount of variation in child care-related 
work disruptions explained by the child care subsidy variable decreased 9% when type of 
care was added.   
                                                 
40 According to Baron and Kenny (1986), when a study has a small sample size, a decrease in the 
magnitude of the independent variable’s regression coefficient when the proposed mediators are added to 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Combinations of proposed mediators. As was done with the regressions of the 
dependent variables on the proposed mediators, regressions of the dependent variables on 
child care subsidy status and combinations of the proposed mediators were broken down 
into two sets of regressions with: 1) financial burden and type of care, and 2) perceived 
affordability of formal care and type of care.  Table 17, which features the regressions 
including financial burden and type of care as controls, displays a decrease in the 
magnitude of the child care subsidy coefficient when the proposed mediators were added 
for every model (except desire to switch care among oldest focal children).  
As a reminder, the only significant mediation effect found thus far was in the 
analysis of youngest focal children in the relationship between child care subsidy and 
child care-related work disruption through type of care.  Though financial burden does 
not meet Baron and Kenny’s (1986) criteria for being a mediator, it does magnify this 
significant mediation effect. Among youngest focal children, the variance in child care-
related work disruptions explained by child care subsidy status decreased 12% when both 
type of care and financial burden were added to the regression (compared to 9% when 
type of care alone was added). With child care problems and parents’ desire to switch 
care (youngest focal child), there was a decrease in the variance explained by child care 
subsidy status when type of care and financial burden were added, but it could not be 
attributed to any significant mediation effect because a) child care subsidy status was not 
a significant predictor of type of care among oldest focal children, and b) child care 
subsidy status was not a significant predictor of parents’ desire to switch care. 
Table 18 displays results from regressions of the dependent variables on child 
care subsidy status and both perceived affordability of formal care and type of care.  In 
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this series of regressions, when perceived affordability of formal care and type of care 
were added to the regressions of child care problems and child care-related work 
disruptions, the child care subsidy status coefficient increased, suggesting a suppression 
effect between child care subsidy status and both child care problems and child care-
related work disruptions through perceived affordability of formal care and type of care.  
Given the finding that type of care had mediation effects on each of the dependent 
variables (significant only in the case of child care-related work disruptions with the 
youngest focal child), it is likely that the suppressive effects of perceived affordability of 
formal care41 combined with the mediation effects of type of care on child care problems 
and child care-related work disruptions resulted in a net suppressive effect.   
The addition of the perceived affordability of formal care and type of care 
variables to the regression of child care subsidy status on parents’ desire to switch care 
resulted in a reduction of the child care subsidy status coefficient.  Because child care 
subsidy status was not a significant predictor of desire to switch care, this effect can not 
be considered a significant mediation effect.  Reasons for differences in the effects of 
financial burden and perceived affordability of formal care on the dependent variables are 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
                                                 
41 The assumption that perceived affordability of formal care had a suppressive effect on these relationships 
is based on regression results not reported in this chapter, in which perceived affordability was shown to be 
a suppressor. 
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B β B β B β B β
Subsidy -0.191** -0.231** -0.161* -0.195* -0.195** -0.236** -0.149* -0.18*
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.084)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.007 -0.031 -0.007 -0.031
(0.029) (0.028)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.011 -0.083 -0.027 -0.21
(0.017) (0.019)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.049 0.101 0.059 0.123 0.069 0.143 0.113* 0.235*
(0.044) (0.043) (0.056) (0.052)
Financial Burden of Care 0.271 0.103 0.258 0.098
(0.362) (0.375)
Formal Care  -0.087 -0.081 -0.274* -0.269*
(0.145) (0.142)
Constant 0.25 0.251 0.263* 0.46*
(0.176) (0.214) (0.134) (0.225)
R2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.12
N 98 98 98 98
B β B β B β B β
Subsidy -0.236** -0.255** -0.209* -0.225* -0.236** -0.255** -0.212** -0.229**
(0.086) (0.095) (0.084) (0.093)
Child's Age (Youngest) 0.004 0.014 0.009 0.034
(0.028) (0.028)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.003 -0.02 -0.019 -0.132
(0.016) (0.018)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.048 0.089 0.052 0.096 0.053 0.098 0.086 0.16
(0.049) (0.052) (0.059) (0.058)
Financial Burden of Care 0.069 0.023 0.006 0.002
(0.378) (0.394)
Formal Care  -0.165 -0.135 -0.217 -0.189
(0.118) (0.132)
Constant 0.322* 0.41* 0.347** 0.562**
(0.160) (0.185) (0.116) (0.211)
R2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09
N 98 98 98 98
B β B β B β B β
Subsidy -0.053 -0.053 -0.051 -0.051 -0.121 -0.121 -0.129 -0.13
(0.127) (0.138) (0.132) (0.137)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.047 -0.169 -0.038 -0.136
(0.037) (0.041)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.018 -0.119 -0.033 -0.218
(0.020) (0.026)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.126** 0.217** 0.113* 0.195* 0.108* 0.189* 0.124* 0.217*
(0.049) (0.055) (0.064) (0.072)
Financial Burden of Care -0.361 -0.113 -0.372 -0.118
(0.295) (0.284)
Formal Care  -0.16 -0.12 -0.128 -0.103
(0.158) (0.163)
Constant 0.485** 0.658*** 0.42** 0.659**
(0.183) (0.180) (0.148) (0.259)
R2 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.06
N 95 95 95 95
Table 17. Wait List Regressions of Child Care Problems, Child Care-Related Work Disruptions and Desire to Switch Care on 
Child Care Subsidy, Financial Burden, and Type of Care
Note. Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-tailed.  a Oldest child eligible to receive a subsidy (up to age 13).
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01 
Desire to Switch Care (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Child Care-Related Work Disruptions (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Child Care Problems (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
(1) (2) (1) (2)
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B β B β B β B β
Subsidy -0.191** -0.231** -0.206** -0.250** -0.195** -0.236** -0.204* -0.247*
(0.074) (0.080) (0.074) (0.087)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.007 -0.031 -0.007 -.031
(0.029) (0.029)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.011 -0.083 -0.031 -0.244
(0.017) (0.020)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.049 0.101 0.045 0.094 0.069 0.143 0.105* 0.218*
(0.044) (0.043) (0.056) (0.055)
Perceived Affordability of Formal Care 0.09 0.087 0.14 0.137
(0.123) (0.101)
Formal Care  -0.051 -0.047 -0.277* -0.272*
(0.134) (0.148)
Constant 0.25 0.233 0.263* 0.457*
(0.176) (0.233) (0.134) (0.227)
R2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.12
N 98 98 98 98
B β B β B β B β
Subsidy -0.236** -0.255** -0.256** -0.277** -0.236** -0.255** -0.270** -0.291**
(0.086) (0.097) (0.084) (0.096)
Child's Age (Youngest) 0.004 0.014 0.006 0.022
(0.028) (0.028)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.003 -0.02 -0.021 -0.15
(0.016) (0.017)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.048 0.089 0.042 0.078 0.053 0.098 0.081 0.15
(0.049) (0.048) (0.059) (0.059)
Perceived Affordability of Formal Care 0.166 0.142 0.22* 0.192*
(0.110) (0.106)
Formal Care  -0.161 -0.132 -0.254* -0.222*
(0.115) (0.129)
Constant 0.322* 0.332* 0.347** 0.47**
(0.160) (0.174) (0.116) (0.179)
R2 0.07 0.1 0.07 0.12
N 98 98 98 98
B β B β B β B β
Subsidy -0.053 -0.053 0.062 0.062 -0.121 -0.121 -0.029 -0.029
(0.127) (0.127) (0.132) (0.132)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.047 -0.169 -0.033 -0.117
(0.037) (0.037)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.018 -0.119 -0.026 -0.172
(0.020) (0.024)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.126** 0.217** 0.142** 0.245** 0.108* 0.189* 0.139* .243*
(0.049) (0.057) (0.064) (0.064)
Perceived Affordability of Formal Care -0.342** -.274** -0.292* -.241*
(0.133) (0.140)
Formal Care  -0.198 -0.148 -0.107 -.086
(0.135) (0.153)
Constant 0.485** 0.792*** 0.42** 0.7**
(0.183) (0.170) (0.148) (0.233)
R2 0.08 0.17 0.04 0.1
N 95 95 95 95
Child Care Problems (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Table 18. Wait List Regressions of Child Care Problems, Child Care-Related Work Disruptions, and Desire to Switch Care on 
Child Care Subsidy, Perceived Affordability of Formal Care, and Type of Care
Note. Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-tailed.  a Oldest child eligible to receive a subsidy (up to age 13).
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01 
Desire to Switch Care (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
(1) (2) (1) (2)






As a final examination of the relationships between the independent, proposed 
mediating, and dependent variables, path models were analyzed.  All paths in the path 
models included the focal child’s age and number of children aged thirteen or under in 
care as controls.  Path models are a pictorial display of the direct effects of the 
independent variable and proposed mediating variables on the dependent variables42.  
These direct effects control for all variables in the model thought to influence them.  
From direct effects, indirect effects through the proposed mediators were calculated by 
multiplying the path coefficients of the paths involved in each indirect effect.  Separate 
path models were run to assess path values with 1) financial burden and type of care as 
intervening variables, and 2) perceived affordability of formal care and type of care as 
intervening variables.  Path models were also run separately for the youngest and oldest 
focal child.  Depictions of the path models with standardized path values are shown in 
Figures 4-7. 
Path model with financial burden. As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the relationship 
between child care subsidy status and financial burden was statistically significant. 
Among both focal children, receiving a child care subsidy was predictive of having a 
lower financial burden.  Receipt of a child care subsidy was also a significant predictor of 
whether parents experienced child care problems or child care-related work disruptions.  
For both focal children, not receiving a subsidy was predictive of experiencing at least 
one child care problem and child care-related work disruption.  Child care subsidy status 
was not found to significantly predict parents’ desire to switch care.  Finally, for both 
                                                 
42 Direct paths were calculated through ordinary least squares regressions. 
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focal children, child care subsidy status was a significant predictor of type of care. 
Parents with a child care subsidy were significantly more likely to use formal care for 
both youngest and oldest focal children than parents without a child care subsidy.   
For both focal children, financial burden was a significant predictor of parents’ 
use of formal care with parents who spent a greater proportion of their income on child 
care being more likely to use formal care.  In neither model was financial burden a 
significant predictor of any of the dependent variables.  Among oldest focal children 
only, type of care was a significant predictor of experiencing at least one child care 
problem.  Parents who used formal care for their oldest child (up to age 13) were 
significantly less likely to experience a child care problem compared to parents who used 
informal care for their oldest child (up to age 13).  In neither model did type of care 
significantly predict child care-related work disruptions or parents’ desire to switch care.  
Finally, as would be expected since one could not have child care-related work 
disruptions without having child care problems (due to the survey design), child care 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Indirect effects in the financial burden models.  There were no significant indirect 
effects between child care subsidy status and the dependent variables in the financial 
burden model with youngest focal children.  This is clear because there were no 
significant direct effects between the proposed mediators and the dependent variables.  In 
the financial burden model with oldest focal children, two significant indirect effects 
were found: 1) between child care subsidy status and child care problems through type of 
care and 2) between child care subsidy status and child care problems through the 
combined indirect paths of financial burden and type of care.  Both of these indirect paths 
were small (-.046 and .010, respectively). 
Path model with perceived affordability of formal care. As shown in Figures 6 
and 7, the relationship between child care subsidies and perceived affordability of formal 
care was highly significant. In analyses with both focal children, receiving a child care 
subsidy was predictive of perceiving formal care for that child as affordable.  Receiving a 
child care subsidy was also a significant predictor of whether parents experienced child 
care problems and child care-related work disruptions.  In models for both focal children, 
parents who did not have a subsidy were more likely to experience at least one child care 
problem and child care-related work disruption than parents who did have a subsidy.  
Child care subsidy status was not found to be a significant predictor of parents’ desire to 
switch care in either model.  Use of formal care was not a significant predictor of parents’ 
desire to switch care arrangements in either model.  Finally, child care subsidy status was 
a significant predictor of type of care for the youngest focal child only with parents who 
had a subsidy being more likely to use formal care than parents without a subsidy. 
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For both focal children, there was a significant relationship between perceived 
affordability of formal care and parents’ desire to switch care with parents who perceived 
formal care as affordable being less likely to desire switching their child care 
arrangement. Perceived affordability of formal care was also a significant predictor of 
child care-related work disruptions among oldest focal children only.  Opposite to what 
was expected, parents who perceived formal care as affordable for their oldest child (up 
to age 13) were more likely to experience a child care-related work disruption.43 
Perceived affordability of formal care was not found to be a significant predictor of child 
care problems in either model.  
Among oldest focal children only, type of care was a significant predictor of both 
child care problems and child care-related work disruptions.  Parents who used formal 
care for their oldest child were less likely to experience at least one child care problem 
and child care-related work disruption compared to parents who used informal care.  
Type of care was not a significant predictor of parents’ desire to switch care in either 
model.  Finally, as mentioned above, child care-related work disruptions and child care 
problems were significantly correlated.   
                                                 
43 Limitations in the perceived affordability of formal care variable that may have affected this relationship 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Indirect effects in the perceived affordability of formal care models.  Despite the 
lack of any mediation effects in the perceived affordability of formal care/type of care 
models (see Table 18), a few indirect effects through perceived affordability of formal 
care were found.  In both figures 6 and 7, a significant indirect effect between child care 
subsidy status and parents’ desire to switch care through perceived affordability of formal 
care is evident.  With both youngest and oldest focal children, this indirect effect is small 
(-.088 and -.083 respectively).  In Figure 7 (oldest focal child), a small but significant 
indirect effect (.066) between child care subsidy and child care-related work disruptions 
through perceived affordability is shown.   
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, hypotheses 1a and 1b were partially supported and evidence to 
support hypothesis 1c was found in this analysis of Wait List data.  In accordance with 
hypothesis 1a, parents who received a child care subsidy were less likely to experience 
child care problems and child care-related work disruptions compared to parents without 
a child care subsidy.  These relationships were found in analyses of both the youngest and 
oldest focal children and held when the child’s age and number of children aged thirteen 
or under in care were controlled.   
In addition to the significant direct effects of child care subsidy status on child 
care problems and child care-related work disruptions, one mediation effect was found 
using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation criteria.  In support of hypothesis 1b, type of 
care was found to be a mediator of the relationship between child care subsidy status and 
child care-related work disruptions among analyses of the youngest focal children. In 
addition to this mediation effect, a significant indirect effect between child care subsidy 
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status and child care problems through type of care was found among oldest focal 
children.    
Though financial burden did not meet Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation 
criteria, the combined effects of financial burden and type of care accounted for more of 
the variation in child care-related work disruptions explained by child care subsidy status 
than was accounted for by type of care alone.  Thus, evidence to support hypothesis 1c 
was found.  It is also notable that an indirect effect between child care subsidy status and 
child care problems through the combined effects of financial burden and type of care 
was found in the path model among oldest focal children. 
No mediation effects were found in the model including perceived affordability of 
formal care and type of care.  Instead, perceived affordability of formal care appeared to 
have a suppressive effect on the relationships between child care subsidy status and both 
child care problems and child care-related work disruptions. This suppression effect held 
when type of care was added as a control.  Significant indirect effects were found 
between child care subsidy status and both child care-related work disruptions (oldest 
focal child only) and desire to switch care (both focal children) through perceived 
affordability.   
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Chapter 5: Results of Fragile Families Cross-Sectional Analyses  
Demographic Characteristics 
Creation of the Data File  
 For the static model using Fragile Families data, a pooled sample of 658 
participants was created from the first two follow-up waves44 of the study.  Participants 
were selected for the sample if they were: single mothers, aged 18 or older, engaged in 
work or school, living with only one child in the household, using non-parent/sibling/self-
care for child care, and at or below 300% FPL.  Some characteristics (marital status, age, 
work participation, child care type45, and percent poverty level) of this selection criterion 
were chosen in order to keep the sample as similar as possible to the Wait List study.  
Other characteristics (school participation and having only one child in the household) 
were necessary in order to analyze the data reliably. 46  Finally, pooled data from follow-
up waves one and two of the Fragile Families study were used in order to capture, to the 
degree possible, the range of children’s ages included in the Wait List study47.  Among 
                                                 
44 1 year and 3 year follow-up 
 
45 A very small proportion of parents in the Wait List study used parent/sibling/self-care (10% for youngest 
focal child, 12% for oldest focal child).  In contrast, one-third of the original Fragile Families sample used 
parent/sibling/self care.  This is likely due to the younger ages of the children in the Fragile Families study 
(~ 1 and 3 years of age).  No children in either study were subsidized in using parent/sibling/self-care. Due 
to regulations in states that prohibit the use of government child care subsidies to pay for most 
parent/sibling/self-care, the decision was made to drop families using this type of care from the Fragile 
Families sample. 
 
46 The dependent variable of child care-related work disruptions asked whether parents missed work/school. 
Thus, parents in work or school were included in the sample.  The choice to include only families with one 
child in the household was made because the questions in Fragile Families varied between asking about the 
focal child in the family and all children in the household. Thus, in order to get an accurate picture of the 
effect of a child care subsidy on child-level variables, inclusion of parents with only one child in the 
household was necessary. 
 
47 The average age of the youngest focal child in the Wait List study was 4 years of age, the range of ages 
for the youngest child in the family was from 5 months to 8 years.  Fragile Families data are currently 
collected only up to age three (Wave 3 follow-up). In order to include children younger than three in the 
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participants in the Fragile Families sample, 22% were receiving a child care subsidy from 
the government.  Among parents who received a child care subsidy, the average amount 
of subsidy was $459/month.  The range in amount of child care subsidy was from $34 to 
$882 per month.48 
Characteristics of the Sample 
The mean annual household income of the Fragile Families sample (inflated to 
2005 dollars) was $21,927 for the non-subsidy group and $16,255 for the subsidy group.  
These incomes translated into an average percent poverty of 163% FPL and 121% FPL, 
respectively.  No families in this sample were above 300% of the poverty threshold.  
Children in this sample (one per household) ranged in age from ten months to 3 1/2 years. 
All participants in the sample were single.  The average number of other adults in the 
household was 3.19. 
 Table 19 provides means and results of t-tests comparing the subsidy and no 
subsidy groups of this pooled sample on a number of characteristics including: household 
income, household composition and living arrangements, characteristics of the mother, 
maternal work and school participation, focal child’s age, and types of assistance 
received for paying for child care.   Parents receiving and not receiving a subsidy were 
similar on most characteristics.  Mothers with a subsidy did have a lower income than 
mothers without a subsidy. Mothers with a subsidy also had fewer adults living with 
them, were more likely to have a high school/vocational degree, and worked fewer hours 
than mothers without a subsidy.  Additionally, mothers with a subsidy were slightly more 
likely than mothers without a subsidy to rent, be black/Hispanic, and have a three year 
                                                                                                                                                 
analyses, children from the one year follow-up were included in addition to children from the three year 
follow-up. 
48 Amount of child care subsidy was inflated to 2005 dollars. 
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old child (as opposed to a one year old).  Finally, mothers with a subsidy were less likely 
to receive help in paying for child care expenses from the non-custodial parent and more 
likely to receive help from other sources than mothers without a subsidy. 
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Household Incomea 21,927 16,255 5.70 ***
% FPL 163.010 120.750 5.71 ***
Number of Adults in the Household 3.304 3.042 2.25 *
Relationship to Other Adults in the Household
   Partner 0.296 0.306 -0.23
   Parent/Parent-in-law 0.294 0.236 1.36
   Grandparent 0.053 0.069 -0.72
   Other adult 0.304 0.250 1.25
Living Arrangements
   Rents 0.691 0.764 -1.71 †
   Owns 0.055 0.035 1.08
   Lives with friends/family 0.247 0.188 1.49
   Temporary housing 0.006 0.007 -0.15
   Controlled housing 0.002 0.007 -0.69
   Homeless 0.000 0.000 NA
   Other living arrangements 0.000 0.000 NA
Race
   Hispanic 0.409 0.444 -0.77
   Black 0.401 0.424 -0.49
   Non-Hispanic, Non-Black 0.191 0.132 1.77 †
Mother's Age 24.420 23.972 0.95
Maternal Depression 0.165 0.222 -1.58
Mother’s Education
   Less than high school 0.323 0.285 0.87
   High school/GED/Vocational 0.389 0.486 -2.10 *
   Some college/Bachelor's degree 0.265 0.222 1.03
Mother in School 0.319 0.354 -0.79
Degree Studying For
   Not in school 0.681 0.646 0.79
   School for h.s. diploma/GED 0.049 0.035 0.77
   School for Associates' degree/training/technical 0.162 0.208 -1.32
   School for Bachelors' degree 0.084 0.069 0.55
   Other degree 0.025 0.042 -0.91
Mother's Employment Status 0.887 0.882 0.17
Non-Traditional Work Hours 0.465 0.479 -0.30
Work Hours 36.278 34.431 1.94 *
Children
Proportion of Sample Approx. Age 3 0.488 0.569 0.09 †
Help Paying for Child Care
Received Help Paying for Care 0.056 1.000 -92.63 ***
Sources of Help
    Non-custodial parent 0.020 0.000 3.19 **
    Relative 0.004 0.000 1.42
    Government 0.000 1.000 inf. ***
    Employer/Foundation 0.000 0.000 NA NA
    Child care provider 0.002 0.014 -1.20
    Other 0.029 0.132 -3.51 ***
†≤.10, *≤.05, **≤.01, ***≤.001, two-tailed t-tests. 
Demographics
Employment/Student Status
Note. As this sample was pooled over time points, the same parents may be counted more than 
once. Results are unweighted. a  Inflated to 2005 dollars.
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Table 20 provides means and t-test results comparing parents receiving and not 
receiving a child care subsidy on child care variables.  Areas of interest in this table 
include child care choices and out-of-pocket costs of care. Three significant differences 
among the subsidy and non-subsidy groups were found through these comparisons.  First, 
mothers receiving a child care subsidy were significantly more likely to use center-based 
care and less likely to use a family day care provider, relative, or other type of care 
compared to mothers not receiving a child care subsidy.  Second, parents receiving a 
child care subsidy had their children in care more hours than parents without a child care 
subsidy.  Third, mothers receiving a child care subsidy paid less in out-of-pocket costs for 
child care and had a lower financial burden of care compared to mothers not receiving a 








   Center 0.307 0.701 -9.06 ***
   FDCP 0.109 0.056 2.26 **
   Relative 0.535 0.229 7.37 ***
   Formal Care 0.416 0.757 -8.12 ***
Multiple Arrangements 0.181 0.139 1.18
Hours in Care Non-Parental, Non-Sibling, Non-Self Care 32.976 35.146 -2.22 **
Amount of government child care subsidy (in months)a 0.00 459.52 -17.86 ***
Out-of-Pocket Cost of Care Per Child (Per month)a 248.01 85.86 12.21 ***
Financial Burden of Careb 0.167 0.085 5.98 ***
 * ≤. 05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001, one-tailed t-tests. 
Table 20. Fragile Families Group Differences on Child Care Variables
Child Care Choices
Note. As this sample was pooled over time points, the same parents may be counted more than 
once.Results are unweighted. a  Inflated to 2005 dollars. b Financial Burden of Care=Monthly 











 Thirteen49,50 control variables were used in this cross-sectional analysis of Fragile 
Families data.  These variables were chosen due to their potential impact on the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables in these analyses (see 
Appendix C).  A brief explanation why each of the control variables was selected 
follows.  Household income and maternal education were selected as controls, as they are 
in many studies, due to their potential impact on parents’ access to resources and decision 
making. Numbers of adults in the household and maternal race were included as controls 
to account for selection issues as the weighting variables were not available.  Focal 
child’s age was included due to the documented tendency of parents to move from 
informal to formal care as a child ages (Sonenstein et al., 2002).  Maternal work hours 
were included because work hours proxies hours in care (a variable that should be 
controlled for because children who are in care more hours have more exposure to the 
risk of experiencing child care problems than children who are in care fewer hours).  An 
indicator for whether the mother was in school was included due to a lack of information 
on school hours.  Due to this lack of data, no adjustment on the work hours variable to 
give credit for time spent in school was possible.  Thus, including a dummy variable for 
school participation was the most valid way to control for time in school.  Working 
during non-traditional hours was included as a control because studies suggest parents 
who work non-traditional hours have different child care choices than parents who work 
                                                 
49 One additional control, out-of-pocket imputed, was used in all analyses that included the financial burden 
variable.  This control accounted for the researcher’s use of imputed out-of-pocket amounts (based on the 
family’s child care subsidy status and percent poverty).  Imputed out-of-pocket amounts were only used 
when the reported out-of-pocket amount paid by the recipient exceeded the household income. 
50 Child characteristics, such as behavior problems, physical issues, and disabilities, were not included as 
controls in this study.  Future studies should control for these variables as they may constrain/affect 
parents’ choices of child care providers. 
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during traditional hours (Riley & Glass, 2002).  The use of multiple child care 
arrangements was included due to findings from studies that more child care problems 
occur when parents are piecing together multiple care providers (Scott et al., 2005).  
Maternal depression was included as a control for parents’ mental health, which could 
affect parents’ perception of and ability to cope with child care problems (Huston et al., 
2002).  Finally, financial help in paying for child care from sources other than the child 
care subsidy was included because financial help received from a source other than the 
child care subsidy would potentially have similar impacts on the dependent variables and 
proposed mediators as the subsidy itself. 
Hypothesis 1a: Impact of Child Care Subsidies 
Bivariate Results 
Hypothesis 1a of this study examines whether families receiving a child care 
subsidy differ from families not receiving a child care subsidy on experiences of child 
care problems and child care-related work disruptions.  The first test of this hypothesis 
uses t-tests to compare parents receiving and not receiving a child care subsidy on each of 
the dependent variables.  As shown in Table 23, mothers without a child care subsidy 
were more likely to experience a child care problem and child care-related work 








Proportion That Experienced Child Care Problems in Last Month 0.318 0.222 2.22 **
Number of Child Care Problems in Last Month 0.663 0.563 0.73
Proportion That Experienced Child Care-Related Work Disruptions in 
Last Month 0.160 0.105 1.81 *
Number of Child Care-Related Work Disruptions in Last Month 0.367 0.287 0.73
Note. As this sample was pooled over time points, the same parents may be counted more than 
once.  Results are unweighted. 
* ≤. 05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001, one-tailed t-tests. 
Table 21. Fragile Families Group Differences on Child Care Problems and Child Care-Related Work 
Disruptions
 
Multivariate Results- Regressing Dependent Variables on Child Care Subsidy 
 The next test of this hypothesis takes control variables into account through the 
use of logistic and ordinal logit regression models (see Table 22).  For this analysis, a 
number of control variables were included: household income, focal child’s age, mother’s 
race and education, maternal depression, number of people in the household, mother’s 
work hours, whether the mother was in school, whether the mother worked non-
traditional hours, whether multiple child care arrangements were used for the child, and 
whether the mother received financial assistance in paying for child care (from a source 
other than the government-provided child care subsidy).       
 Child care problems. As shown in Table 22, receiving a child care subsidy 
reduced the odds of experiencing a child care problem in the last month by 36%. Receipt 
of a child care subsidy was also a significant negative predictor of the number of child 
care problems experienced.   
 Child care-related work disruptions.  Having a child care subsidy was a 
significant predictor of whether parents experienced a child care-related work disruption 
(See Table 22). Receiving a child care subsidy reduced the odds of experiencing a child 
care-related work disruption in the last month by 44%.  Receipt of a child care subsidy 
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was also a significant negative predictor of the number of times a parent experienced 
child care-related work disruptions.  Parents who had a child care subsidy had fewer child 
care-related work disruptions than parents who did not have a subsidy. 
B eB B eB B eB B eB
Subsidy -0.446 0.64 * -0.43 0.650 * -0.579 0.56 * -0.582 0.559 *
(0.243) (0.246) (0.311) (0.313)
Income/Month (log) 0.098 1.103 0.037 1.038 -0.067 0.935 -0.077 0.925
(0.104) (0.105) (0.114) (0.115)
Focal Child's Age 0.143 1.154 0.205 1.227 0.268 1.307 0.253 1.288
(0.182) (0.173) (0.243) (0.237)
Hispanic 0.291 1.337 0.386 1.471 0.613 1.847 * 0.695 2.004 *
(0.261) (0.253) (0.371) (0.366)
Black 0.2 1.222 0.237 1.267 0.554 1.74 0.602 1.826 *
(0.247) (0.237) (0.361) (0.357)
Maternal Depression 0.48 1.616 ** 0.517 1.678 ** 0.518 1.679 * 0.54 1.715 *
(0.213) (0.216) (0.282) (0.283)
Number of Adults in 
Household 0.032 1.033 0.055 1.057 0.196 1.216 ** 0.212 1.237 **
(0.066) (0.068) (0.078) (0.082)
Work Hours 0.001 1.001 -0.002 0.998 -0.009 0.991 -0.011 0.989
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Mother in School 0.026 1.027 0.075 1.078 0.353 1.423 0.339 1.404
(0.197) (0.194) (0.248) (0.249)
Non-Traditional Hours 0.199 1.22 0.228 1.256 0.276 1.318 0.281 1.324
(0.186) (0.181) (0.242) (0.244)
Multiple Child Care 
Arrangements 0.782 2.185 *** 0.725 2.065 *** 0.324 1.382 0.338 1.402
(0.227) (0.219) (0.296) (0.296)
Other Help Received -0.561 0.571 -0.496 0.609 0.019 1.019 -0.013 0.987
(0.395) (0.397) (0.458) (0.434)
High School/GED/Voc 0.045 1.046 0.05 1.051 0.093 1.097 0.05 1.051
(0.215) (0.211) (0.270) (0.267)
Associates/College 0.213 1.237 0.176 1.192 -0.059 0.943 -0.065 0.937
(0.246) (0.240) (0.328) * (0.333)
Constant -0.276 ** -2.584 **
(0.844) (0.983)
R2/Pseudo R2 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03
Observations 657 657 657 656 656 656
* p ≤ .05, ** p  ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of child care problems/child care-related work disruptions 
results based on ordinal logit regressions.  Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-tailed.  
Unweighted results reported.
















Hypothesis 1b/c: Role of Financial Burden and Type of Care as Mediators 
Bivariate Results 
 Hypotheses 1b/c of this study examines whether parents’ perceived financial 
burden of care (out-of-pocket cost of care per child/household income) and type of care 
used (formal vs. informal) mediate the relationship between having a child care subsidy 
and experiencing child care problems and/or child care-related work disruptions.  Before 
using multivariate methods to test this hypothesis, families were split into two levels for 
each of the proposed mediating variables and compared on the dependent variables of 
child care problems and child care-related work disruptions through t-tests.  These t-tests 
results were consistent with the multivariate analyses of hypothesis 1b/c, which are 
reported next.  
Multivariate Results- Regressing Proposed Mediators on Child Care Subsidy 
To further explore the relationships between the proposed mediators (financial 
burden and type of care), the independent variable (child care subsidy status), and the 
dependent variables (child care problems and child care-related work disruptions) a series 
of multivariate analyses were run in accordance with the mediation criteria set forth by 
Baron and Kenny (1986).   
First, each of the dependent variables was regressed on child care subsidy status.  
(Results from these regressions are reported above.) Next, each of the proposed mediators 
was regressed on the child care subsidy variable (See Table 23).  Having a child care 
subsidy was a strong predictor of both financial burden and use of formal care.  The 
financial burden of parents with a child care subsidy was .09 units lower than the 
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financial burden of parents without a child care subsidy.  Additionally, parents with a 
child care subsidy were four times more likely to use formal care than parents without a 
child care subsidy. 
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B B eB
Subsidy -0.09 *** 1.459 4.303 ***
(0.016) (0.237)
Income/Month (log) -0.054 *** 0.11 1.116
(0.018) (0.104)
Focal Child's Age -0.039 ** 0.838 2.311 ***
(0.014) (0.183)
Hispanic 0.052 ** 0.119 1.126
(0.018) (0.251)
Black 0.02 0.316 1.372
(0.016) (0.249)
Maternal Depression 0.012 -0.389 0.678
(0.018) (0.249)
Number of Adults in 
Household -0.004 -0.236 0.79 **
(0.005) (0.075)
Work Hours 0.002 ** 0.012 1.012
(0.008) (0.009)
Mother in School -0.021 0.273 1.313
(0.015) (0.192)
Non-Traditional Hours -0.009 -0.62 0.538 ***
(0.012) (0.180)
Multiple Child Care 
Arrangements -0.015 -0.013 0.987
(0.018) (0.231)
Other Help Received -0.065 *** 1.342 3.827 ***
(0.019) (0.392)
High School/GED/Voc 0.002 0.246 1.279
(0.016) (0.208)
Associates/College 0.013 0.401 1.494 *
(0.017) (0.242)
Out-of-Pocket Imputed 0.09 *
(0.054)




* p ≤ .05, ** p  ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001
Financial Burden Formal Care
Table 23. Fragile Families Regressions of Proposed 
Mediators on Child Care Subsidy 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results based on 
ordinal logit/logistic regressions.  Tests of significance for 






Multivariate Results- Regressing Dependent Variables on Proposed Mediators 
Next, each of the dependent variables was regressed on each of the proposed 
mediators and then on both of the proposed mediators. Neither proposed mediator was 
found to be a significant predictor of either dependent variable in any of the models (see 
Tables 24 and 25).  This lack of significance was found using both the dichotomous and 
ordinal measures of the dependent variables.   
Since Baron and Kenny (1986) require both significant relationships between the 
independent variable and the mediator and between the mediator and the dependent 
variable in order for mediation to occur, it can be concluded that financial burden of care 
and type of care do not mediate the relationships between child care subsidy status and 
child care problems/child care-related work disruptions in this sample.  Thus, further 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To further clarify the relationships between child care subsidy, financial burden, 
type of care, and the dependent variables using the Fragile Families data, path models 
were analyzed.  All paths in the path models included the control variables used 
throughout this chapter51.  Depictions of the path models with standardized path values 
are shown in Figure 8. 
 As shown in Figure 8, child care subsidy status had a direct negative effect on 
each of the dependent variables (child care problems and child care-related work 
disruptions).  Thus, parents with a child care subsidy were less likely to experience a 
child care problem or child care-related work disruption than parents without a child care 
subsidy.  Child care subsidy status was also a significant predictor of each of the 
proposed mediators.  Parents with a child care subsidy had a lower financial burden of 
care and were more likely to use a formal child care provider than parents without a child 
care subsidy.  Financial burden was a significant predictor of type of care used with 
families who had a higher financial burden being more likely to use formal care than 
families with a lower financial burden.  Neither of the proposed mediators had a 
significant direct effect on either dependent variable.  Due to the lack of direct effects 
between either of the proposed mediators and the dependent variables, it is clear that 
there are also no indirect effects between child care subsidy status and either child care 
problems or child care-related work disruptions through either of the proposed mediators.  
Finally, there was a strong correlation between child care problems and child care-related 
                                                 
51 These control variables are: household income, focal child’s age, maternal race, maternal depression, 
number of adults in the household, maternal education, whether mothers were in school, maternal work 
hours, whether mother’s worked non-traditional hours, use of multiple arrangements for child care, and 
financial assistance for child care from sources other than the government subsidy. 
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work disruptions.  This correlation is expected because parents were not asked the survey 
question about child care-related work disruptions unless they stated they had 

























































































































































































































 In conclusion, parents from the Fragile Families sample who were receiving a 
child care subsidy were less likely to experience and experienced fewer child care 
problems and child care-related work disruptions than parents without a subsidy.  This 
finding supports hypothesis 1a of this study.  Financial burden of care and type of care 
were tested as mediators of the relationships between child care subsidy status and the 
dependent variables.  Neither variable was found to be a mediator, nor were there any 
significant indirect effects between child care subsidy status and the dependent variables 
through financial burden, type of care, or the combination of these variables.  These 
findings do not support hypotheses 1b/c of this study. 
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Chapter 6: Results of Attrition and Wait List Study Change Analyses 
Creation of Data File 
 A more stringent test of the effect of child care subsidies on parents’ experiences 
of child care problems, child care-related work disruptions, and a desire to switch care 
analyzes the same families over time.  In order to conduct change analyses, a new dataset 
was created from the Wait List study using every combination of data collection time 
points including current and retrospective data.  These data collection time points were: 
1) retrospective data prior to Wave I, 2) Wave I data, 3) retrospective data prior to Wave 
II, and 4) Wave II data.  The change dataset included one case for each pair of data 
collection time points completed by the respondent.52  Sample sizes for each pair of data 
collection time points used as subsamples in creating the final change data file are 
provided in Table 26.  Because families may have had more than one record (if they 
answered both current and retrospective data in either wave of data collection), all 
multivariate analyses were run clustered on a family identification variable, thus the 
standard errors were adjusted appropriately.  In the new change data file, among families 
that changed subsidy status at some point in the study, the time point in which they were 
not receiving a subsidy was considered Time 1 and the time point in which they were 
receiving a subsidy was considered Time 2.  For families that did not change subsidy 
status, Time 1 and Time 2 were based on which data were collected first/second. 
                                                 
52 The intervals between time points varied ranging from one month to three months depending on whether 
the data was collected retrospectively and how long the family had/had not received a child care subsidy. 
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Table 26. Description of Wait List Change Dataset

















T1_1 (ns) T1ns T1s T2_1(s) T2ns T2s N
- X X 12
Note. "ns" signifies the family was not receiving a child care subsidy at this time 
point. "s" signifies the family was receiving a child care subsidy at this time 
point.
98
No Change in Child Care Subsidy Status Samples (N=30)
Change in Child Care Subsidy Status Samples (N=56)














 Once the change data file was created, variables were recoded.  A complete 
description of variable recoding is available in Chapter 3.  As a brief reminder, the 
subsidy variable was coded “1” if a change occurred in which the family went from not 
receiving a subsidy to receiving a subsidy. The omitted group included all families who 
did not change their subsidy status.  Each of the dependent variables were coded “1” if 
the desired outcome (decrease in child care problems, child care-related work disruptions, 
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or desire to switch care) occurred at Time 2.  Each of the dependent variables was coded 
“2” if the parent attrited (data were only available at one time point).  Finally, the omitted 
group for the dependent variables included all parents who had scores at both time 
periods and whose score on the dependent variable did not change in the desired direction 
from Time 1 to Time 2.  
Descriptive Results from the Change Sample 
Table 27 provides means and results of dependent t-tests comparing parents 
across Time 1 and Time 2 on variables of interest.53  As shown, there was a significant 
difference in the proportion of the sample that received a child care subsidy, perceived 
formal care as affordable for their youngest and oldest children, and experienced child 
care problems across time points.  There was also a significant difference in parents’ 
financial burden of care per child between Time 1 and Time 2.  As would be expected 
given that a greater proportion of the sample received a child care subsidy at Time 2, at 
Time 2 parents were more likely to perceive formal care as affordable for both their 
youngest and oldest children, less likely to experience child care problems, and had a 
lower financial burden of care per child compared to Time 1.   
It is worthy of note that among parents who changed subsidy status across time 
periods in the Wait List study, switching from no subsidy to receiving a subsidy resulted 
in an average reduction of out-of-pocket child care costs (for all children) of $251.56 per 
month.  Thirty percent of the 56 parents who changed child care subsidy status across 
                                                 
53 Missing data due to attrition was counted as omitted in this analysis. 
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waves had no change in cost of care or had an increased cost of care with the addition of 







Child Care Subsidy 0.224 0.837 -12.60 ***
Family Income 28321.81 28428.56 -0.30
Financial Burden of Care Per Childa 0.178 0.121 3.20 **
Perceived Affordability of Formal Care (Youngest Child) 0.724 0.884 -3.06 **
Perceived Affordability of Formal Care (Oldest Child) 0.724 0.872 -2.80 **
Use of Formal Care (Youngest Child) 0.480 0.520 -1.65 †
Use of Formal Care (Oldest Child) 0.459 0.500 -1.16
Desire to Change Child Care (Youngest Child) 0.449 0.463 -0.54
Desire to Change Child Care (Oldest Child) 0.388 0.413 -0.17
Proportion that Experienced Child Care Problems 0.224 0.151 2.00 *
How Often Had Child Care Problems 0.347 0.349 0.35
Proportion that Experienced Employment Problems 0.296 0.256 0.68
How Often Had Employment Problems 0.408 0.360 0.69
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed t-tests 
Table 27. Wait List Change Dependent T-Tests on Change Variables





As all original participants of the Wait List study did not participate in both waves 
of data collection, an analysis of participants who attrited (N=12) was necessary to 
determine whether the act of attrition was random.  First, characteristics of persons who 
did and did not complete both waves of data (see Tables 28 and 29) showed that attriters 
differed from non-attriters in terms of work/school participation and receipt of help from 
child care providers.  Study participants who attrited were more likely to work one job 
than those who did not attrite.  Participants who attrited also worked more hours than 
non-attriters and when school hours were taken into account, attriters worked/were in 
                                                 
54 This occurred because these parents were using free/low cost informal care and switched to formal care 
when they received a subsidy, were subsidized through other means (i.e. provider discount) before 
receiving the subsidy, or changed to a more expensive formal provider when they received the subsidy. 
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school more hours than non-attriters.  Finally, attriters were less likely to receive help in 








Household Income 27510 28366 -0.230
Percent Poverty 164.11 172.28 -0.370
Single 0.929 0.833 0.910
Living Arrangements
   Rents 0.786 0.833 -0.340
   Owns 0.107 0.000 1.800 †
   Lives with friends/family 0.071 0.167 -0.910
   Temporary Housing 0.036 0.000 1.000
Length of Time in Residence 2.796 1.694 1.450
Mother's Education
   H.S./GED 0.429 0.417 0.070
   Some college/vocational 0.429 0.500 -0.410
   Bachelors degree/more 0.143 0.083 0.510
Employment/Student Status
Mother in School 0.286 0.333 -0.290
Mother's School Schedule
   Not in school 0.714 0.667 -0.290
   Part-time 0.143 0.250 -0.800
   Full-time 0.143 0.083 0.510
Degree Studying For
   GED 0.000 0.000 NA
   Associates/Vocational Training 0.214 0.250 -0.240
   Bachelors 0.071 0.083 -0.130
Mother's Employment Status 0.929 1.000 -1.440
Length of Time in Current Job 2.415 3.519 -1.240
Non-Traditional Work Hours 0.429 0.417 0.070
Number of Jobs
   No jobs 0.071 0.000 1.440
   One job 0.857 1.000 -2.120 *
   More than one job 0.071 0.000 1.440
Work Hours 32.411 41.250 -3.160 **
Work and School Hoursb 36.696 45.417 -2.780 **
Children
Number of Children 13 or Under 2.000 1.917 0.230
Number of Children 13 or Under in Care 1.336 1.354 0.200
Youngest Child's Age 3.691 3.667 0.040
Oldesta Child's Age 6.476 7.000 -0.440
Table 28. Group Differences Between Attriters and Non-Attriters from Wait List Sample on 
Demographics
Note.  a Oldest child eligible for a subsidy (13 or under). b 10 hours were added for part-time 
school enrollment, 20 hours for full-time school enrollment.  









       Child Care Youngest Child
Type of Care
   Center 0.500 0.500 0.000
   FDCP 0.321 0.333 -0.070
   Relative 0.107 0.083 0.220
Multiple Arrangements 0.214 0.333 -0.780
       Child Care Oldesta Child
Type of Care
   Center 0.571 0.667 -0.550
   FDCP 0.321 0.167 0.990
   Relative 0.071 0.083 -0.130
Multiple Arrangements 0.179 0.417 -1.610
       Child Care All Children
Out of Pocket Cost 418.350 355.290 1.090
Out of Pocket Cost/Child (Average) 262.860 241.350 0.890
Financial Burden of Child Careb 0.193 0.143 0.490
Financial Burden of Care Per Childb 0.133 0.102 0.270
Has Help Paying for Child Care 0.929 0.667 1.740 †
Sources of Help
   Government
   Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit 0.607 0.333 1.600
   Child care provider 0.250 0.000 3.000 **
   Foundation 0.036 0.000 1.000
   Relative 0.071 0.000 1.440
   Non-custodial parentc 0.000 0.000 NA
   Other help 0.071 0.000 1.440
Table 29. Group Differences Between Attriters and Non-Attriters on Child Care Variables
Note. a Oldest child eligible for a subsidy (13 or under). b Financial Burden of Child 
Care=Monthly Out of Pocket Cost/Monthly Household Income c Non-custodial parent 
assistance does not include child support. 
† p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed tests  
Multivariate Analyses 
Due to the availability of administrative data on child care subsidy status for all 
participants, whether they attrited or not, a multinomial logit regression analysis 
predicting attrition was possible.  Child care subsidy status was used as the sole predictor 
for these regressions and each of the dependent variables was coded in three levels (0=no 
change, 1=outcome improved at time two, 2=attrited).  Whether one attrited from the 
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study was significantly predicted by whether or not they changed child care subsidy 
status over the course of the study (see Table 30).  In fact, none of the participants who 
had a change in child care subsidy status attrited over the course of the study.55  As 
household income was also available through administrative data for each participant at 
both time points, this variable was added as a second predictor, with child care subsidy 
status, in a second set of multinomial logistic regressions.  Household income was not 
found to be a significant predictor of attrition in this analysis. 
Table 30. Multivariate Attrition Analysis
DV=1 Attrite DV=1 Attrite DV=1 Attrite DV=1 Attrite
Subsidy 1.443* -37.083*** 1.809** -37.997*** 20.634 -37.114*** 20.714 -36.057***
(0.803) (0.352) (0.804) (0.360) (0.000) (0.353) (0.000) (0.344)
Constant -2.639*** -0.847** -2.639*** -0.847** -22.287*** -0.916** -22.013*** -0.916**
(0.750) (0.368) (0.750) (0.368) (0.492) (0.362) (0.425) (0.362)
Log Likelihood -62.82 -66.851 -49.815 -54.224
Observations 98 98 98 98




Desire to Switch Care
Youngest Child
Desire to Switch Care
Oldest Child
 
Hypothesis 2a: Impact of Child Care Subsidies among the Same Families over Time  
 Participants who attrited were then removed from the data and logistic regressions 
were used to test hypothesis 2a (parents who change child care subsidy status from no 
subsidy to receiving a subsidy will be less likely to experience/experience fewer child 
care problems, child care-related work disruptions, and a desire to switch care while 
receiving a child care subsidy).  As evident in Table 31, logistic regressions using change 
in child care subsidy as the sole predictor found changing child care subsidy status from 
not receiving a subsidy to receiving a subsidy, was associated with the following 
outcomes: 
                                                 
55 The majority of people (75%) who attrited from the study were not receiving a child care subsidy at 
either wave of data collection.   
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o Decreased likelihood of experiencing a child care problem and experiencing 
fewer child care problems when receiving a subsidy56  
o Decreased likelihood of experiencing a child care-related work disruption and 
experiencing fewer child care-related work disruptions when receiving a subsidy57  
o Decreased likelihood of desiring to switch child care arrangements for both the 
youngest (χ2= 5.385, p=.020) and oldest (χ2= 7.471, p= 0.006)58 focal children 
when receiving a subsidy.  
B eB B eB B eB B eB
Subsidy 1.443* 4.233 1.809** 6.103 -1.544** 0.213 -1.523*** 0.218
(0.805) (0.806) (0.627) (0.483)
Constant -2.639*** -2.639***
(0.752) (0.752)
Observations 86 86 86 86













Note. One-tailed t-tests using robust standard errors. Difference measures tested with ordinal logistic 
models.
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001  
Hypothesis 2b/c: Role of Perceived Affordability of Formal Care, Financial Burden and 
Type of Care as Mediators among the Same Families over Time 
 In order to better understand the relationships between a change in child care 
subsidy status and the dependent variables (child care problems, child care-related work 
                                                 
56 No child-specific variables are included in this analysis.  Thus, this analysis uses a family level of 
measurement and focal child is not specified. 
 
57 No child-specific variables are included in this analysis.  Thus, this analysis uses a family level of 
measurement and focal child is not specified. 
 
58 The change in desire to switch care is not included in the regression table because the change in child 
care subsidy status variable perfectly predicted a change in parents’ desire to switch care.  As such, using 
logistic regression was not possible. In lieu of a regression, chi-square statistics were used to analyze this 
relationship. 
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disruptions, and desire to switch care) among the same families over time, three variables 
were tested as mediators (financial burden, perceived affordability of formal care, and 
type of care).  The proposed mediators were coded similarly to the dependent variables, 
with “1” indicating a change in the desirable direction (decrease in financial burden at 
Time 2 only, perception of formal care as affordable at Time 2 only, and use of formal 
care at Time 2 only) and a “0” indicating the lack of such a change. 
Multivariate Results- Regressing Proposed Mediators on Child Care Subsidy 
In the first set of tests used to detect mediation effects, each of the dependent 
variables was regressed on child care subsidy status (see above for results).  Next, each of 
the proposed mediators was regressed on child care subsidy status.  As shown in Table 
32, the only proposed mediator that was significantly predicted by a change in child care 
subsidy status was type of care for oldest children.59  A change in type of care for oldest 
focal children (from informal to formal care) was perfectly predicted by a change in child 
care subsidy status.  In other words, parents who changed child care subsidy status from 
not receiving a subsidy at Time 1 to receiving a subsidy at Time 2 were the only parents 
who changed their oldest60 child’s care from informal care at Time 1 to formal care at 
Time 2 (χ2= 4.725, p= 0.030). 
                                                 
59 Because the change in child care subsidy status variable perfectly predicted a change in use of formal 
care for oldest children, a logistic regression was not possible. Thus, a chi-square statistic was used to 
analyze this relationship. 
 
60 Oldest child up to age 13. 
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Table 32. Wait List Change in Mediators Regressed on Change in Child Care Subsidy
Financial 
Burden
B B eB B eB B eB
Subsidy -0.065 1.205 3.338 1.205 3.338 1.045 2.843
(0.048) (0.757) (0.757) (1.209)
Constant -0.025 -1.872** -1.872** -3.367***
(0.031) (0.644) (0.644) (1.038)
Observations 86 86 86 86 86
R-squared 0.03
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.





Uses Formal Care 
(Youngest)
 
Multivariate Results- Regressing Dependent Variables on Proposed Mediators 
 The second test of mediation used a set of regressions to predict each of the 
dependent variables from each of the proposed mediators. As shown in Table 3361, the 
only significant relationship between proposed mediators and dependent variables in the 
expected direction was that between financial burden and child care problems.  A 
decrease in financial burden significantly predicted a decrease in child care problems 
from Time 1 to Time 2.  
 Since none of the proposed mediators (financial burden, perceived affordability, 
or use of formal care) was significantly predicted from the child care subsidy variable and 
significantly predicted a dependent variable, the conditions necessary for mediation in 
this change model were not met.  Thus, no further analyses are reported for the mediation 
hypotheses of this model.   
                                                 
61 Because the change in perceived affordability of formal care for both youngest and oldest focal children 
and the change in use of formal care for the youngest focal child perfectly predicted a change in parents’ 
experience of at least one child care problem (each perfectly predicting a lack of decrease in child care 
problems from Time 1 to Time 2), logistic regressions were not possible. Cross-tabulations and chi-squares 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In conclusion, an attrition analysis revealed parents who attrited from the Wait 
List study were busier in terms of work and school than parents who did not attrite.  
Additionally, a lack of change in child care subsidy status over the course of the study 
significantly predicted attrition. For parents who completed both interviews a change in 
child care subsidy status was predictive of child care problems, child care-related work 
disruptions, and a desire to switch child care arrangements.  Each of these dependent 
variables was less likely to happen while parents were receiving a subsidy compared to 
when they were not receiving a subsidy.  This finding is consistent with hypothesis 2a 
and provides a stronger test of the association between child care subsidy status and the 
dependent variables (child care problems, child care-related work disruptions, and a 
desire to switch care) than was provided in the cross-sectional results previously reported.  
The relationships between child care subsidy status and the dependent variables for the 
same families over time were not mediated by experiencing a decrease in financial 
burden, change in one’s perception about the affordability of formal care62, or change in 
the type of care used for the focal child63.  The lack of mediation found in this analysis is 
not consistent with hypotheses 2b/c of this study. 
                                                 
62 Change in perception of affordability refers to perceiving formal care as unaffordable at Time 1 and 
affordable at Time 2. 
 
63 Change in type of care refers to using informal care at Time 1 and formal care at Time 2. 
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Chapter 7: Comparing the Wait List and Fragile Families Samples and Findings 
 In this chapter, the Wait List and Fragile Families samples are compared on 
characteristics and path models.  Differences in the samples and explanations for variant 
findings across samples are presented.  Finally, conclusions are shared. 
Comparison of Sample Characteristics 
Demographics 
As can be seen in Table 34, the Wait List and Fragile Families samples were 
similar on many characteristics.  Some differences among the samples warrant 
recognition.  First, the Fragile Families sample appeared to be less independent in 
housing arrangements compared to the Wait List sample.  Members of the Fragile 
Families sample were more likely to live with friends/family, have more adults living 
with them in the household, and be living with their own parents/grandparents compared 
to members of the Wait List sample.  These differences in living arrangements are 
important because they could have an effect on parents’ child care choices and 
experiences of child care problems/child care-related work disruptions.  For example, the 
difference in living arrangement may be an indicator of social capital with participants 
who live with more adults having access to more resources through the people they live 
with.  Alternatively, living with few/no other adults may be an indicator of human capital 
with study participants who live with few/no other adults demonstrating human capital 













Household Incomea 21,927 16,255 5.70 *** 27,853 27,822 0.01
% FPL 163.01 120.75 5.71 *** 166.54 173.83 -0.55
Number of Adults in the Household 3.304 3.042 2.25 * 0.353 0.127 1.980 *
Relation to Adults in the Household
   Partner 0.296 0.306 -0.23 0.167 0.114 0.740
   Parent/Parent-in-law 0.294 0.236 1.36 0.093 0.046 0.930
   Grandparent 0.053 0.069 -0.72
   Other adult 0.304 0.250 1.25 0.204 0.091 1.600
Living Arrangements
   Rents 0.691 0.764 -1.71 † 0.796 0.886 -1.2
   Owns 0.055 0.035 1.08 0.074 0.068 0.11
   Lives with friends/family 0.247 0.188 1.49 0.111 0.046 1.23
   Temporary housing 0.006 0.007 -0.15 0.019 0.000 1
   Controlled housing 0.002 0.007 -0.69
Race
   Hispanic 0.409 0.444 -0.77 0.130 0.136 -0.100
   Black 0.401 0.424 -0.49 0.519 0.500 0.180
   Non-Hispanic, Non-Black 0.191 0.132 1.77 † 0.241 0.250 -0.100
   Unknown Race 0.111 0.114 -0.040
Mother's Age 24.420 23.972 0.95 30.630 30.114 0.380
Mother’s Education
   Less than high school 0.323 0.285 0.87
   High school/GED/Vocational 0.389 0.486 -2.10 * 0.407 0.341 0.670
   Some college/Bachelor's degree 0.265 0.222 1.03 0.593 0.659 -0.670
Mother in School 0.319 0.354 -0.79 0.111 0.364 -2.97 ***
Degree Studying For
   School for h.s. diploma/GED 0.049 0.035 0.77 0.000 0.000 NA
   School for Associates' 
degree/training/technical 0.162 0.208 -1.32 0.204 0.318 -1.29
   School for Bachelors' degree 0.084 0.069 0.55 0.093 0.046 0.9
   Other degree 0.025 0.042 -0.91
Mother's Employment Status 0.887 0.882 0.17 0.944 0.955 -0.22
Non-Traditional Work Hours 0.465 0.479 -0.30 0.426 0.409 0.17
Work Hours 36.278 34.431 1.94 * 35.972 35.125 0.34
Number of Children 1.000 1.000 NA 2.093 2.068 0.1
Proportion of Sample Approx. Age 3 0.488 0.569 0.09 †
Age of Youngest Focal Child 3.664 3.924 -0.72
Age of Oldest Focal Child 6.645 6.849 -0.31
Received Help Paying for Care 0.056 1.000 -92.63 *** 0.648 1.000 -5.36 ***
Sources of Help
    Non-custodial parent 0.020 0.000 3.19 ** 0.019 0.000 1
    Relative 0.004 0.000 1.42 0.130 0.070 0.96
    Employer/Foundation 0.000 0.000 NA NA 0.019 0.047 -0.75
    Child care provider 0.002 0.014 -1.20 0.222 0.186 0.43
    Other 0.029 0.132 -3.51 *** 0.056 0.000 1.77 †
Note.  Fragile Families results are unweighted. a  Inflated to 2005 dollars.  
 †≤.10, *≤.05, **≤.01, ***≤.001, two-tailed t-tests
Table 34. Comparison of the Wait List and Fragile Families Samples on Demographics and Other 
Characteristics
Fragile Families Wait List Study






 In the Wait List study, participants were older, better educated, had older children, 
were more likely to be working than in school, and were more likely to get assistance in 
paying for child care compared to participants from the Fragile Families sample. These 
characteristics taken as a whole lend support to the idea that the Wait List study 
participants had more human capital and resources than the Fragile Families sample. 
 Due to the selection of the sample for this study, participants in the Fragile 
Families sample had no more than one child in the household.  Consequently, the Wait 
List sample had more children in the household than the Fragile Families sample.  
Additionally, the range of ages of children in the Wait List sample was broad (5 months 
to 13 years) compared to the Fragile Families sample (10 months to 3.5 years).  Having 
more children in the household could be an asset, especially if the older children are able 
to contribute resources (such as child care services).  More likely, having more children 
would put additional financial strain on the family and provide more opportunities for 
parents to experience child care problems/child care-related work disruptions as parents’ 
risks for these outcomes increase with the number of children in care. 
Finally, there was less representation by Hispanics in the Wait List sample 
compared to the Fragile Families sample.  Though the Hispanic control indicator was 
significant in a number of regressions, the literature is inconsistent in interpreting how 
ethnicity affects child care choices and experiences of child care problems/child care-
related work disruptions (see Fuller et al., 1996; Huston et al.,2002).   
Outcomes 
Perhaps as a result of these variations in characteristics, the Wait List and Fragile 
Families samples differed somewhat on the proposed mediators and dependent variables 
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(See Tables 35 and 37).  The Wait List sample was more likely to use formal care 
(center/family day care provider) than the Fragile Families sample.  (For a detailed 
breakdown of child care type by age, see Table 36). Additionally, the Wait List sample 
was more likely to use multiple child care arrangements than the Fragile Families sample.  
Type of care and the choice/necessity of using multiple providers have both been 
established in the literature as variables that affect parents’ propensity towards 
experiencing child care problems and child care-related work disruptions (Knox et al., 
2003; Scott et al., 2005).  Additionally, because the Wait List sample was more likely to 
use formal care, it comes as no surprise that their financial burden of child care per child 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Finally, though the Fragile Families participants were more likely to experience 
child care problems, Wait List study participants were more likely to experience child 
care-related work disruptions.  Two data issues are notable with regard to these 
dependent variables. First, the measures of child care problems and child care-related 
work disruptions ask about the last month for the Fragile Families study and the last three 
months for the Wait List study.  Thus, the difference in experience of child care problems 
between the Wait List and Fragile Families samples may be understated.  Second, the 
survey questions for the child care-related work disruptions variable differed by study.  In 
Fragile Families, this question queried parents about missing work/school only.  In the 
Wait List study, this variable was created based on a number of potential child care-
related work disruptions (missing work, being tardy/leaving work early, having to change 
work hours due to child care, and having to make alternative arrangements for child care 
due to child care problems).  Thus, the difference between the Wait List and Fragile 













Proportion That Experienced Child Care 
Problems 0.318 0.222 2.22 ** 0.296 0.114 2.31 **
Number of Child Care Problems 0.663 0.563 0.73 0.519 0.227 1.47 †
Proportion That Experienced Child Care-
Related Work/School Disruptions 0.160 0.105 1.81 * 0.407 0.182 2.46 **
How Often Missed Work/School Due to 
Child Care Problems 0.367 0.287 0.73 0.778 0.250 2.72 **
Note. Fragile Famlies results are unweighted. 
†≤.10, *≤.05, **≤.01, ***≤.001, one-tailed t-tests
Fragile Families Wait List Study
Table 37. Comparison of the Wait List and Fragile Families Samples on Child Care Problems and Child Care-Related 
Work Disruptions Variables
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Comparison of Path Models 
 As seen in Figure 9 and Table 38, the unstandardized paths between child care 
subsidy status, financial burden, type of care, child care problems, and child care-related 
work disruptions vary somewhat between the Wait List and Fragile Families samples.  
For ease of comparison, path models for the youngest focal child from the Wait List 
sample and the only focal child in the Fragile Families sample are featured in Figure 9.  
To supplement the comparison of the path models, effect sizes for each direct effect in 
the model was computed.  Effect sizes are calculated by dividing each unstandardized 
path coefficient64 by the standard deviation of the dependent variable in that path.  Effect 
sizes provide a means for comparing models across samples.  Table 38 includes effect 
sizes for both the youngest and oldest focal child from the Wait List sample and the sole 
focal child of the Fragile Families sample.  The following path models and effect size 
table include as controls focal child’s age and numbers of children aged thirteen or under 
in non-parent/self/sibling care65 as these were the only controls that were available and 
significant for both studies.
                                                 
64 Unstandardized coefficients are used because standardized coefficients are standardized based on 
characteristics of the sample and thus are not comparable across samples. 
 
65 Number of children aged thirteen or under in non-parent/self/sibling care is automatically controlled in 
the Fragile Families sample because there is only one child (who is not in parent/self/sibling care) between 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































Sbsidy-CCprb -0.391 -0.362 -0.206
Sbsidy-Empprb -0.451 -0.458 -0.144
Sbsidy-Fburden -0.423 -0.417 -0.523
Sbsidy-Type Care 0.520 0.338 0.734
Fburden-Type Care 2.354 1.178 1.018
Fburden-Ccprob 0.658 0.626 -0.103
Fburden- Empprob 0.149 0.013 0.144
Type Care-Ccprob -0.211 -0.665 -0.055
Type Care- Empprob -0.356 -0.469 -0.014
Mediators-Dependent Variables
Note. Effect Size=Unstandardized Path/Standard Deviation of Dependent 
Variable.  Fragile Families results are unweighted. Focal child's age and 
number of children aged thirteen or under in care are the  only control 
variables. 






 As shown in Figure 9 and Table 38, parents who received a child care subsidy 
were less likely to experience a child care problem than parents who were not receiving a 
child care subsidy in both samples.  Parents who received a child care subsidy were less 
likely to experience a child care-related work disruption in the Wait List sample only.  
The magnitudes of these relationships were larger with the Wait List sample compared to 
the Fragile Families sample.  In both samples, having a subsidy was associated with a 
lower financial burden of care and a greater likelihood of using a formal child care 
provider.  Both of these relationships were stronger in the Fragile Families data compared 
to the Wait List data.  Having a higher financial burden of care was associated with 
greater likelihood of using formal care for both samples, though this relationship was 
stronger with the Wait List data.  Financial burden was not predictive of parents’ 
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likelihood of experiencing a child care problem or child care-related work disruption in 
either sample and the magnitude of effect sizes differed by sample with financial burden 
having a positive association with child care problems with the Wait List sample and a 
weak negative association with child care problems with the Fragile Families sample.  
The weak positive effect of financial burden on child care-related work disruptions was 
similar in both samples.  Use of formal care was not predictive of parents’ likelihood of 
experiencing child care problems or child care-related work disruptions in either model 
shown in Figure 966, though the effect sizes between these variables were larger with the 
Wait List sample.  Finally, the correlation between child care problems and child care-
related work disruptions was nearly identical in the Wait List and Fragile Families data.  
 In conclusion, the unstandardized path models using the Wait List (youngest focal 
child) and Fragile Families data show similar effects.  In both models, negative direct 
effects were found between child care subsidy status and the dependent variables and no 
indirect effects were found.  The effect sizes of paths tended to be stronger with the Wait 
List data, though the impact of child care subsidy status on the proposed mediators was 
stronger with the Fragile Families data.  In the next section, explanations for the slight 
variations in the models are explained. 
Explanations for Varying Effect Sizes between Samples 
 Variations in the findings of the Wait List and Fragile Families data may occur for 
a number of reasons.  First, children in the Fragile Families study were younger and there 
was less variation in their age compared to the Wait List sample.  Probably due mostly to 
this distinction in age, children in the Fragile Families study were also less likely to use 
                                                 
66 In the analysis of the oldest focal child from the Wait List sample, use of formal care was predictive of 
being less likely to experience child care problems. 
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formal care (M=.490, SD=.500) compared to children in the Wait List study 
(Myoungest=.827, SD=.381; Moldest=.796, SD=.405).  The variation in type of care used 
across samples could have affected the magnitude of relationships involving both type of 
care and financial burden (since formal care tends to be more expensive than informal 
care).  Variation in type of care across studies may also explain why the effect size of the 
subsidy/type of care relationship is so strong, as most parents using relative care do not 
obtain child care subsidies, thus leaving subsidy as a strong predictor of parents who use 
formal providers.   
Second, the measure of child care subsidy status comes from administrative data 
in the Wait List study and self-report data in the Fragile Families study.  As some parents 
likely did not know the source of their financial assistance in paying for child care, 
measurement error in the Fragile Families study may account for some variation in effect 
sizes involving the subsidy variable.  For example, this difference may explain, in part, 
why the effect sizes of direct effects between child care subsidy status and the dependent 
variables were smaller in the Fragile Families data. 
Third, the time frame for the child care problems and child care-related work 
disruption variables was longer in the Wait List study (three months) compared to the 
Fragile Families study (one month).  Additionally, the child care-related work disruption 
variable in the Wait List study incorporated a broader measure of disturbance compared 
to the Fragile Families study.  Each of these issues may have also contributed to smaller 
effect sizes involving the direct and indirect effects between the child care subsidy 
variable and the dependent variables in the Fragile Families sample. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, though the Wait List and Fragile Families samples were not 
perfectly comparable, these samples were similar on many characteristics.  Additionally, 
the path models in this chapter showed the relationships among variables to be similar 
across samples when the same controls were used.  Differences in relationships within the 
path models were largely attributable to differences in characteristics of the samples 





Chapter 8: Discussion 
 In this chapter, the results are reviewed and potential explanations for unexpected 
findings offered.  The degree to which the findings are consistent with the literature and 
rational choice theory are then evaluated.  Differences between the focal children in the 
Wait List study are reviewed and a note on the choice of two of the dependent variables 
for this study is provided.  Next, limitations of the study are detailed and implications of 
the study on policies, programs, and future research discussed.  Finally, conclusions from 
this study are presented. 
Summary of Key Findings 
There were six hypotheses for this study.  Three of the hypotheses tested the 
direct and mediated impact of child care subsidies on child care problems, child care-
related work disruptions, and parents’ desire to switch care using a static model and three 
tested these relationships using a change model.  As can be seen in Table 39, four of the 
six hypotheses in this study were supported.  
Table 39. Review of Hypotheses and Findings 
Hypothesis Results 
Static Model 
1a. Parents with a child care subsidy will 
be less likely to report child care problems, 
child care-related work disruptions, and a 
desire to switch care than parents who do 
not have a subsidy. 
Partially supported. Parents with a child care 
subsidy were significantly less likely to experience 
child care problems and child care-related work 
disruptions than parents without a subsidy.  This 
relationship was found in both the Fragile Families 
and Wait List data.  Additionally, in the Fragile 
Families data, parents who had a child care subsidy 
experienced fewer child care problems and child 
care-related work disruptions than parents who did 
not have a child care subsidy. 
1b. The relationships between child care 
subsidy receipt and child care 
problems/child care-related work 
disruptions/desire to switch care are 
mediated by at least one of the following 
variables: financial burden of care, 
perceived affordability of formal care, or 
type of care.   
Partially supported.  Type of care mediated the 
relationship between child care subsidy status and 
child care-related work disruptions (youngest focal 
child) in the Wait List sample.  No mediation effects 
were found in the Fragile Families sample, nor were 
financial burden/perceived affordability of formal 




1c. The relationships between child care 
subsidy receipt and child care 
problems/child care-related work 
disruptions/desire to switch care are 
mediated by the combined effects of type 
of care and financial burden/perceived 
affordability of child care. 
Partially supported. Though financial burden was 
not established as a mediator, the mediation effect 
between child care subsidy status and child care-
related work disruptions (among youngest focal 
children) through type of care was magnified when 
financial burden was added as an intervening 
variable in the Wait List analyses. A combined 
mediation effect was not found with the Fragile 
Families sample, nor was a combined mediation 
effect through perceived affordability of formal care 
and type of care found with the Wait List sample. 
Change Model (Wait List Sample Only) 
2a. Parents who were not receiving a child 
care subsidy at Time 1 and were receiving 
a child care subsidy at Time 2 will report a 
decrease in child care problems/child care-
related work disruptions/desire to switch 
care between time points. 
Supported. When parents began receiving a child 
care subsidy, they were significantly less likely to 
experience a child care problem, child care-related 
work disruption, or desire to switch care compared 
to when they were not receiving a child care 
subsidy.  Additionally, when they began receiving a 
child care subsidy, parents experienced fewer child 
care problems and child care-related work 
disruptions compared to when not receiving a 
subsidy. 
2b. The relationships between changes in 
child care subsidy receipt and child care 
problems/child care-related work 
disruptions/desire to switch care are 
mediated by at least one of the following 
variables: change in financial burden of 
care, change in perceived affordability of 
formal care, or change in type of care 
across time periods.    
 
Not supported. No mediation effects were found 
through the change in financial burden, perceived 
affordability, or type of care. 
2c. The relationships between changes in 
child care subsidy receipt and child care 
problems/child care-related work 
disruptions/desire to switch care are 
mediated by the combined effects of 
change in type of care and the change in 
financial burden/perceived affordability of 
child care across time periods. 
Not supported. No mediation effects were detected 
through the combined effects of financial burden or 
perceived affordability and type of care. 
Note. As a reminder, type of care was broken into two categories: formal care (including: child care 
centers, family day care providers, pre-kindergarten programs, Head Start, before and afterschool 
extracurricular programs) and informal care (including care provided by relatives, family, or friends). 
 
Impact of Child Care Subsidy on the Dependent Variables 
 As mentioned above, child care subsidy status was a negative predictor of two of 
the three dependent variables in cross-sectional analyses of both samples in this study: 
child care problems and child care-related work disruptions.  These relationships were 
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also found in a more conservative analysis among the same people over time using the 
Wait List data.  Thus, in the Wait List analyses, child care subsidies were found to 
decrease the likelihood and number of episodes of child care unreliability and, perhaps 
more importantly, decrease the likelihood and number of unreliable child care episodes 
that affect parents’ work.   
 Though the preponderance of evidence from this study suggests there is an effect 
of child care subsidies on child care problems and child care-related work disruptions, an 
alternative explanation for this finding is that selection effects are responsible for the 
differences in child care problems/child care-related work disruptions between those 
receiving and not receiving a child care subsidy.  In other words, it could be that parents 
who receive a child care subsidy are more likely to use reliable child care than those who 
do not receive a subsidy because of differences in their desire to use reliable care or other 
untested characteristics.  Results of the change analyses from the Wait List data, which 
found both the likelihood and frequency of child care problems/child care-related work 
disruptions decreased when parents changed child care subsidy status, lend support to the 
hypothesis that child care subsidy status affects child care reliability.  However, doubts 
about causal versus selection effects may remain. 
 In the change model, a change in child care subsidy status was predictive of a 
change in parents’ desire to switch care.  When parents in this analysis began receiving a 
child care subsidy, they were significantly less likely to desire switching their child care 
arrangements compared to when they were not receiving a child care subsidy.  
Additionally, an indirect association between child care subsidy status and parents’ desire 
to switch care through perceived affordability was found in the expected direction in the 
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static model using Wait List data.  Thus, some support for the hypothesis that child care 
subsidies allow parents to use care with which they are more satisfied was provided in 
this study. 
Indirect Effects of Child Care Subsidy Status on the Dependent Variables 
 Though the direct relationships between child care subsidy status and parents’ 
experiences with child care problems and child care-related work disruptions are 
interesting, the mechanisms through which subsidies affected the dependent variables in 
this study are, perhaps, even more valuable in terms of developing policy and program 
implications.  Two mechanisms were identified as having mediating or indirect effects on 
the relationships between child care subsidy status and the dependent variables. The first 
involved the cost of care (financial burden of care/perceived affordability of formal care) 
and the second was related to the type of care chosen.  Each of these mechanisms is 
explored further below. 
 Cost of care (financial burden/perceived affordability).  The first mechanism 
thought to influence the relationship between child care subsidies and the dependent 
variables is the cost of care.  Two interesting findings involved the cost of care.  First, in 
the analysis of Wait List parents over time, a decrease in financial burden for the same 
family over time was predictive of a decrease in child care problems.67  Second, 
significant indirect paths in the Wait List cross-sectional analysis were found between 
child care subsidy status and both child care-related work disruptions and parents’ desire 
to switch care through perceived affordability of formal care.68 Though a decrease in the 
                                                 
67 This relationship was slightly smaller but still significant when child care subsidy status was controlled.  
 
68 These paths were not tested in the Fragile Families data because the perceived affordability of formal 
care and desire to switch care variables were not in this dataset. 
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percentage of income a parent devoted to child care did have an independent effect on 
child care reliability (predicting a lower probability of experiencing a child care 
problem), neither measure of the cost of care (financial burden/perceived affordability of 
formal care) mediated the impact of child care subsidies on child care problems/child 
care-related work disruptions.  Thus, some evidence was found to suggest that cost of 
care affected child care reliability, but no evidence was found that the relationship 
between child care subsidy status and child care reliability/the effect of child care 
unreliability on parent’s work was due to the subjective or objective cost of care.  
Parents’ choice to switch child care providers in order to obtain more desirable care was 
affected by both the amount of money parents spent on child care and their perception of 
the affordability of formal care. 
 One explanation for the lack of a mediation effect between child care subsidy 
status and child care problems/child care-related work disruptions through financial 
burden involves the substitution of formal care for informal care with the addition of a 
subsidy.  The theory behind the conceptual model in this study assumed that families’ 
cost of care (financial burden) would decrease when a child care subsidy was obtained.  
However, some parents (12% of those in the Wait List sample) in the study used informal 
providers, who cost little or nothing, when a child care subsidy was not available and 
switched to formal care when the subsidy became available.  Upon receiving a child care 
subsidy, of those who switched from informal to formal care, a significant proportion 
(56% in the Wait List sample) actually had an increase in their financial burden of care 
(due to the co-pay associated with the subsidy).  The relationship between financial 
burden and child care problems/child care-related work disruptions becomes complicated 
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when this dynamic of substituting formal for informal care is introduced, because both 
receiving a subsidy and using informal care (two phenomenon that are negatively 
associated and assumed to have opposing associations with the dependent variables) can 
be associated with having a low financial burden.  Additionally, because data on the 
quality of child care were not available, the impact of substitution from low-quality to 
higher-quality care on financial burden was not accounted for. 
 The second explanation involves the theory underlying the relationships among 
child care subsidies, financial burden, and child care problems/child care-related work 
disruptions.  In developing this study, it was assumed that parents who are spending a 
high proportion of their income on child care are likely constrained by cost in their choice 
of providers. In other words, those with a low income are likely to have a high financial 
burden even with unreliable providers.  An alternate and competing explanation is that 
some parents are willing to pay a high proportion of their income on child care if it means 
they will obtain reliable care.69 Thus, it could be that a high financial burden of care is 
associated with having fewer child care problems/child care-related work disruptions.  If 
both of these explanations were applicable to different members within a sample, a 
mediation effect may have been cancelled out in the analysis of the whole sample.   
 The lack of mediation effects through perceived affordability of formal care in 
this study may be due to limitations of this variable.  Surveying parental perception can 
be challenging because subjective words such as “affordable” can be defined differently.  
The lack of a significant correlation between financial burden and perceived affordability 
                                                 
69 The financial burden of care per child in the Wait List study ranged from 0 to .73, with 20% spending 
more than one-third their income and 9% spending more than 50% of their income on child care.  
Similarly, in the Fragile Families sample, 13% spent more than one-third their income, and 6% spent more 
than 50% of their income on child care. 
165 
of formal care (see Appendix B) was one indication that the perceived affordability of 
formal care variable was inconsistently defined by participants in this study.  This lack of 
consistency may have contributed to the variation in results found with financial burden 
and perceived affordability of formal care. 
An alternative explanation for why perceived affordability of formal care might 
not mediate the relationships between child care subsidies and child care problems/child 
care-related work disruptions is that whether one perceives care as affordable may have 
little bearing on his/her child care choices.  Perceiving that one is not constrained fiscally 
from accessing the most expensive type of child care provider does not necessarily lead 
to purchasing expensive (which may be reliable/satisfactory) child care.  Using concepts 
from rational choice theory, parents will spend their money on things they perceive to be 
most useful to them.  Child care may rank lower than other priorities. In this case, parents 
may choose not to use expensive providers despite being able to afford such care.  
Alternatively, parents who are not fiscally constrained in child care choice may select 
care that offers benefits other than reliability (i.e. quality, convenience, etc.). Finally, 
when selecting a child care provider, parents may not be able to predict whether the 
provider will be reliable or not. 
 Type of care. As a brief review, the use of formal care differed across samples. 
More informal (relative) care was used for children in the Fragile Families sample 
compared to the Wait List sample. This was likely due to differences in the ages of 
children across samples and the well-documented association between child’s age and 
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child care choices70 (i.e. Burchinal & Nelson, 2000; Hofferth & Wissoker, 1991; Huston, 
Chang, & Gennetian, 2002; Mulligan, Brimall, West, & Chapman., 2005; Uttal, 2002).  
Type of care was found to have both direct and indirect effects on measures of 
child care reliability and episodes of child care reliability that affected parents’ work.  
The use of formal care was a significant negative predictor of both child care-related 
work disruptions among both focal children and child care problems among oldest focal 
children in the Wait List data. Type of care was also a mediator in the relationship 
between child care subsidy status and child care-related work disruptions among 
youngest focal children in the Wait List cross-sectional analysis.  Additionally, 
significant indirect effects between child care subsidy status and child care problems 
through type of care were found in analyses of the oldest focal child in the Wait List 
cross-sectional analyses.  Thus, this study does provide some evidence that a) formal care 
is more reliable than informal care, b) formal care providers are less likely than informal 
providers to cause an episode of child care unreliability that affects parents’ work, and c) 
part of the relationship between child care subsidy and child care reliability is explained 
by the type of care parents choose.  No significant mediation or indirect effects involving 
type of care were found in the Fragile Families analyses. The difference in distribution of 
type of care across samples and measurement differences in the child care problems and 
child care-related work disruptions variables across studies may help explain these 
differences in findings. 
                                                 
70 An alternative explanation for this difference in usage of formal care may have to do with the availability 
of formal providers who accept child care subsidies. State-level data are available on the provider 
acceptance rate of subsidies for the Wait List data (this acceptance rate was between 76%-81%), but no 
such data are available for the public use Fragile Families data. 
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 Type of care was not found to have direct or indirect relationships on parents’ 
desire to switch care arrangements.  This finding can probably be attributed to the wide 
amount of variation within formal and informal care.  In other words, although some 
parents desired to switch child care arrangements from informal to formal care, most 
parents who expressed a desire to switch care desired to pick a different provider within 
the same type of care. 
 The use of formal versus informal care is a crude measure of all the dynamics that 
can change when one receives a child care subsidy.  For example, with the receipt of a 
child care subsidy, parents may be able to discontinue their use of multiple providers,71 
use higher quality care, or establish a more reliable payment plan with their provider 
(which could lend itself to more tenure with that provider).  This study was limited in its 
ability to study these concepts because they were not measured and the sample size was 
small.  However, future studies should look at more nuanced effects of child care 
subsidies on child care choices as these choices may have policy and program 
implications. 
 Variation in the reliability and quality of child care arrangements are likely key 
factors in the explanation of why mediation effects, other than the effect detected among 
youngest focal children in the Wait List study, were not found through type of care. 
Variation in quality and reliability even among formal providers is supported in the child 
care literature (Doherty, Forer, Lero, Goelman, & LaGrange, 2006) and is a key concern 
for policymakers and administrators who are in charge of licensing and accrediting child 
care providers. 
                                                 
71 In the Wait List study, no significant change in use of multiple child care arrangements across time 
periods was found.  However, there were very few participants in the study who used multiple 
arrangements at either time period. 
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Cost-of-care/type of care combination. Evidence of combined mediation/indirect 
effects through financial burden and type of care on measures of child care unreliability 
and parental work disruptions resulting from child care unreliability were found in the 
Wait List data only.  These effects came in the form of a) a significant mediation effect 
involving financial burden and type of care between child care subsidy status and child 
care-related work disruptions among youngest focal children, and b) an indirect effect 
between child care subsidy status and child care problems through the combined effects 
of financial burden and type of care.  
Neither mediation nor indirect effects were found through the combined effects of 
financial burden and type of care in the Fragile Families data.  As mentioned, the lack of 
such effects in the Fragile Families data is likely due, at least in part, to parents’ child 
care choices and measurement issues with the child care problem and child care-related 
work disruption variables.  As mentioned, in the Fragile Families dataset, more of the 
sample used informal care as the primary provider compared to the Wait List sample.  
This difference in the distribution of the child care type variable may explain why this 
effect was found in one dataset and not the other.  Additionally, as mentioned, the child 
care problems and child care-related work disruption variables were asked only for the 
last month.  Thus, some parents may have experienced child care problems/child care-
related work disruptions in the last three months without being captured by this measure. 
Finally, due to the small sample size of the Wait List study, it may be that the parents in 
this sample are unique and no indirect relationship between child care subsidy status and 
child care problems through financial burden and type of care exists for most parents.   
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Other undetected mechanisms.  In conclusion, receipt of a child care subsidy did 
result in parents having fewer episodes in which child care unreliability affected their 
work.  Though part of this effect was attributed to the combined effects of financial 
burden and type of care, this mediation effect was small. A full mediation effect was not 
detected in any of the models with either dataset and it is safe to say that the conceptual 
model was not fully specified (i.e. not all variables that explain the relationships between 
child care subsidy status and the dependent variables were included in the model).  Other 
variables that might have a moderating effect on the relationship between child care 
subsidy status and the dependent variables include child-specific variables (i.e. 
disability), family-specific issues (i.e. access to transportation), variables specific to child 
care services (i.e. quality, availability), national/state-level influences (i.e. policies 
affecting the generosity of child care subsidies), etc. Inclusion of additional contextual 
variables in future studies is warranted.   
Consistency of Findings with the Literature and Rational Choice Theory 
Impact of Child Care Subsidies 
 The first main finding of this study is that parents with a child care subsidy were 
significantly less likely to experience and experienced fewer child care problems and 
child care-related work disruptions compared to parents without a child care subsidy.  
This finding is consistent with some of the literature on this relationship and the 
assumptions of rational choice theory.   
As was reviewed in Chapter 2, findings regarding the impact of child care 
subsidies on child care problems and child care-related work disruptions are consistent 
with two of the four cross-sectional studies in the literature: Press et al. (2006), who 
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analyzed parents who had applied, received, or been signed up for a child care subsidy in 
the last month, and Weinraub et al. (2005), who compared African American parents in 
Philadelphia who were and were not receiving a child care subsidy.  The findings from 
the change analysis of Wait List data (when parents were receiving a child care subsidy 
they were less likely to experience/experienced fewer child care problems and child care-
related work disruptions compared to when they were not receiving a child care subsidy) 
further supports the findings of Press et al. and Weinraub et al. because using the same 
parents over time is a more conservative analysis than a cross-sectional design.   
The finding that child care subsidy receipt was a significant negative predictor of 
parents’ experiences of child care problems and child care-related work disruptions also 
supports the assumptions of rational choice theory.  In accordance with the assumptions 
of this theory, parents who received a child care subsidy were provided resources that 
allowed them to choose more expensive child care, which is assumed to be more reliable.   
Findings from this study on the impact of child care subsidies on parents’ desire 
to switch care were not consistent across cross-sectional and change analyses.  No 
significant negative relationship was found between child care subsidy status and parents’ 
desire to switch care arrangements in the cross-sectional analysis of Wait List data.  This 
finding is consistent with both Weinraub et al. (2005) and Press et al. (2006), each of 
whom used cross-sectional designs and did not find a significant relationship between 
child care subsidy status and parents’ dissatisfaction with care/desire to switch care 
arrangements.  The change analysis of the Wait List data found that a change in child 
care subsidy status (from no subsidy to receiving a subsidy) perfectly predicted parents 
being less likely to desire to switch their care arrangement for their oldest focal child.  
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This finding is consistent with the findings of Berger and Black (1992), Wolfe and 
Scrivner (2004), and Brooks et al. (2002), each of whom found child care subsidies to be 
associated with greater satisfaction with child care.   
The findings described above suggest that financial constraints keep some parents 
from accessing their ideal provider.  The lack of a significant relationship between child 
care subsidy status and desire to switch care in the cross-sectional analysis of Wait List 
data may be due in part to the complexity of defining this dependent variable.  Parents’ 
desire to switch care may be a complex variable because parents may be dissatisfied with 
some aspects of their care and satisfied with other aspects.  Thus, parents in this study 
may have reported a desire to switch providers and yet not have been willing to switch 
because they did not want to lose whatever source of utility their provider was offering.  
This idea highlights the complexities involved in predicting a decision when the decision 
itself is complex.  Rational choice theory provides a basic framework for thinking about 
how parents make decisions, but it cannot accurately predict complex decisions without 
insight into parents’ evaluations of alternative choices.  For example, in predicting 
parents’ choices around switching child care arrangements, information on the 
characteristics of alternative child care options (i.e. location, trust, accessibility, and 
reliability) and parental preferences would be helpful (see Hofferth & Wissoker, 1992). 
Mediating Effects of Financial Burden, Perceived Affordability, and Type of Care 
 Using the Wait List data, a significant mediation effect on the relationship 
between child care subsidy status and child care-related work disruptions through type of 
care was found.  This finding was not surprising given the strong relationships in the 
literature between a) child care subsidy status and type of care (Huston et al., 2002; Lowe 
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& Weisner, 2004; Tekin, 2005; Weinraub et al., 2005; Wolfe & Scrivner, 2004), and b) 
type of care and child care-related work disruptions (Hofferth et al., 1991; Knox et al., 
2003).  It was surprising, given the literature, that no independent mediation effects were 
detected through financial burden/perceived affordability of formal care.   
The mediation effect found between child care subsidy status and child care-
related work disruptions through type of care is supported by the assumptions of rational 
choice theory (for details, see Chapter 2).  The lack of other mediation effects in this 
study, especially between child care subsidy status and the dependent variables through 
financial burden/perceived affordability of formal care, is not consistent with the 
assumptions based on rational choice theory put forth in Chapter 2.  According to these 
assumptions, obtaining a utility-enhancing resource, such as a child care subsidy, would 
minimize/alleviate financial constraints on parents’ choice of child care providers and 
would thus free them to choose a provider who is reliable and satisfactory.   
Due to the complexities involved in choosing a child care provider and evaluating 
satisfaction, the lack of mediation effects through financial burden/perceived affordability 
of formal care could be explained by rational choice theory if types of utility considered 
went beyond financial constraints.  For example, parents may prioritize unreliable 
providers who offer other sources of utility over reliable providers or parents may choose 
to stay with a provider despite a general desire to switch care due to some aspect of utility 
that provider offers (for example, convenience or high quality care, especially if the 
parent perceives this particular level of utility is unique to the provider).   
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Combined Mediating Effects of Financial Burden, Perceived Affordability, and Type of 
Care 
 The final major finding of the study, found only using the Wait List cross-
sectional analyses, was evidence of a mediation effect through the combined effects of 
financial burden and type of care.  This finding is consistent with findings in the literature 
that a) child care subsidy status is a significant predictor of child care-related work 
disruptions (Press et al., 2006; Weinraub et al., 2005), b) receipt of a child care subsidy 
affects families’ financial burden of care (Danzinger et al., 2001; Weinraub et al., 2005), 
and c) financial burden of care is associated with the type of care families select (Chin & 
Phillips, 2004; Fuller et al., 2002; Hofferth & Wissoker, 1991), and d) formal care is 
associated with fewer child care-related work disruptions than informal care (Hofferth et 
al., 1991; Knox et al., 2003).  Additionally, this finding is supported by the tenets of 
rational choice theory as financial burden was hypothesized to be a constraint affecting 
parents’ choice of care and ability to use reliable care (for details, see Chapter 2). 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, for the most part, the findings in this study are consistent with 
findings in the literature.  However, in some cases, such as in the direct relationships 
among child care subsidy status and child care problems, child care-related work 
disruptions, and parents’ desire to switch care, findings in the literature are inconsistent.  
Thus, through findings that support theorized effects of subsidies, this study adds to the 
literature in an important way. 
With regard to rational choice theory, the current study benefited from the 
framework that rational choice theory provides in thinking about how families make 
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decisions through an economic model.  A key limitation of rational choice theory that 
affected its usefulness in this study was the ability of this theory to explain complexities.  
Parents’ choices around child care, the multiplicity of constraints parents face in making 
child care choices, and parents’ definitions of concepts that can involve multiple and 
competing dimensions (i.e. parents’ desire to switch care) are not well explained by the 
hypotheses developed from rational choice theory without information on parents’ 
perceptions of alternatives and parents’ access to information that is not easily predictable 
(i.e. how reliable a child care provider will be).  That being said, the strengths of rational 
choice theory outweighed its limitations in framing this study. 
Differences between the Youngest and Oldest Focal Children 
 Before proceeding to the limitations of this study, two issues deserve explanation.  
The first of these is a review of differences in findings between the youngest and oldest 
focal children in the Wait List study.  Two focal children were included in the analysis of 
Wait List data.  In these analyses, a few differences in findings between these focal 
children emerged.   
With regards to multivariate cross-sectional results, the impact of child care 
subsidy status on each of the dependent variables was similar for the youngest and oldest 
focal children.  In terms of differences in the impact of child care subsidy status on the 
proposed mediating variables, child care subsidy status was a significant predictor of type 
of care for the youngest focal child in cross-sectional analyses.  This finding is not 
surprising given that the modal age of the youngest focal child was five years and 
findings in the literature report that parents tend to prefer formal care for preschoolers 
(Sonenstein et al., 2002). In the change analysis, a change in child care subsidy status 
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(from no subsidy to subsidy) was a significant predictor of change in type of care among 
oldest focal children (from informal to formal care).  This finding is also not surprising 
given that 65% of Wait List participants who received a child care subsidy received the 
county-provided subsidy that first went to pay for the oldest child’s (up to age 13) care 
and required the subsidized child be in formal care.  
Some of the relationships between proposed mediators and the dependent 
variables in the cross-sectional analyses differed by focal child.  First, the impact of 
financial burden on desire to switch care was found only for the youngest focal child.  
Since both financial burden and child care problems are family-level variables, this 
difference can be attributed to the age of the child.  Thus, this difference may reflect the 
higher cost of child care for younger children.  The effect of perceived affordability of 
formal care on the dependent variables did not differ by focal child except when type of 
care was controlled.  With this control added, perceived affordability of formal care 
became a significant predictor of child care-related work disruptions for the oldest focal 
child only.  This effect may be due to data issues involving the perceived affordability of 
formal care variable. Finally, the relationship between type of care and the dependent 
variables differed by focal child.  Type of care was a significant predictor of child care 
problems for the oldest focal child only.  This may be due to differences in the 
unreliability of informal care used for the youngest and oldest focal children.  For 
example, it may be that parents are more cautious and thus select more reliable informal 
providers for their youngest children compared to their oldest children (up to age 13) 
because they perceive their youngest children to be more dependent on the provider.   
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Child Care Problems and Child Care-Related Work Disruptions 
The second issue that deserves mention before proceeding to the limitations of 
this study involves the choice of child care unreliability measures in this study.  The 
dependent variables of child care problems and child care-related work disruptions were 
similar measures designed to obtain information on two unique concepts related to child 
care unreliability.  The child care problems variable was a measure of episodes of child 
care unreliability.  It was used in this study as a measure of whether and how often 
unreliable child care episodes happened, regardless of the outcome of these episodes.  
The child care-related work disruptions variable was a measure of the effects of episodes 
of child care reliability on parents’ work/school.  As these two dependent variables 
measure distinct concepts, both were included in this study and no index was created 
from these variables. 
Study Limitations 
 This study has a few key limitations that could be addressed in future studies.  
First, the study lacks measures of job tenure (how long participants remain at each job) 
and upward mobility within and across positions.  Inclusion of each of these dependent 
variables would allow a researcher to test the relationship between variables believed to 
affect parents’ ability to maintain work (i.e. child care problems, child care-related work 
disruptions, and a desire to switch care) and relevant employment outcomes.  It should be 
noted that because participants had to be employed in order to receive a subsidy, the 
effect of a subsidy on employment status could not be tested. 
Second, the two data sets used in this study are not comparable in terms of 
children’s ages.  This study analyzes data from a small sample of low-income mothers on 
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whom there is rich data, and replicates the analyses with a national sample.  Although the 
samples were comparable on many demographic features, the average age of children and 
variation in child’s age differed significantly between samples.72  Because child’s age is 
so central to many child care choices, this is a real limitation in comparing results from 
the two samples.   
Third, some of the variables from the Wait List and Fragile Families samples are 
not perfectly comparable.  For example, the dependent variables of child care problems 
and child care-related work disruptions were measured across different time frames in the 
two datasets.  Also, the scope of the child care-related work disruption variable differed 
across samples.  In addition to using variables with the same scope and measured across 
the same time frame, consistency in the reliability of measures across samples would 
have been preferred.  In the current study, the Wait List data had more reliable measures 
of child care subsidy status and household income, based on administrative data, than the 
self-reported Fragile Families data.  
Fourth, selection criteria imposed on data in this study limits the generalizability 
of the study.  In the Wait List study, only English-speaking parents were interviewed.  
Thus, results from this dataset should be generalized to Spanish-speaking parents with 
caution as the Latino culture may affect parents’ child care and employment choices.  
Additionally, the selection criteria that restricted members of the Fragile Families sample 
to those with one child in the household limits the generalizability of results using these 
data to families with multiple children. 
                                                 
72 The Wait List focal children varied in age from .42 to 13 years, whereas the Fragile Families focal 
children were approximately 1 or 3 years old. 
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Finally, in this study, sample size was an issue with both samples.  In the Wait 
List study, the small sample size due to the limited number of parents who had consented 
with the county to be approached for research projects precluded the researcher from 
using certain more appropriate statistical techniques and from including additional 
control variables.  Likewise, issues with the survey questionnaire that required the 
researcher to limit the Fragile Families sample to families with one child in the household 
resulted in a sample size that was insufficient for analyses of a change model.73  These 
sample size limitations along with limitations in the availability of relevant variables with 
the Wait List data restricted the number of control variables in the analyses.  As a 
consequence, child characteristics, such as behavior problems, disabilities, and health 
issues were not included. 
Study Implications 
 In this section, the implications of this study for future policies, administration of 
current programs, and future research are detailed. 
Future Policies 
 Impact of child care subsidies. With the passage of welfare reform, which 
requires parents to work, policies that effectively support low-income parents’ ability to 
maintain employment are necessary.  Findings from this study suggest that receiving a 
child care subsidy decreases the likelihood/frequency of experiencing child care 
problems, child care-related work disruptions, and a desire to switch care; three variables 
                                                 
73 Analyses testing bias in the samples revealed the Wait List sample to be similar in demographics to the 
Fragile Families sample.  No data were available to compare the Wait List sample to the population of 
persons eligible to receive a child care subsidy in the study county.  Additionally, analyses of demographics 
of the Fragile Families sample before and after the “one child per household” selection criterion revealed 
similar characteristics in both samples. 
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found by researchers to interfere with parents’ ability to maintain a job (see Chaudry, 
2004; Dodson, 2006; Holzer, 1999; and Holzer et al., 2001).  
As the efficacy of child care subsidies for maintaining employment was supported 
in this study using multiple datasets and methods, policies that fiscally support the 
continuation or growth of the child care subsidy program are justified. Additional funds 
for the child care subsidy program combined with more generous income eligibility 
requirements for the child care subsidy program would assist families who are 
establishing economic self-sufficiency (in terms of both welfare independence and 
freedom from debt) by maintaining steady employment.  Policies that increase the 
funding for child care subsidies, either through traditional allocations or more creative 
means (such as through bonuses to states whose subsidy recipients do not return or 
commence receiving welfare within two years of receiving a child care subsidy) would 
also support states in making the child care subsidy policy changes described below. 
In addition to policies that affect child care subsidy funding, changes to the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) could be adopted by states in order to expand the 
allowable activities for taking leave to cover child care problems. Six states (DC, IL, MA, 
MN, NC, VT) currently have expanded FMLA policies that allow parents time off to 
participate in their children’s school activities (National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2006).74   
Finally, new policies that address emergency child care (child care for parents 
who have experienced a child care problem) are justified as they might minimize the 
effect of child care problems on parents’ work.  These policies would likely be most 
                                                 
74 It deserves mention that unless the FMLA offered paid leave and some of the eligibility criteria for 
receiving FMLA leave changed, it might not be an effective intervention for many low-income parents. 
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successful if developed on the state level. Perhaps a tax credit could be given to providers 
who participate in an emergency care program in which they would leave one or two 
slots in their center/home open for children who need emergency care.  This policy might 
be most successful if targeted to large centers or child care chains that are more likely to 
be able to afford leaving a slot or two open (as compared to family day care providers). 
 Mediation findings.  Parents’ use of formal care mediated the relationship 
between child care subsidy status and child care-related work disruptions with the Wait 
List data.  This finding lends support to the need to maximize parental access to formal 
providers through child care subsidies by a) ensuring each state complies with CCDF 
regulations that provider reimbursement rates are maintained at or above 75% of the state 
market rate and that the assessment of market rates are conducted every two years (US 
DHHS, 2007), and b) providing bonuses to states who are successful in ensuring the 
accessibility of formal providers in both rural and urban areas of the state through quality 
set-aside activities.75 
Administration of Current Programs 
 Impact of child care subsidies.  Because this study found child care subsidies to 
be effective in intervening with variables assumed to affect parents’ ability to maintain 
work, one program administration implication is to ensure the accessibility and 
attractiveness of child care subsidies to parents.  As mentioned in the previous section, 
increasing funding for child care subsidy programs is one way in which access to the 
child care subsidy program can be improved.  However, many parents who are eligible to 
receive a child care subsidy do not do so.  In fact, recent estimates of the program uptake 
                                                 
75 These quality set-aside activities are community-level interventions and affect both subsidy recipients 
and non-subsidy recipients. 
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rate for child care subsidies range from 25-40% depending on the study (Goerge, 2006; 
Witte & Queralt, 2002).  Researchers have identified various reasons for low uptake 
rates.  These reasons include: a desire not to accept assistance from the government, a 
lack of knowledge/erroneous beliefs about eligibility for and services offered by the 
subsidy program, administrative policies that are burdensome to families (i.e. application/ 
recertification procedures and a mandatory requirement to establish a child support 
agreement), limited utility of the program due to high co-pays, and parents’ perception 
that children’s care will be compromised if a subsidy is received (Adams, Weinraub, & 
Shlay, 2006).76  Thus, in addition to making the child care subsidy program available, 
efforts at making it attractive and accessible are necessary in order for it to be an effective 
program.  Such efforts may include changing policies about wait lists so that when a 
family is temporarily bumped off the child care subsidy program or wait list (due to a 
lump sum child support payment, bonus at work, etc.) they do not lose their place on the 
wait list. Currently fourteen states have a wait list (AL, AR, FL, GA, IN, LA, MD, ME, 
MN, MS, NJ, PA, TX, VA); most of these states reevaluate the eligibility of parents on 
the wait list about every six months (US DHHS, 2007).  Also, adhering to the federal 
guideline that parents receiving a child care subsidy pay no more than 10% of their 
income on child care (Blau, 2001; Greenberg, Lombardi, & Schumacher, 2000) might 
make the child care subsidy amount seem more attractive to parents as they engage in the 
application/recertification process.77  Currently, among states who report co-payment 
                                                 
76 Qualitative studies on eligible parents’ choices not to access child care subsidies would deepen 
understanding regarding this phenomenon.  
77 In both the Wait List and Fragile Families samples, among parents receiving a subsidy, over 25% of 
parents had financial burdens that exceeded this 10% cap.  This recommendation is also important given 
the finding from the Wait List study that a decrease in financial burden for the same family over time was 
predictive of being less likely to experience a child care problem. 
182 
amounts in terms of percent income, the range of family income spent on child care is 0% 
to 17% (US DHHS, 2007).  Third, administrative policies that are flexible and family-
friendly, such as two-tiered income eligibility policies that allow families who are 
receiving a child care subsidy to remain on the subsidy program if their income increases 
slightly and application/recertification procedures that minimize parents’ need to take off 
work by allowing for online applications and phone interviews would be helpful.  States 
have engaged in innovative efforts to make the CCDF program more accessible.  Twelve 
states (AL, DC, FL, KY, MA, MN, MT, NJ, PA, VA, WI, WV) currently offer two-tier 
eligibility (US DHHS, 2007).  Additionally, seven states (CO, DE, KS, ME, MN, MT, 
VT) offer sliding scale co-pays that increase gradually as parents make more money (US 
DHHS, 2007).  In terms of worker-friendly application and recertification processes, 
states are increasingly using the internet to provide access to information on program 
eligibility and application materials.  Although most states still require parents to 
complete an in-person interview when applying, eight states (DE, MD, MS, MT, ND, 
OH, OK, TX) allow parents to apply for subsidies by mail and five states (DE, KE, OH, 
SD, VT) allow families to complete applications online (US DHHS, 2007). 
Mediation findings.  In terms of the role of type of care in mediating the 
relationships between child care subsidy status and child care-related work disruptions, a 
few program implications are warranted.  First, a rating for reliability could be added to 
the state rating systems implemented by states and child care resource and referral 
agencies.  These rating systems serve as an incentive/reward system to child care 
providers and a valuable source of information for parents selecting a child care provider.  
Second, child care resource and referral agencies could be commissioned to assist parents 
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and child care providers (particularly informal providers) in identifying options for 
emergency care before child care problems occur.  Through the resource and referral 
agencies, providers could be encouraged to build networks with other providers so they 
could refer parents to another provider should they be unable to provide care 
unexpectedly. Additionally, resource and referral agencies could develop a list of 
providers who are willing to take children whose usual provider is temporarily unable to 
provide care.  Finally, parents, particularly low-income parents, could be encouraged to 
have emergency child care plans should their provider be unexpectedly unavailable.  A 
program encouraging parents to develop emergency child care plans could be 
administered through child care providers in the form of flyers or during the parents’ 
orientations with providers.  If the other program suggestions listed above were 
implemented, parents could be given either the phone number of a resource and referral 
agency that knew of providers willing to offer emergency care or the name and phone 
number of a provider with whom their current provider had an agreement for providing 
emergency care. 
Future Studies 
 Future research on the impact of child care subsidies on parents’ ability to 
maintain work should be more inclusive of variables that may mediate and moderate the 
relationships between child care subsidy status and dependent variables of interest.  
Studies should include more nuanced measures of child care choices.  In particular, these 
measures should include indicators of child care quality.  Such measures would be 
helpful for two reasons: 1) child care quality is a potential point of intervention via 
provider education and other quality set-aside activities, and 2) measures of child care 
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choices that include only the type of care accessed are likely to miss aspects of care that 
could affect the relationships between child care choices and the dependent variables of 
interest.  Additionally, inclusion of contextual variables, such as characteristics of the 
child, family, and community, as well as state policies that affect the generosity of child 
care subsidies and regulation of provider quality that may moderate the effects found in 
this study, is warranted. 
 Inclusion of additional and more nuanced dependent variables would also be an 
asset in future studies.  Inclusion of a job tenure variable would be an asset to future 
studies as such a variable would assist in validating the link between variables thought to 
affect parents’ ability to maintain work (i.e. child care problems, child care-related work 
disruptions, and parents’ desire to switch care) and parents’ actual employment 
outcomes.  Additionally, including more nuanced measures of child care-related work 
disruptions (see Press et al., 2006) would be helpful in clarifying the role of different 
child care-related work disruptions on parental employment outcomes and offering 
insight into entrees for interventions. 
 In addition to each of the measures detailed above, future studies should do more 
work on two issues.  First, the causal direction underlying the relationship between child 
care subsidy status and child care choices should be explored.  For example, more 
complex modeling involving selection effects would shed light on the effect of selectivity 
on the impact of child care subsidies.  Second, the relationship between child care 
problems and child care-related work disruptions should be studied.  This is important 
because the inconsistency in effects of subsidies on these variables suggests that some 
families have protective factors that allow them to experience child care problems 
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without affecting their employment. Identifying these protective factors could be the first 
step in developing programs and policies that could intervene when parents experience a 
child care problem. 
 Finally, additional studies on the impact of child care subsidies could add to the 
knowledge of the field if a few research design issues were addressed.  First, researchers 
should use datasets that allow one to disaggregate by the age of the child as child’s age 
affects parental preferences for child care and employment.  Second, whenever possible, 
researchers should use administrative data for the child care subsidy variable.  Third, 
more qualitative inquiries of phenomenon, such as child care problems and child care-
related work disruptions would provide a deeper understanding of parents’ experiences 
and choices.  Finally, whenever possible, researchers should use a pre/post-test design 
when studying the impact of the child care subsidy program on dependent variables so 
causality may be established.   
Conclusions 
 Through its unique design, this study offers benefits to local and state 
administrators, policymakers, and researchers in the field of child care.  Its strengths 
include the use of administrative data and a pre-/post-test research design with the Wait 
List data and the use of a demographically similar national sample through the Fragile 
Families data.  Using these methods, this study addressed two critical issues in the field 
of child care: 1) the effectiveness of child care subsidies in intervening with variables 
assumed to facilitate parents’ ability to maintain employment and 2) the mechanisms 
through which child care subsidies have their effects.  This study found that parents who 
received a child care subsidy were less likely to experience and experienced fewer child 
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care problems and child care-related work disruptions than parents without a child care 
subsidy.  It also found that among parents who changed child care subsidy status over the 
course of the study, experiencing child care problems, child care-related work 
disruptions, and a desire to switch care were less likely and less frequent when parents 
were receiving a child care subsidy compared to when they were not receiving a child 
care subsidy.  Finally, this study found that the relationships between child care subsidy 
status and child care-related work disruptions were mediated through type of care and 
that the addition of financial burden as an intervening variable magnified this mediation 
effect.  Though this study has limitations, it adds to the body of literature on child care 
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Initials
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM
Child Care Subsidy Impact Study
I am over 18 years of age and wish to participate in a program of research being conducted by the Deparbnent
of Family Studies atthe University of Maryland College Park.
The purposes of this research are to 1) understand the impact of child care subsidies on families' financial
resources, and choices about employment and child care and 2) provide a general description of families on the
waiting lisVreceiving child care subsidies in Montgomery County, Maryland.
I understand that
o For the study, I will be asked to participate in two interview sessions. The first interview will last about
twenty minutes and will be conducted either by phone , at an office within the Montgomery County
Deparhnent of Health and Human Services, or at another location that is convenient o myself and the
interviewer. A second twenty-five minute interview will be conducted approximately six months later,
again either by phone, in an offrce at the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human
Services, or at another location that is convenient to myself and the interviewer.
o In addition to the two interviews, with my permission, the principal investigator will use my child care
subsidy records at the Department of Health and Human Services for information relevant to the
research study.
o Each time I complete an interview I will receive $10 in the form of cash.
o Information from completed interviews is confidential. I understand that the information I provide
will be grouped with information gathered from others in the study and that my name will not be used
for reporting and presentation of the study results. I also understand that the information I provide
will not affect my status on the child care subsidy waiting list or as a child care subsidy recipient.
Though staff at the Departrnent of Health and Human Services may be involved in recruiting me and
setting interview appointrnents for me, they will not have access to my completed interview.
I may experience some discomfort responding to personal questions regarding demographic information, my
child care choices, employment choices, and my financial resources. I may choose not to answer interview
questions that cause me discomfort and I can withdraw from the study or stop the interview without penalty
If I have any questions about this research project, I can contact Ms. Nikki Forry, Deparhnent of Family
Studies, 1204 Marie Mount Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742,202-641-7389 or Dr.
Sandra Hofferth, Deparhnent of Family Studies, 1204Marie Mount Hall, University of Maryland, College Park,
l,/D 20742,301-405-8501. If I have questions about my rights as a research subject or wish to report a
research-related injury, I can contact the Instifutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College
Parh MD 207 42; (e-mail) irb@deans. umd. edu ; (telephone) 3 0 | 40 5 42 12.
Participant's Name Date
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Revised on Monday, April4, 2005
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Participant' s Signature
Initials Date
PERMISSION TO ACCESS CHILD CARE SUBSIDY ADMIMSTRATTVB RECORDS
Child Care Subsidy Impact Study
I give permission forthe principal investigator of this $udy, Nikki Forry, underthe direction of Dr. Sandra
Hofferth, to access my child care subsidy adminishative records at the Montgomery County Deparhent of




Revised on Monday, April4, 2005
Laitials Date
EMERGENCY CONTACT INFORMATION
Child Care Subsidy Impact Study
Please provide the nameso phone numbers, and addresses of three people that would know where you axe should
the researcher be unable to contact you. By providing this information, you are giving the researcher
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IRB Manager
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College Park, Maryland 207 42-51,21
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The University of Maryland, College Park Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved
your IRB application. The research was approved in accordance with the University's
IRB policies and procedures and 45 CFR 46, the Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects. Please reference the above-cited IRB application number in any future
communications with our office resardine this research.
RecruitmenUConsent: For r.r"ui.n ..nlr.rn, written informed consent, the
IRB-approved and stamped informed consent document is enclosed. The IRB approval
expiration date has been stamped on the informed consent document. Please keep copies
of the consent forms used for this research for three years after the completion of the
research.
Continuing Review: If you want to continue to collect data from human subjects or
analyze data from human subjects after the expiration date for this approval, you must
submit a renewal application to the IRB Office at least 30 days before the approval
expiration date.
Re:
Modifications: Any changes to the approved protocol must be approved by the IRB
before the change is implemented except when a change is necessary to eliminate
apparent immediate hazards to the subjects. If you want to modify the approved protocol,
please submit an IRB addendum application to the IRB Office.
Unanticipated Problems Involving Risks: You must promptly report any unanticipated
problems involving risks to subjects or others to the IRB Manager at 301-405-0678 or
redson@umres arch.umd. edu.
Student Researchers: Unless otherwise requested, this IRB approval document was
sent to the Principal Investigator (PI). The PI should pass on the approval document or a
copy to the student researchers. This IRB approval document may be a requirement for
student researchers applyrng for graduation. The IRB may not be able to provide copies
of the approval documents if several years have passed since the date of the original
approval.
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Appendix E: Wait List Cross-Sectional Analyses Logistic Regressions  
B eB B eB B eB B eB
Subsidy -1.254 0.285 ** -1.269 0.281 ** -1.191 0.304 ** -1.188 0.305 **
(0.517) (0.515) (0.477) (0.468)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.053 0.948 0.016 1.017
(0.189) (0.144)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.064 0.938 -0.012 0.988
(0.109) (0.077)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.296 1.344 0.42 1.521 0.233 1.263 0.255 1.29
(0.265) (0.379) (0.231) (0.279)
Constant -1.127 -1.091 -0.788 -0.679
(1.011) (0.728) (0.766) (0.533)
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.065 0.056 0.057
Observations 98 98 98 98
Table 8. Wait List Regression of Child Care Problems and Child Care-Related Work Disruptions on Child Care Subsidy 
Child Care Problems (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
Child Care-Related 
Work Disruptions (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
Note.  Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-tailed.  a Oldest child eligible to receive a subsidy (up to age 13). 
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01  
 
B eB B eB
Subsidy -0.289 0.749 -0.171 0.843
(1.008) (1.052)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.563 0.57 **
(0.241)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.158 0.854
(0.183)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care -0.782 0.457 -0.518 0.595
(0.708) (0.674)
Constant 4.347 * 2.775 *
(1.910) (1.290)
Pseudo R2 0.213 0.119
Observations 30 30
Missed Part/Full Day Modeled, Alternative 
Arrangements as Omitted
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
Note.  Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-tailed.  a Oldest 
child eligible to receive a subsidy (up to age 13). 
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01




B eB B eB
Subsidy -0.228 0.796 -0.502 0.605
(0.543) (0.558)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.204 0.816
(0.165)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.078 0.925
(0.088)




Pseudo R2 0.060 0.028
Observations 95 95
Oldest Childa
Note.  Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-tailed.  a Oldest 
child eligible to receive a subsidy (up to age 13). 
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01
Table 10. Wait List Regression of Desire to Switch Care on Child Care Subsidy 
Desire to Switch Care (Yes/No)
Youngest Child
 
B sig. B sig. B eB B eB B eB B eB
Subsidy -0.066 * -0.065 ** 2.191 8.948 ** 2.3 9.978 *** 1.118 3.059 ** 0.744 2.105
(0.030) (0.026) (0.780) (0.756) (0.430) (0.584)
Child's Age (Youngest) 0.012 0.186 1.204 0.302 1.353
(0.011) (0.192) (0.289)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.016 ** 0.004 1.004 -0.607 0.545 **
(0.005) (0.081) (0.245)
Children Aged 13 or 
Under In Care -0.035 * -0.007 0.366 1.442 0.372 1.45 0.06 1.062 1.124 3.078
(0.018) (0.019) (0.316) (0.307) (0.848) (0.737)
Constant 0.194 *** 0.301 *** -0.416 0.129 0.016 3.919 *
(0.056) (0.037) (0.909) (0.675) (2.055) (1.975)
R2/Pseudo R2 0.108 0.176 0.165 0.155 0.080 0.310
N 98 98 98 98 98 98
Table 11. Wait List Regression of Proposed Mediators on Child Care Subsidy
Note.  Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-tailed. a Oldest child eligible to receive a subsidy (up to age 13).


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B eB B eB B eB B eB
Subsidy -1.254 0.285 ** -1.097 0.334 * -1.269 0.281 ** -1.087 0.337 *
(0.517) (0.515) (0.515) (0.601)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.053 0.948 -0.066 0.936
(0.189) (0.174)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.064 0.938 -0.157 0.855
(0.109) (0.109)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.296 1.344 0.366 1.442 0.42 1.521 0.675 1.965 *
(0.265) (0.262) (0.379) (0.343)
Financial Burden of Care 1.595 4.929 1.595 4.927
(1.842) (2.035)
Formal Care  -0.501 0.606 -1.564 0.209 *
(0.760) (0.738)
Constant -1.127 -1.109 -1.091 -0.031
(1.011) (1.174) (0.728) (1.185)
Pseudo-R2 0.061 0.071 0.065 0.113
N 98 98 98 98
B eB B eB B eB B eB
Subsidy -1.191 0.304 ** -1.084 0.338 * -1.188 0.305 ** -1.113 0.329
(0.477) (0.509) (0.468) (0.509)
Child's Age (Youngest) 0.016 1.017 0.04 1.041
(0.144) (0.148)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.012 0.988 -0.09 0.914
(0.077) (0.087)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.233 1.263 0.256 1.292 0.255 1.29 0.423 1.527
(0.231) (0.237) (0.279) (0.268)
Financial Burden of Care 0.337 1.4 0.063 1.065
(1.698) (1.891)
Formal Care  -0.75 0.473 -1.027 0.358
(0.516) (0.605)
Constant -0.788 -0.403 -0.679 0.328
(0.766) (0.817) (0.533) (0.973)
Pseudo-R2 0.056 0.069 0.057 0.077
N 98 98 98 98
B eB B eB B eB B eB
Subsidy -0.228 0.796 -0.21 0.81 -0.502 0.605 -0.555 0.574
(0.543) (0.608) (0.558) (0.587)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.204 0.816 -0.172 0.842
(0.165) (0.193)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.078 0.925 -0.145 0.865
(0.088) (0.114)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.54 1.716 ** 0.508 1.662 * 0.462 1.587 * 0.535 1.708 *
(0.229) (0.281) (0.286) (0.325)
Financial Burden of Care -1.807 0.164 -1.759 0.172
(1.641) (1.464)
Formal Care  -0.729 0.482 -0.547 0.578
(0.784) (0.686)
Constant -0.067 0.741 -0.333 0.722
(0.775) (0.849) (0.599) (1.097)
Pseudo-R2 0.060 0.088 0.028 0.045
N 95 95 95 95
Note. Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-tailed.  a Oldest child eligible to receive a 
subsidy (up to age 13).
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01 
Desire to Switch Care (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Child Care-Related Work Disruptions (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
(1) (2) (1) (2)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Table 17. Wait List Regressions of Child Care Problems, Child Care-Related Work Disruptions and Desire to 
Switch Care on Child Care Subsidy, Financial Burden, and Type of Care
Child Care Problems (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
 
197 
B eB B eB B eB B eB
Subsidy -1.254 0.285 ** -1.344 0.261 ** -1.269 0.281 ** -1.409 0.244 **
(0.517) (0.545) (0.515) (0.603)*
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.053 0.948 -0.065 0.937
(0.189) (0.185)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.064 0.938 -0.185 0.831 *
(0.109) (0.115)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.296 1.344 0.275 1.316 0.42 1.521 0.619 1.856 *
(0.265) (0.244) (0.379) (0.336)
Perceived Affordability of Formal 
Care 0.52 1.682 0.88 2.411
(0.728) (0.623)
Formal Care  -0.298 0.742 -1.624 0.197 *
(0.690) (0.765)*
Constant -1.127 -1.196 -1.091 -0.031
(1.011) (1.286) (0.728) (1.173)
Pseudo-R2 0.061 0.069 0.065 0.121
N 98 98 98 98
B eB B eB B eB B eB
Subsidy -1.191 0.304 ** -1.301 0.272 ** -1.188 0.305 ** -1.405 0.245 **
(0.477) (0.523) (0.468) (0.543)
Child's Age (Youngest) 0.016 1.017 0.02 1.02
(0.144) (0.149)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.012 0.988 -0.108 0.897
(0.077) (0.085)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.233 1.263 0.211 1.235 0.255 1.29 0.411 1.508
(0.231) (0.222) (0.279) (0.281)
Perceived Affordability of Formal 
Care 0.798 2.221 1.12 3.064 *
(0.571) (0.581)
Formal Care  -0.746 0.474 -1.28 0.278 *
(0.508) (0.605)
Constant -0.788 -0.765 -0.679 -0.105
(0.766) (0.811) (0.533) (0.844)
Pseudo-R2 0.056 0.083 0.057 0.104
N 98 98 98 98
B eB B eB B eB B eB
Subsidy -0.228 0.796 0.314 1.369 -0.502 0.605 -0.115 0.892
(0.543) (0.598) (0.558) (0.583)
Child's Age (Youngest) -0.204 0.816 -0.16 0.852
(0.165) (0.179)
Child's Age (Oldest)a -0.078 0.925 -0.121 0.886
(0.088) (0.112)
Children Aged 13 or Under In Care 0.54 1.716 ** 0.682 1.978 ** 0.462 1.587 * 0.636 1.889 *
(0.229) (0.311) (0.286) (0.323)
Perceived Affordability of Formal 
Care -1.618 0.198 ** -1.267 0.282 *
(0.675) (0.631)
Formal Care  -1.007 0.365 -0.461 0.631
(0.770) (0.696)
Constant -0.067 1.474 -0.333 0.877
(0.775) (0.994) (0.599) (1.078)
Pseudo-R2 0.060 0.133 0.028 0.074
N 95 95 95 95
Note. Tests of significance for regression coefficients are one-tailed.  a Oldest child eligible to receive a subsidy (up to 
age 13).
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01 
Desire to Switch Care (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Child Care-Related Work Disruptions (Yes/No)
Youngest Child Oldest Childa
(1) (2) (1) (2)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Table 18. Wait List Regressions of Child Care Problems, Child Care-Related Work Disruptions, and Desire to Switch Care 
on Child Care Subsidy, Perceived Affordability of Formal Care, and Type of Care
Child Care Problems (Yes/No)
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